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

MEMOIRS

OF THE

LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF

THE HONOURABLE

HENRY HOME OF KAMES,

ONE OF THE SENATORS OF THE COLLEGE OF JUSTICE, AND ONE OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF JUSTICIARY IN SCOTLAND:

CONTAINING

SKETCHES

OF THE

PROGRESS OF LITERATURE AND GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN SCOTLAND DURING THE GREATER PART OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

BY THE HONOURABLE

ALEX. FRASER TYTLER OF WOODHOUSELEE,

ONE OF THE SENATORS OF THE COLLEGE OF JUSTICE, AND ONE OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF JUSTICIARY IN SCOTLAND.

C'est pécher contre le Public que de taire la vertu des Hommes illustres: C'est envier l'honneur que méritent les uns, et ravir aux autres le bonheur de les imiter. *Panég. du Sully, par* DE CHEVRY.

SECOND EDITION,

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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APPENDIX.

No. I.

Biographical Notices *of some* Scotsmen, *eminent in Classical Literature, who flourished in the period from the end of the Sixteenth to the beginning of the Eighteenth Century.*

1. Robert Johnston was author of *Historia Rerum Britannicarum, &c. ab anno* 1572 *ad annum* 1628, Amstel. 1655, a work of great merit, whether we consider the judicious structure of the narrative, the sagacity of the reflections, the acute discernment of characters, or the classical tincture of the style. In those passages of his History where there is room for a display of eloquence, he is often singularly happy in touching those characteristic circumstances which present the picture strongly to the mind of the reader,

without a vain parade of words, or artificial refinement of sentiment. We may cite as an example his description of the death of Mary Queen of Scots, *Lib.* iv. *sub anno* 1586; and the circumstances attending the death of Essex, with the author's reflections on that event, *Lib.* ix. *sub anno* 1601. A translation of this work, with notes, in the manner of commentary, would be a most acceptable present to the public; but it would require a writer of superior ability, and deeply read in the history of the times, to do justice to such an undertaking. Johnston was one of the executors of George Heriot, jeweller to King James VI. the founder of the magnificent Hospital for the education of orphans at Edinburgh, which bears his name: and the historian informs us that the endowment, splendid as it is, would have been greatly more so, *si Reges* (meaning James and Charles) *et Buckingamius obligatam fidem liberâssent.*

2. ROBERT BAILLIE, author of a very learned work, *Opus Historicum et Chronologicum in quo Historia sacra et profana compendiosè deducitur ex ipsis fontibus, a creatione mundi ad Constant. Magn.* Amstel. 1688; but better known as the author of *Letters and Journals from* 1637 *to* 1662, published at Edinburgh in 1775, which give a very curious account of the negotiations between the Scots Covenanted Presbyterians and their

brethren of England in the latter part of the reign of Charles I *. Baillie had been educated at Glasgow, in the time when Episcopacy was established in Scotland, and had received holy orders from Law, Archbishop of Glasgow; but in 1640, he devoted himself entirely to the party of the Covenanted Lords, who sent him to London to draw up heads of accusation against Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, on the score of the innovations which that prelate had introduced into the ritual and mode of worship in Scotland. He was a man of considerable penetration, whose active and intriguing spirit fitted him for performing a distinguished part in times of anarchy and national commotion. His talents had recommended him to the Duke of Lauderdale, by whose interest he was made principal of the University of Glasgow in 1661. It has been already mentioned, (in the second page of these Memoirs), that a daughter of Robert Baillie, married to Mr Walkinshaw of Barrowfield, was the grandmother of Lord Kames.

3. ALEXANDER CUNNINGHAME, author of the *History of Great Britain from the Revolution in*

* His account of the Trial of Strafford, exhibits a most painful proof, to what degree the spirit of Party is capable of subduing the best feelings of Human Nature.

1688 *to the Accession of George I. in* 1714, (translated from the Latin original by Dr Thomson, and published at London in 1787, in two volumes 4to). This work, which comprehends the annals of a very interesting period, is written with judgment and candour; and being the composition of a person actively engaged in several of the public transactions which he records, contains many curious anecdotes and facts not to be found in other historians. Cunninghame, by birth a Scotsman, was educated in Holland, where he lived in intimacy with the Scottish and English refugees at the Court of the Prince of Orange; and particularly with the Earls of Argyle and Sunderland, and Mr Carstares, afterwards confidential secretary for Scottish affairs to King William. The Earl of Argyle appointed him tutor to his son Lord Lorn, a young man of uncommon talents, known, at a subsequent period, in the first rank of British statesmen, by the title of John, Duke of Argyle. Cunninghame, while abroad, carried on a regular confidential correspondence with the Ministry, and was afterwards honoured with the office of resident from the British Court to the Republic of Venice. A coincidence of name has led to the confounding of the historian with Alexander Cunninghame, the celebrated editor and emendator of Horace, and the antagonist of Bently; but the evidence produced by Dr Thomson, in a very elaborate pre-

face to Cunninghame's *History*, leads to a strong presumption that they were different persons: and a late writer, under the signature of *Crito*, in the *Scots Magazine* for October 1804, seems to have put this fact beyond question; the editor of Horace having died at the Hague in 1730, and the historian at London in 1737. The style of the original work, as appears from the specimens given by the translator, is in general correct, and sufficiently perspicuous; but has no pretension either to elegance or classical purity. It is chiefly remarkable for expressing with ease, ideas peculiar to modern life and manners. It was a difficult matter, as his translator justly remarks, "to express the humours of the people of Eng-"land on the occasion of a general election, the "extravagance of the Londoners at the time of "Dr Sacheverell's trial; and the temporary im-"portance of butchers with marrow-bones and "cleavers, chairmen, porters, chimney-sweeps, "link-boys, and blackguards." But that a task even of this kind could be atchieved, in consistence with the purity of the Latin idiom, had been before evinced by Buchanan and Robert Johnston; not to mention the writers of other nations, Strada, Grotius, and Thuanus.

4. PATRICK HUME, author of a most elaborate and learned *Commentary on the Paradise Lost of Milton*, published, London 1695, in folio, "to

"which, (says Mr T. Warton), "some of his "successors in the same province, apprehending "no danger of detection from a work rarely in-"spected, and too pedantic and cumbersome to "attract many readers, have been often amply "indebted, without even the most distant hint "of acknowledgment," (Warton's edition of Milton's *Lesser Poems, &c.* Pref.) That great depredations have been frequently made on the labours of Patrick Hume is certain; but the wonder is, that the plunderers should ever have hoped for concealment; for the edition to which the commentary is usually subjoined, is one of the most splendid and beautiful that have ever been published of the *Paradise Lost;* and the notes display such a depth of erudition and elaborate research, as could scarcely fail to procure them the attention of all the learned readers of Milton. But it is a disgrace to his age, that their author should have met with so much neglect that not a trace is now to be discovered of his history or character.

5. Mr JOHN SAGE, a Bishop of the Old Episcopal Church of Scotland, a man of great learning, worth and piety, and of uncommon acuteness as a controversial writer in defence of the church to which he belonged. He was profoundly skilled in all the ancient languages, which gave him an eminent advantage over his adver-

saries, the most distinguished of whom was Mr GILBERT RULE, Principal of the College of Edinburgh, who, with much zeal, and no mean ability, was overmatched by the superior learning and historical knowlege of his antagonist. Sage was born in 1652, the son of Captain Sage, a gentleman of Fifeshire, and an officer of merit in Lord Duffus's regiment, who fought on the side of the Royalists, when Monk stormed Dundee in 1651. The chief writings of Bishop Sage are, *The Fundamental Charter of Presbytery*, London 1693; *The Principles of the Cyprianic Age*, London 1695; *A Vindication of that Work*, London 1701; *The Life of Gawin Douglas, Bishop of Dunkeld*, prefixed to Ruddiman's edition of *The Translation of Virgil's Æneis*, Edinburgh 1710; An *Introduction to Drummond's History of the Five Jameses*, Edinburgh 1711. The *Life of Sage* was well written by Mr John Gillan, a Bishop of the same church, published at London in 1714; and several interesting notices of him are given in Mr Chalmers's instructive and curious *Life of Ruddiman*.

I shall mention a few other writers who do honour to Scotland, and who may be ranked in the class of elegant, though not profound scholars, during the same unfavourable period, from the beginning of the reign of Charles I. till the Revolution.

1. WILLIAM DRUMMOND *of Hawthornden*, whose various talents, improved by a most liberal education, and polished by a long residence in foreign countries, fitted him to be the ornament of a court, and to shine conspicuously as a public character; from an amiable diffidence and modesty, and a mind insensible to the allurements of ambition, chose to devote his life to studious retirement, and the cultivation of polite literature; for which he had the best accomplishment, in the knowledge he possessed of most of the ancient and modern languages. He inherited a native poetic genius, but vitiated by the false taste which prevailed in his age,—a fondness for the conceits of the Italian poets, *Petrarch* and *Marino*, and those of the same school among the French, *Ronsard*, *Bellai*, and *Du Bartas*. Yet many of his sonnets contain simple and natural thoughts clothed in great beauty of expression. His poem entitled *Forth Feasting*, which attracted the envy as well as the praise of BEN JOHNSON, is superior, in harmony of numbers, to any of the compositions of the cotemporary poets of England; and is, in its subject, one of the most elegant panegyrics that ever were addressed by a poet to a prince. In prose writing, the merits of Drummond are as unequal as they are in poetry. When an imitator, he is harsh, turgid, affected and unnatural; as in his *History of the Five Jameses*, which, though judicious in the arrangement of the matter, and abounding in

excellent political and moral sentiments, is barbarous and uncouth in its style, from an affectation of imitating partly the manner of Livy, and partly that of Tacitus. Thus, there is a perpetual departure from ordinary construction, and frequently a violation of the English idiom. In others of his prose compositions, where he followed his own taste, as in the *Irene* and *Cypress-Grove*, and particularly in the former, there is a remarkable purity and ease of expression, and often a very high tone of eloquence. The *Irene*, written in 1638, is a persuasive to civil union, and the accommodation of those fatal differences between the King and the People, then verging to a crisis: It is a model of a popular address; and, allowing for its pushing too far the doctrine of passive obedience, bears equal evidence of the political sagacity, copious historical information, and great moral worth and benevolence of its author.—Drummond died in 1649, in the sixty-fourth year of his age, a few months after the murder of his sovereign Charles I.

2. *The Reverend Mr* NINIAN PATERSON, author of an amusing miscellany, entitled, *Epigrammatum Libri Octo, cum aliquot Psalmorum paraphrasi poeticâ*, Edinburgi 1678. He was minister of Liberton in the reigns of Charles II. and James II. He designs himself *Glasguensis*, and was probably a relation of John Paterson, Bishop

of Galloway, afterwards Archbishop of Glasgow, to whom he addresses several of his poems. His *Epigrammata* are curious, as commemorating all the remarkable men of his own time. They are often extremely happy in the turn of thought, and written in easy numbers and good Latinity; The following specimen appears to me to possess much tenderness and beauty, both of sentiment and expression:

Ad filium infantem dum ejularet.

Parve, quid, heu, lacrymis teneros corrumpis ocellos?
An cum luce tibi sors quoque damna dedit?
Nulla tuum lædit mendax infamia nomen,
Nec nocet insani lis rabiosa fori:
Præsentis non cura coquit, terrorve futuri,
Lascivusve vorat mollia corda furor.
Te neque suspensis ludit spes anxia votis,
Nec tibi pauperies horrida tela quatit.
Damna gemis forsan nimiùm meâ, præcoce curâ,
Plùs nimis (O infans!) hac mihi parte loquax:
Mœstave præludunt propriis præsagia fatis,
Et tecum tenero crescit ab ungue dolor!
At, precor, hos fletus maturos differ in annos,
Tum plùs fortè satis cur lacrymeris erit;
Quin potiùs senii solamen vivito nostri,
Si datur, et matri gaudia longa feras.

Paterson appears to have suffered much calumny from the puritanical party of his times, whom

his poetical satire probably galled and exasperated. In a miserable production, entitled, *An Answer to Scots Presbyterian Eloquence Displayed*, (the original piece and the answer, equally infamous and disgraceful libels,) he is stigmatized as a hypocrite in religion, and a profligate in his manners: but, from his writings, he appears to have been a man of piety and virtue.

Sir GEORGE MACKENZIE *of Rosehaugh*, one of the most distinguished characters of his time, was the son of Simon Mackenzie of Lochsline, and nephew of George, first Earl of Seaforth. He was born at Dundee in 1636, and educated at the Universities of Aberdeen and St Andrew's. At the age of sixteen, he went abroad, and studied the civil law in the University of Bourges. He put on the gown of a barrister in the twentieth year of his age; and although his mind seems to have had a strong bent to the prosecution of general literature, the ardour with which he applied himself to the profession of the law, together with a copious and animated elocution, raised him in a few years to the greatest eminence at the Scottish bar. Yet, judging from his writings, his talents appear to have been rather splendid than solid. He certainly possessed uncommon assiduity and activity of mind, as the number and variety of his compositions testify: and perhaps the superficial manner in which he

has treated many of those subjects foreign to his profession, is the less to be wondered at, in a man whose time was so occupied in professional duties. The obscurity and confusion that are discernible in some of his juridical discussions, may have arisen in a great measure from the rude, unmethodized, and almost chaotic state of the law of Scotland, both civil and criminal, in his days. We do not judge candidly of the merit of those older authors, who wrote before the law was systematized, and who were themselves the first to bring it into method, when we compare their efforts in clearing a path through a trackless forest, to the advances of their successors on a beaten road, and through an improved and polished country. We ought never to forget the difficulties which the former had to encounter, nor the advantages which the latter have derived from their labours; availing themselves of all their discoveries, and profiting even by their errors. On one account alone, although every other merit were forgotten, Sir George Mackenzie is entitled to respect as a lawyer. He was the first who exploded from the practice of the criminal courts of Scotland, that most absurd and iniquitous doctrine, That no defence was to be admitted in exculpation from a criminal indictment which was contrary to the libel: as, if *John* were accused of having murdered *James*, by giving him a mortal wound with a

sword, it was not allowable for John to prove in his defence, that the wound was not given in any vital part, and that James died of a fever caught afterwards by contagion. It appears strange to us, that a doctrine or rule so repugnant to common sense, should require a serious confutation; but the annals of our criminal court, and the writings of foreign jurists, shew, that it was of long and inveterate prevalence, not only in this country, but in the most polished nations of Europe.—Sir George Mackenzie, in the exercise of his duty of King's Advocate in the reign of Charles II. incurred of necessity the resentment of the party of the Covenanters; and perhaps it is not without reason that his conduct on some of the Treason trials of that period has been censured even by writers of constitutional principles *. But it is not so much the public character of Sir George Mackenzie that warrants any notice of him in this place: It is in the capa-

* A more attentive and minute investigation into those trials, (particularly the trial of Mitchel for an attempt to assassinate the Archbishop of St Andrew's,) has induced the author, upon full conviction, to alter the opinion expressed in the first edition of this work, and to allow, that the conduct of Sir George Mackenzie on some of those trials was much more deserving of blame than of encomium. But on this I may possibly find a more proper occasion to make some remarks.

city of an elegant scholar, that I have ranked him among the ornaments of his age and country. His Latin compositions are correct and classical in no common degree. His style is evidently formed on the writings of Cicero and the Younger Pliny; and though a little tinctured with the more florid eloquence of Quinctilian, is entirely free from the false embellishments and the barbarisms of the writers of the lower ages. His *Idea Eloquentiæ forensis*, is a masterly tractate, which enumerates and eloquently describes all the important requisites of a pleader, and gives the most judicious precepts for the cultivation of the various excellencies, and the avoiding of the ordinary defects of forensic elocution. His *Characteres quorundam apud Scotos Advocatorum*, evince a happy talent for painting, not only the great and prominent differences of manner in the pleaders of his age, but of discriminating, with singular nicety, and in the most appropriate terms, the more minute and delicate shades of distinction, which a critical judgment alone could perceive, and which could be delineated only by a master's hand. Sir George Mackenzie retired at the Revolution from all public employment; and died, a short time after, at London, 1691, in the fifty-fifth year of his age.

APPENDIX.—NO. II.

ART. I.—LETTER *from Mr* HENRY HOME *to the Reverend Dr* SAMUEL CLARKE.

Edinburgh, August 1723.

REVEREND SIR,

THE same inclination for the benefit and instruction of mankind, that engaged you first to publish to the world your excellent *Sermons upon the Being and Attributes of the Deity*, will, I am hopeful, prevail upon you frankly to give your assistance to a young philosopher, though a stranger, whose misfortune it is to have yet some remaining difficulties, after the strictest perusal of your book: Nor do I want precedents in this boldness; and the obliging as well as satisfactory returns you have given to your former correspondents, makes me not despair of success.

Not to waste your time with apologies, I shall begin with the demonstrations of your second proposition, neither of which, (pardon my weakness,) can I prevail upon myself to think accurate; and both for the same reasons; for you connect two ideas which in this proof are neces-

sarily distinct, viz. self-existence and necessity; for, upon the present supposition, though it is granted that not a link of the chain is self-evident, yet it certainly follows, that each is necessary; from this plain reason, that the whole is reckoned so. It is unreasonable, therefore, to take for granted, that none of the series is necessary, when the direct contrary is the most immediate consequence that possibly can be drawn from the supposition, which stands at length thus: There has been infinite succession of beings produced one from another, in an endless progression, none of which are self-existent, because each owes the cause of its being to the preceding; but the whole, and consequently every one, is necessary, upon this account, that there is something in the nature of every individual that works necessarily in the production of that immediately following.

Dear Sir, I am heartily convinced, even without a demonstration, of the wildness of this position; but I would gladly not rest here, not doubting but there are *data* sufficient to determine your proposition to the conviction of the most obstinate atheist. If this be done already, and your demonstrations conclusive, I am confident you will not grudge the trouble of giving me satisfaction. I must look upon it as a most valuable favour, and mark myself down very

much your debtor upon that account.—But to proceed:

In Prop. 7. in your demonstrations of the Unity, you seem not accurately enough to distinguish the *hypothetical necessity*, from the *absolute necessity à priori*; and though I grant your proof conclusive with respect to the first, yet by no means with respect to the other. There is nothing plainer, than that but one Deity can be hypothetically necessary, that is to say, one being sufficiently answers for that necessity, by which I am obliged to allow some one being at least to be eternal, and this precisely is your argument. But though I see no necessity for more than one Deity, does it from thence follow, that there possibly can be no more: here lies my difficulty, which I am vexed your arguments have not as yet brought me over.

Page 107. edit. 4. you endeavour to reconcile Liberty and Prescience: I confess I never could get over this point, and I have long ago drawn up some arguments on this head, before I had it in my thoughts of giving you the trouble of this epistle, and they are as follows*:—

* In the MS., which is a copy in Lord Kames's handwriting, or a rough draught of his letter to Dr Clarke, the arguments on this point are omitted: They were probably the same that are urged on the same topic, in his *Essays on Morality and Natural Religion.*

In page 123. the proof that God is true, seems not clear enough. You say the only possible reason of falsifying is either rashness or forgetfulness, inconstancy, &c. Now, this looks a little like begging the question; for unless it be antecedently wrong to tell a lie, it will not be granted you, that rashness, forgetfulness, &c. are the only possible reasons of falsifying, because your antagonist would say, there being no antecedent preference of truth to falsehood in the nature of things, in every case you are left at liberty to choose which of them is fittest for your present purpose.

In page 127. you say, God cannot but do always what is best and wisest on the whole: if you design only that best and wisest should stand in opposition to error, evil and unfitness, I willingly close with you; but if you mean by best and wisest, strictly, that of all possible infinite varieties of actions, God cannot but choose that which, taking in all considerations, is the best and most for the advantage of the whole; herein I must profess myself your antagonist. It is undeniably certain, that there is a series of possible events going on to infinity, each of which is more fitted than the preceding for the good of mankind. To refuse this, is to set limits to God's power of doing good. The case being so, to say that in any one instance God has done the best upon the whole, is to maintain

this absurdity, that infinity is exhausted, at the same time that it is inexhaustible. But enough of this; I am convinced that the first meaning is only yours; and, upon reflection, I perceive your demonstration goes no further.

In the evidences of natural and revealed religion, you lay it down as the first rule, that we keep up constantly in our minds, the highest possible honour, esteem and veneration for the Deity. It is true, that most writers upon the laws of nature do the same; but it is certainly too loose a way of writing. I believe it will be granted, that our actions are the only proper objects of law. Now, having veneration, honour, esteem for the Deity, is not acting. Veneration, honour, esteem, are passions, and, therefore, not subject to laws. 2dly, You order us to consider him as the only Supreme Author, Preserver and Governor of all things. Now, it is absurd that any law should subject our thoughts, or oblige us to look upon a thing to be so or so. It may indeed oblige us to act, by applying our faculties to the consideration of the attributes of the Deity; and this truly is our duty, because thereby we learn God's will, which is the rule of all our actions: for as the end is necessary, so is the means; and it must be confessed also, that if we thus apply our minds to consider God's attributes, it can hardly miss to influence our passions; but this is far from making it our duty to have these passions.

In the rule you laid down to regulate our actions with respect to our neighbours, (page 67. of the second Treatise,) you name two branches, one of Equity, another of Love; but the second, viz. That we deal so with every man, as, in the like circumstances, we could reasonably expect he should deal with us, is either no rule at all, or a very undetermined one; for if you mean by it only this, that any relation I bear to you, changing places, you must bear to me; in this sense, it is no rule of action, but an abstract truth: and if you design any thing more, it must lie in the words, "we could reasonably expect." This indeed makes it a rule, but much too general for practice; for the question still remains, What can we reasonably expect? Indeed, we have the answer ready which we can draw from the latter branch of this rule; for, as you say afterwards, explaining this second branch in page 72., we may expect all the good that is in our neighbour's power; and after all, I cannot possibly find the reason why you should not distinguish these two branches, and call the one Equity, and the other Love; for the second seems purposely calculated to determine the too general conception of the first. What you mean by Love I do not so well comprehend; for, as you lay down in page 72., if every rational creature ought in its sphere and station, to do all the good it can do to all its fellow-creatures, the fellow-creature

must have the reciprocal right of exacting; consequently, it will be unjust to withhold any part of this good, or to disappoint the just and reasonable expectations of the fellow-creature. Besides, I wish you had explained this last rule, That every one is obliged to do all the good he can, so as to have left no dubiety; for I cannot certainly determine, whether your sense be, that he ought to do all he can, providing that he do himself no harm; or if the rule be absolute, that he is under a positive obligation in every action to do what is best in the whole, without considering himself in any other view but as a single particle of this whole. I am the more importunate upon this head, because it is of great consequence, no less than the foundation of all morality, that part at least which regards our neighbours; and it is strange that this matter has not, as far as I could learn, as yet been taken out of the state of dubiety, and fixed to some certain point by an accurate demonstration. There are three different schemes which I have frequently revolved in my thoughts, but have not yet been able to determine positively which to fix on.

The first goes upon the supposition, that there are certain rights granted to every man indifferently by the laws of nature; such as the right to food, right to truth, right of punishment, &c.; and these rights contain in their idea, that the law

protects every man in the exercise of them; so the rule will run thus, That every man is obliged to act thus with relation to his neighbour, as not directly to do him damage, or, which is the same thing, disturb him in the exercise of his rights; but, on the other hand, that he is not bound to advance his good. The second goes also upon the foundation of rights, only it carries the point a little further, viz. That every man is positively bound to advance the good of others, in all cases where it does not contradict his own good. The third commands, That every man must directly choose that which, taking in all circumstances, will do most good, without considering himself but as one of the infinite number whose good he is equally bound to advance. This last, it is plain, destroys all other rights and obligations, to raise itself upon their ruins. The first, were I obliged to fix, would be my scheme; and I have the securest side of the question, the presumption being for me, from the nature of rights. It is indeed evident, that I am bound to do my neighbour no harm; but if you carry the point higher, and oblige me also to do him good, yours must be the probation; for I will never submit myself to a greater burden than I see myself in duty bound: besides that, if you establish any of the other schemes, of consequence you make all the common epithets, generosity, benevolence, selfishness, kindness, &c. mere empty sounds, with-

out any fixed ideas; for how can you reckon that man generous or benevolent, who, in doing all the good he is capable of, does nothing more than what he is directly bound, &c. to do. Sure nobody is reckoned generous for paying his just debts; and the man also who neglects this duty is not properly named selfish, but wicked. But still, after all, there is no direct demonstration; and if you adhere to your rule laid down in page 72., you will be so kind as to acquaint me what strictly is the meaning; but whatever sense you put upon it, I expect you will join it with some other demonstration than that already given: for I cannot help thinking, that it is not far from a contradiction to assert, that God does always what is absolutely best on the whole; though, upon the other hand, I shall readily grant, if you prove *aliundè*, that this duty is incumbent upon mankind, God's not doing always what is absolutely best, will be no solid objection; for it is no good consequence to say, that since it is impossible God should do what is absolutely best, therefore, man, (though there be no impossibility,) is not obliged to contribute all his endeavours. I cannot deny, even granting the reasonableness of the first scheme, but there may be some exceptions, which, too, may be drawn from the nature of the thing: for an example, I have set down the following, which oc-

curred to me, as I was considering a short essay that a friend of mine had drawn up upon the subject of *Conjunctions*; and though I cannot help thinking, that I have carried the point too far, yet I am not able for the life of me to find out where the weak side lies.

ART. II.—*The Reverend Dr* SAMUEL CLARKE *to Mr* HENRY HOME.

SIR,

You will pardon my sending you such a brief answer, as is according to my custom, and to the time allowed me for such matters.

Though the ideas of necessity and self-existence are indeed distinct, yet every necessity not founded in self-existence, is in reality either merely figurative, or merely hypothetical. An endless succession of *beings*, produced one from another, without any self-existent cause, is nothing but a *verbal* removing of the difficulty a little out of sight: It is in reality the same supposition, as the endless (the *beginningless*) duration of *one being*, neither *self-existent* itself, nor having its existence founded in any self-existent cause; which is absurd and contradictory.

If we see no necessity for more than one Deity, (that is, if *one* necessary being sufficiently answers for that necessity, by which I am obliged to allow *some one being at least* to be necessary,) it doth from thence follow, that there can possibly be no more: Because whatever *being* can *possibly* be conceived *not to be necessary*, cannot *possibly* be *necessary;* the idea of *necessity* effectually excluding all *possibility* of being so much as conceived to be *not necessary*. He that *conceives* the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right ones, *not to be necessary*, does not *in truth* conceive any such thing, but only carelessly affirms a *contradiction*, of which no man can ever *possibly* have any *conception* at all: It is only talking nonsense in an unknown language.

Just as omnipotence is the power of doing all things possible to be done, so omniscience is the power of knowing all things possible to be known. Whether, therefore, future free actions be the object of *science*, or only of *infinitely perfect and unerring judgment*, which is a *distinct attribute*, is the *only pertinent* question, but of no *importance at all* to be resolved. Undoubtedly, were there no antecedent preference of *truth* to *falsehood* in the nature of things, in every case every one would be left at liberty to choose which of them is fittest for his present purpose: And for the same reason, the whole *nature and existence* of things would be a mere impertinency.

It is certainly true, (speaking morally, not physically,) that God *cannot but* do always what is best and wisest *on the whole*. But then, by the word *whole*, you must always remember, not to mean so *small a part* as *mankind* in the present time, or *mankind* in *all* times, but the *sum total* of the works of God (taken together as *one* system,) through *infinite space and infinite time*; with regard to which, *infinity* is by no means inexhaustible.

I agree, that "*actions only* are the proper objects of law:" And, therefore, I mean only what you rightly express, that "we are obliged "to *act*, by applying our faculties to the consi-"deration of the attributes of the Deity;" the *consequence* of which, in a sincere mind, *cannot but be* veneration, honour, and esteem. As to the *obligation* upon men to do all *the good they can*, I take it to be, not a *point* or a *line*, but a matter of *great latitude*. To do *any wrong*, is *punishable* in proportion to the wrong *done* or *intended*. To do barely what is *just*, is barely *not being punishable*. To be *totally negligent* and *inactive*, and to do *no good*, is (I think) a *species* of vice, *punishable*. To do good actually, is a *power* and a *duty*, unlimited, and divisible *in infinitum*; commendable in proportion to the *innumerable* different possible degrees of it, and proposed to us as such, by the *nature of things*, and by the *Author of our being*. I take a *right* to be, not

only (what you define it) *a moral power to act*, but also a moral *fitness and capacity to receive*, which belongs as much to *infants* as to *men*.

I am, Sir, your very humble servant,

S. CLARKE.

London, August 29. 1723.

ART. III.—LETTER from MR ANDREW BAXTER, *Author of* "An Inquiry into the Nature of the "Human Soul, of Matho or Cosmotheoria "puerilis," *&c. to* JOHN WILKES, Esq.

MY DEAREST MR WILKES,

Your letter of December the 12th alarmed me, by hearing you had got such a dangerous fall off your horse. Moderate exercise is good; but dangerous exercise, such as riding a fiery horse, is not commendable; and if you would oblige Mrs Wilkes, if you would oblige all your friends, and all good men, who conceive great hopes from you, you will be more cautious for the future. We had a terrible instance in the newspapers lately, of a man, spoken wonderfully well of, who got his death by such a fall.

As to altering any thing in the address to you before the appendix, I durst not do it without

your participation; unless you had suggested something you would have had changed: and by this time I suppose it is published. If not, I beg you cause change any thing you think proper. I wrote to Mr Millar, after presenting some copies to gentlemen in London, to send down five copies of it to Lord Blantyre at Edinburgh, to be given to particular friends there, and I wish you would speak to him of it. As to the state of my disease, unless I would make suppositions contrary to all probability, I have no reasonable hopes of recovery; the swelling which began at my legs, being now got up to my belly and head. I am a trouble to all about me, especially to my poor wife, who has the life of a slave, night and day, in helping me to take care of a diseased carcase. Yet I may linger on a while, as I can still walk a little through my room, and divert myself now and then with reading, nay, and writing down my remarks on what I read. But I can with sincerity assure you, (my most dear Mr Wilkes,) death has nothing terrible to me, or rather I look upon it with pleasure. I have long and often considered, and written down, the advantages of a separate state. I shall soon know more than all the men I leave behind me; wonders in material nature, and the world of spirits, which never entered into the thoughts of philosophers. The end of knowledge there, is not to get a name, or form a new sect, BUT TO ADORE

THE POWER AND WISDOM OF THE DEITY. This kills pride, but heightens happiness and pleasure. All our rational desires, because rational, must be satisfied by a Being himself infinitely rational. I have been long aware that nothing can go beyond the grave, but the habits of virtue and innocence. There is no distinction in that world, but what proceeds from virtue, or vice. Titles and riches are laid off, when the shroud goes on. But O! my dearest friend, I cannot conceal from you a topic of inexpressible pleasure. Punishment itself is pleasant. God does not punish out of anger and revenge, to destroy; as we wrathful men conclude; but to correct and make better. That is the true end of punishment. Boundless punishment would show uncontrollable power, but chastisement in proportion to our faults, shows the divine perfection of equity; and with a design to correct, not to throw us off, shews mercy. The end of God's punishing us, therefore, is our final happiness. Are not these, my dearest friend, comfortable topics at the approach of death? Besides, what is it to be free from the pains and infirmities of the body? Though I am satisfied just now, that the weakness of my distressed limbs is as much the immediate effect of the same power and goodness, as their growth and strength was sixty years ago. Durst I add a word without being thought vain, I would say, This is owing to my having reasoned honestly on

the nature of that dead substance, *Matter*. It is as utterly inert, when the tree flourishes, as when the leaf withers. And it is the same divine power, differently applied, that directs the last parting throb, and the first drawing breath. O! the blindness of those, who think matter can do any thing of itself, or perform an effect, without impulse or direction by immaterial power! As to party-philosophers, who are for one side only, and contract a personal dislike to those who are not as stiff as themselves, they are to be pitied. I see them making their court to the heads of the party, and thus angling for a little reputation, at second-hand. It is astonishing, my dear Sir, that all men are forced to own, that all matter necessarily resists a change of its present state, either of rest or motion; and yet when they come to the genuine consequence of this, to wit, that the Deity performs immediately all that is done in the material universe, they retract the former self-evident truth, and ascribe to this resisting substance, both a self-motive and self-determining power. I know not one book of natural philosophy, not one, free from this inconsistency. And though I be the only person (for any thing I know) who has endeavoured to establish the particular Providence of the Deity, and show his incessant influence and action on all the parts of matter, through the wide universe, from the inactivity of this dead substance: Yet I hope, when

the present party-zeal subsides a little, men will come more easily in, to own such a plain truth: And, from the same obvious principle, a great many absurd notions in natural philosophy, concerning powers in matter, will be rejected.

I own, if it had been the will of Heaven, I would gladly have lived, till I had put in order the *Second Part of the Inquiry shewing the Immortality of the Human Soul**. But Infinite Wisdom cannot be mistaken in calling me sooner. Our blindness makes us form wishes. I have left seven or eight different MS. books, where all the materials I have been collecting, for near thirty years, are put down, without any order, in the book that came next to my hand, in the place or circumstances I was in at the time. I took all these papers to Holland with me, thinking to put them in order there; but you know that was impracticable. And since I came home I have been prevented, either with looking after country affairs, or want of health. There are among these a great many miscellaneous subjects in philosophy, of a very serious nature, few of them ever considered before, as I know of. But (as I hinted above) a short time of separate existence will

* The author's materials for this second part were, many years after his death, arranged and published by Dr J. Duncan, in 1779, in one volume 8vo.

make every good man look with pity on the deepest researches we make here, and which we are apt to be vain of.—Thus I have writ you every thing I had to say. It will be kind if you send me a *last* letter. I wish you and Mrs Wilkes all possible prosperity. And though I cannot do you any service here, yet I hope our friendship shall never end.

ANDREW BAXTER.

Whittingham, January 29. 1750*.

APPENDIX.—No. III.

On Final Causes.

A VERY striking feature in all the philosophical writings of Lord Kames, is, his frequent reference to Final Causes. He omits no opportunity that occurs of pointing them out to the attention of his reader; and indulges himself with

* This excellent man died a few weeks after the date of this letter.

evident delight in considering all the phenomena both of the natural and moral world, as evidences of consummate wisdom, combined with benevolent design, and therefore furnishing irresistible conviction, not only of the power, but of the wisdom and beneficence of the Supreme Being. So universally indeed is this argument diffused through the author's writings, that we are induced to conclude, he regarded it as a primary object of his philosophy: A noble object, and worthy of those superior endowments of intellect, with which it has pleased our Creator to distinguish the highest order of his creatures. In this important point of view, not less than in its subserviency to the acquisition of knowledge, and the improvement of science, the consideration of Final Causes has been recommended by the ablest philosophers. But as it is capable of being pushed to a hurtful extreme, we willingly admit, that it is to be cautiously pursued; and it must be acknowledged, that, in those of a warm and sanguine temperament, and in whom the generous affections strongly predominate, a want of due caution in such researches has led to error instead of truth. This abuse sufficiently accounts for the strong censure which has been bestowed on this mode of inquiry by speculative men of a colder frame of mind, though of great philosophical acuteness. But every argument *ab abusu* ought

to be well weighed, before it receives our implicit assent.

I propose to examine briefly the grounds of this unfavourable prejudice, to canvass the arguments that have been adduced against those researches, and to evince their utility when properly and cautiously conducted.

The inquiry into Final Causes *, or the attempt to discover those ends which the Creator proposed to himself, in the formation of the universe, and of the various species of animate and inanimate beings with which it is filled, has been condemned by certain philosophers, on distinct and separate grounds of objection. These may be reduced to three principal heads.

1. The possibility of tracing design from its effects, has been altogether denied.

2. It is alleged, that it is presumptuous and impious in man to pretend, that he is able to discover the ends of the Omniscient Being in the formation of his creatures: And,

3. It is asserted, that such researches are a hinderance to improvement in philosophy, and in the knowledge of nature.

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* These observations on the subject of Final Causes, were first published in an *Account of the Life and Writings of Dr William Derham*, written by the author of the present work, and prefixed to an enlarged edition of the *Physico-Theology*, printed, London, 1798. They are now given in a more correct, and somewhat more ample form.

1. The first of these propositions has been maintained by Mr David Hume and his followers; who argue, that the inferences of design from its effects, are neither demonstrable by reasoning, nor deducible from experience. Dr Reid, who has most ably combated Mr Hume's argument on this subject, admits, that the inferences in question are not the result of reasoning or of experience; but he maintains at the same time, that they may be made with a degree of certainty equal to what the human mind is capable of attaining in any instance whatever. "The opi-" nions (says an able expositor of Dr Reid's phi-" losophy) which we form of the talents of other " men; nay, our belief that other men are intel-" ligent beings, are founded on this very infer-" ence of design from its effects. Intelligence " and design are not objects of our senses; and " yet we judge of them every moment from ex-" ternal conduct and behaviour, with as little he-" sitation as we pronounce on the existence of " what we immediately perceive *." In short, our conviction of the existence of a designing cause, when we perceive certain regular and constant effects, is so inborn and natural to the mind, that it may be classed among those intuitive

* *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, by Professor DUGALD STEWART, edit. 2., p. 188.

truths that need no argument to demonstrate them. We should justly accuse that man of insanity, who, on seeing a well-constructed clock, and observing how nicely all its parts were formed and put together, so that nothing appeared superfluous, or out of its place, nor any thing wanting that was necessary towards the regularity of its motion; on finding likewise, that this beautiful machine answered the useful purpose of pointing out most accurately the division of time by hours, minutes, and seconds, and marked the greater divisions by audible sounds, so as to be equally serviceable in the night as in the day;—we should justly, I say, accuse that man of absolute insanity, who should deny, that those various complicated parts were formed and put together for the very purposes which we see the machine so admirably fulfils. It is a law of our nature that we should entertain this belief. No man can avoid it. The greatest sceptic himself is irresistibly impressed with this conviction, and regulates all his actions by similar conclusions drawn from effect to cause.

But, says the sceptical philosopher, we can in no case judge of the wisdom of any design, unless we are first made acquainted with the end or object which the artist proposed to attain; for, it is not till we have obtained that acquaintance, that we can form any judgment of the means employed to accomplish the end. Now, all that

we perceive in the universe, is, that certain things are actually accomplished: but we are utterly ignorant what plan was proposed.

In answer to this objection it may be urged, that in many instances we discern, with the utmost certainty, the plan that was proposed. As, for example, we plainly perceive it to have been the intention of the Creator, that every animated being should be able to perpetuate its kind; so that the universe may be constantly supplied with inhabitants, without the intervention of the creative power exerted to form every individual animal. This plan is obvious and certain; because we perceive the power of propagation in every individual of every species of the animal kind, unless it is impaired by disease or accidental defect. In this instance, we are not left to doubt as to the Creator's plan; and we may, therefore, confidently reason as to the fitness or unfitness of the means for accomplishing that end in all the different species: And if we find those means, however various in the different tribes of animals, yet all most completely answering the same end, and with equal certainty accomplishing one uniform purpose, we are compelled to pronounce, that this effect is a proof of design, and that the means are with consummate skill and wisdom adapted to the end.

2. The second objection that has been urged

against all inquiries into Final Causes, is, That it is presumptuous and impious in man, to endeavour to penetrate into the designs of the Deity, and to search out those ends which He proposed to himself in the formation of the universe. This reason is urged by Des Cartes, who rejects the speculation into Final Causes altogether; and we find several observations to the same purpose in the works of Maupertuis and Buffon.

In answer to this objection, we have a single argument of Mr Boyle, which appears sufficient completely to overthrow it. It were both presumption and folly for man to pretend to discover *all* the ends which God may have proposed to himself in the formation of all his works. But, to perceive *some* of those ends in certain of his works, is, so far from being presumptuous, that it would be absolute blindness and stupidity not to discover them. As, for instance, he who considers the complicated structure of the eye, and observes how admirably it serves the purpose of conveying to the mind an idea of the figure, size, and colour of external objects, cannot possibly entertain a doubt, that it was intended for that purpose by the Being who framed it; and it would be egregious folly indeed, to suspend or to refuse our belief of that design, from the notion of its being presumptuous to attempt finding out the counsels of the Deity. If a peasant, says Mr Boyle, were brought into the garden of a philo-

sopher, and should there observe one of those curious gnomonic instruments, which shew at once the place of the sun in the zodiac, his declination from the equator, the day of the month, the length of the day, &c., it would confessedly be presumptuous in him, while both unacquainted with mathematics, and ignorant of the intentions of the artist, to pretend to ascertain *all the uses* of that elaborate piece of work: but, observing on it the ordinary marks of a sun-dial, and seeing that the shadow actually pointed to the hour of the day, and always indicated it with exactness, it would be no presumption, even in this ignorant peasant, to say, that this, for certain, was *one of the purposes* for which the artificer intended it.

But further, it could not justly be deemed presumption, even in this ignorant peasant, but on the contrary, a just and fair exercise of the knowledge and understanding which he possessed, were he with some confidence to entertain the belief, that since he saw at least one evident purpose for which such a piece of art had been designed, the rest of its complicated structure had likewise its uses, although he could not discover them; and that the entire instrument was the work of an intelligent artist, who had adapted all its parts to wise and useful purposes. "If men "would but seriously reflect, (says Mr Wollas-"ton,) upon the many marks of *Reason*, *Wisdom*

" and *Goodness*, every where to be observed in " instances which they *do* or *may* understand, " they could scarce doubt but the same things " prevailed in those which they *do not* under- " stand. If I should meet with a *book*, the au- " thor of which I found had disposed his matter " in beautiful order, and treated his subjects with " reason and exactness; but at last, as I read on, " came to a few leaves written in a language " which I did not know, in this case I should " close the book with a full persuasion, that the " same vein of good sense which shewed itself in " the former and greater part of it, ran through " the other also: especially having arguments *à* " *priori*, which obliged me to believe that the " author of it all was the same person *."

In addition to this argument, it may be observed, that although the adoption of *singular* and *uncommon* opinions may be an evidence of presumption, there can be no presumption, properly speaking, in entertaining opinions, in which we are warranted and supported by the concurring sentiments of mankind. In such a case, it is he who dissents or doubts that incurs the charge of presumption, and not he who adopts the general belief. The uses of many of the works of Na-

* Wollaston's *Religion of Nature Delineated*, p. 128. (Dr Clarke's edition.)

ture, and more particularly, of many parts of the animal frame, are so obvious, that they have been acknowledged by the generality of mankind in all ages of the world. Even the Epicureans, who taught that all things were the operation of chance, were forced to acknowledge, that chance had constructed the eye with most admirable fitness for the purpose of seeing, and the ear for hearing *. If, therefore, we perceive these purposes as plainly as the Epicureans, and at the same time acknowledge, that the organs themselves were originally framed by an intelligent artist, it seems a great absurdity to refuse to believe, that this intelligent artist intended them to serve those uses and purposes for which we confess them to be so wonderfully adapted. Let us suppose any person to deny, that the eye and ear were intended for seeing and hearing, and to assert, that they might be designed for other uses,

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* *Quanta fuit vestri super his prudentia casûs?*
Quam benè disposuit res çunctas, æmulus alti
Judicii? Melior casu mens nulla fuisset——
O casum prudentem! O sanæ mentis! Et omni
Dignandum cultu! sapiens qui primus, opinor,
Te fecit Fortuna Deam, cæloque locavit;
Çausarum causa omnipotens et summa creatrix!

POLIGNAC, *Anti-Lucretius*, lib. ix. v. 247.

we should undoubtedly regard that man either with scorn or pity. But, in what respect is the absurdity less, if, while we cannot assign any other purposes for which those organs can serve, but are forced to acknowledge, that they serve most admirably for seeing and hearing; we should yet hesitate to affirm, that, assuredly, they were intended to serve those uses?

Moreover, it seems just as unreasonable to deny, that the adaptation of things to certain ends and uses, is a proof of Design and Wisdom in the Creator, as it would be to deny, that the creation of those things is an evidence of his Power. The creation alone of such an infinite variety of beings and substances, gives certain demonstration of the wonderful power of God; but that power would be idly displayed to our perceptions, if we did not at the same time perceive, that it was exerted to ends which we acknowledge to be wise and beneficent. We might indeed fear a being of such infinite power, and fear him perhaps the more, that we could not perceive his exertions to be regulated by any law of wisdom, or motive of benevolence; but we could not respect, adore, or love a being of this nature. It is the conviction of the perfect wisdom of the Supreme Being, manifested in all the works of the creation, and in their fitness to answer certain ends which we ac-

knowledge to be benevolent, that entitles this being to the love and adoration of his creatures *.

3. With regard to the third objection, namely, That the search after Final Causes is a hinderance to improvement in philosophy, and in the knowledge of nature: this objection seems to have arisen from a misconception of the sentiments of Lord Bacon, in that part of his work *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, where he treats of Metaphysics: for Lord Bacon no otherwise condemns the search into Final Causes, than in so far as they prevent our investigation into the immediate physical causes of the phenomena of nature. As, for example, if one should ask what is the cause of clouds in the atmosphere? it

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* "Epicurus verò ex animis hominum extraxit radicitùs religionem, cùm diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. Cùm enim optimam et præstantissimam naturam dei dicit esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam; tollit id quod maximè proprium est optimæ et præstantissimæque naturæ. Quid enim est melius, aut quid præstantius bonitate et beneficentiâ? Qua cùm carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec deum, nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari, neminem diligi vultis.—Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur Deos? Deinde, si maximè talis est Deus, ut nullâ gratiâ, nullâ hominum caritate teneatur, valeat. Quid enim dicam, propitius sit? Esse enim propitius potest nemini. quoniam ut dicitis omnis in imbecillitate est et gratia et caritas."—CICERO, *De Natur. Deor.* lib. i. c. 43, 44.

would, no doubt, be a very lame and unphilosophical answer to say, That it was to give water to the earth. This indeed may be the final cause; but no philosopher of the present day would rest satisfied with this conviction, while there remains a physical cause to be assigned for the phenomenon, as, the moisture raised by the heat of the sun from the sea and earth, which, when condensed, becomes visible. It was no doubt a just reproach to many of the ancient philosophers, that, neglecting the immediate physical causes of the phenomena of Nature, they rested satisfied with assigning the ultimate end or final cause of those phenomena. It was Lord Bacon's intention to explode that indolent and unsatisfying mode of reasoning; and therefore, in allusion to such reasoners, he was warranted in saying, that the search of Final Causes, as generally employed, was *Inquisitio sterilis, et tanquam virgo Deo consecrata, nihil parit. (De Aug. Scien. l.* iii. *c. 5.)* But, in the manner that physical science has been cultivated by the moderns, on the solid basis of induction from observation and experiment, there is not the smallest hazard, that the inquiry into Final Causes should retard our progress in the search of the Physical. The caveat of Lord Bacon may have been useful in his time, and may have had a beneficial effect on the whole; for it is to those admirable methods of induction which he has pointed out,

that modern philosophy, so far as physics are concerned, is indebted for its most material improvements, and science for its most sublime discoveries. But, taken in a general and unqualified sense, and thus employed by the materialists as an authority for excluding from physics the consideration of final causes altogether, the maxim is of a hurtful tendency, and has been used to support opinions which its illustrious author would have reprobated with indignation. It is, therefore, with great truth, that a late eminent philosopher has characterized this remark of Bacon as an inconsiderate expression, more distinguished by its *wit* than by its *solidity* *.

It excites much regret, when we observe such philosophers as La Place, and others of the materialists, men certainly of great abilities, pursuing elaborate inquiries into nature, with a view only to the discovery of those secondary causes which account for her phenomena, without the slightest regard to that Supreme Intelligence, who has employed those secondary causes merely as his instruments in the execution of his infinitely wise and benevolent designs †. But it is

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* *Elements of Mechanical Philosophy*, by Professor JOHN ROBISON, vol. i. p. 679.

† To this eminent astronomer (M. de la Place) has been justly assigned the high praise of having completed that theory of which Kepler and Newton laid the foundation; by superadding to their discoveries of the laws which regulate the mo-

with still greater concern we observe, that the example of those materialists has been followed

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tions of planets, and the universal influence of gravitation, the demonstration that the inequalities in our system, which seemed to threaten a derangement of the machine, are all periodical, and are corrective of themselves in a certain number of revolutions: a discovery which gives assurance that the machine is perfect, and can never suffer any disorder of its frame, or an extinction by natural decay. To such philosophers, whose penetrating intellect, proceeding thus far in the discovery of the *secondary* causes, which account for the phenomena of the universe, stops short in its research, and seems even with caution to avoid drawing the inference which so naturally follows, for the existence of a *primary* cause—to such philosophers the following question may be fairly put; and it is the *argumentum ad hominem*: If the bare discovery of such sublime truths calls forth our admiration and astonishment at the powers of the human mind, which could trace out and demonstrate those laws which uphold and perpetuate this system, What must we judge to be the powers of that MIND which contrived and framed the whole machine, and established those eternal laws which regulate and maintain it *?

* The same argument is enforced with all the beauty of poetry by *Polignac*:

O mirum artificem. Quis tam præclara videndo,
Non stupeat genus esse hominum qui talia casu
Facta velint, et materiæ sine more vaganti
Accepta hæc referant; cum nos sine mente, sine arte
Tot portentorum reddi mera possit imago.
Scilicet astronomos, et qui cœlestia quondam
Lustrarunt oculis, et quos nova protulit ætas
Contemplatores, æterno nomine dignos
Censuimus, quod sint qui signare figuram
Astrorum, et spatia, et moles varioseque meatus:

by some authors of our own country, who have written with intentions very opposite to theirs, but who have inadvertently adopted their plan, and without fully discerning its purpose. Thus, an English writer of the best intentions, who has composed a Natural History chiefly from materials furnished by the French authors, sets out, after their example, with a denunciation of the mischievous consequences resulting to philosophy from the speculation into final causes; though, in the course of his work, the natural bias of his mind occasionally appears, in pointing out, in strains of the warmest eloquence, to our observation, those very ends of wisdom and benevolence, of which he had before exploded the consideration as useless, and even pernicious to the prosecution of science. Thus, in the 4th chapter of his *History of the Earth and Animated Nature*, he retails the favourite remark of Bacon, "That "the investigation of Final Causes is a barren "study; and, like a virgin dedicated to the

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Et Causam Supremam ipsis quæ tradidit astris
Materiem, formam, atque situm, normamque movendi,
Legitimo, ingrati, laudum fraudamus honore!
Est grave mentis opus chartâ describere cœlum
Ac terras, duplicique globo diversa notare
Climata, sidereumque rotis effingere motum:
Et potuit sine mente fabri consistere Mundus!
O pudor! O miseræ vecors insania gentis!

Polignac, Anti-Lucret. lib. viii. v. 1271.

" Deity, brings forth nothing:" Yet in the last chapter of the same volume, he considers " the " universe as the palace in which the Deity re- " sides, and this earth as one of its apartments, " allotted to man for his habitation, and the " scene of his enjoyments;" he sees " the im- " mense and shapeless mass of matter formed in- " to worlds by the power of the Deity, and dis- " persed at intervals, to which even the imagi- " nation cannot travel." He discerns the earth, at His command, " producing by its twofold " motion the change of seasons, and the grate- " ful vicissitudes of day and night." He observes it " with a steady rotation successively pre- " senting every part of its bosom to the sun; at " once imbibing nourishment and light from that " parent of vegetation and fertility." He re- marks " the waters on its surface supplied in " healthful abundance, to support life and assist " vegetation: the mountains arising to diversify " the prospect, and give a current to the stream: " the seas extending from one continent to ano- " ther, replenished with animals that may be " turned to human support, and also serving to " enrich the earth with a sufficiency of vapour: " breezes flying along the surface of the fields, " to promote health and vegetation: the cool- " ness of the evening that invites man to his " rest, and the freshness of the morning that re-

" news him for his labour*." Thus, the eloquent writer, in contempt of that law which he had laid down, of banishing Final Causes entirely from his speculations, unconsciously resorts to them whenever his subject points the way, and yields himself without reserve to that emotion of gratitude which is felt by every well-constituted mind to the bountiful Author of all its multiplied enjoyments.

It is curious to remark, that the Epicureans themselves, who utterly disclaimed a Divine Providence, as concerned either in the original formation, or in the government of the universe, were yet forced to acknowledge throughout the whole system, the most pregnant and incontrovertible marks of benevolent design. But how did they extricate themselves from this apparent dilemma? Why, by bestowing even on insensate and brute matter that eulogium which they withheld from the Divinity. Thus, Pliny, who acknowledged no God as the author of all the wonders to which he solicits our attention in his *Natural History*, indulges a vein of the most eloquent panegyric on the *benevolence* of the *Earth* to man. " It is this Earth," says he, " that, like " a kind mother, receives us at our birth, and

* Goldsmith's *Natural History*, vol. i. chap. 4.

" sustains us when born. It is this alone, of all " the elements around us, that is never found an " enemy to man. The waters deluge him with " rains, oppress him with hail, and drown him " with inundations. The air rushes in storms, " prepares the tempest, or lights up the thunders. " But the Earth, gentle and indulgent, ever sub- " servient to the wants of man, spreads his walk " with flowers, and his table with plenty; re- " turns with interest every good committed to " her care; and though she produces the poison, " she still supplies the antidote; though con- " stantly importuned more to furnish the luxu- " ries of man than his necessities, yet even to " the last she continues her kind indulgence; " and when life is over, she piously covers his " remains in her bosom *." Thus, even the atheist plainly discerns in the system of Nature the traces of benevolent design; but *insanientis sapientiæ consultis*, proficient only in that wisdom which argues a perverted understanding, he attributes that design and that benevolence to a substance incapable itself of thought or purpose of any kind, and stupidly transfers the praise due to the Creator, to the inert, the lifeless, and unconscious *substratum* of his operations.

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* PLIN. *Hist. Nat.* lib. ii. cap. 63.

With the true philosopher, the research into Physical and Final Causes will ever go hand in hand, as they mutually assist each other's progress; and there would in most sciences be a very great bar to improvement, if we were to attempt to separate them. Let the science of Anatomy be taken as an example. We study the structure of the different parts of the human body, with a constant view to the functions which those parts are intended to serve: nay, the very end of the study is in order that we may be able to correct any fault or unfitness of the organs, and restore them to that healthful tone which is necessary for the right performance of their functions. We anatomize the eye, and examine its different tunicles and humours, that we may be enabled to find a cure for imperfect vision, or for absolute blindness. We examine the structure of the stomach and bowels, that we may well understand what state of these organs is best fitted for perfect digestion, and the conversion of the aliment into chyle and blood, and know how to restore that state when impaired by accidental injury, or vitiated by disease. In short, it may be confidently affirmed, that in this science, which is nothing more than the accurate knowledge of the animal machine, we could no more advance a single step, without having in our view the proper functions of the several

parts of that machine, than we could study the art of clock-making without having it in our view that all the parts of the machine were intended to operate towards one ultimate or final purpose, the regular division of time by hours, minutes, and seconds. In like manner, there is so necessary a connexion between the science of medicine and final causes, that they may be considered as absolutely inseparable; and it may be affirmed in general, that in the study of all those sciences which have the knowledge of nature for their object, the search of final causes, or those wise ends proposed by the Author of Nature, is altogether as necessary, as an attention to the views and purposes of man, is necessary in studying those arts which are dependant on human wisdom and skill; as, for example, architecture, ship-building, and the construction of all useful engines and machines.

Lastly, it may be observed, that the greatest philosophers, far from excluding from their speculations the research into final causes, have recommended that research as the greatest incentive to the prosecution of science, and as being eminently serviceable in guiding or conducting our inquiries. With regard to the former of these purposes, what motive can be more worthy of an intelligent being, than the desire of tracing out those characters of wise and benevolent design, which, to a certain degree, are obvious,

even to the most superficial observer, but of whose universality, extent and wonderful connexion, through the whole of this visible system of nature, the philosopher alone can form an adequate comprehension?—With respect to the latter purpose, the guiding or conducting our inquiries, and thus contributing both to improvements and actual discoveries in science, Mr Boyle has recorded a very striking testimony of the utility of such speculations. "I remember," says he, "that when I asked our famous Harvey what "were the things that induced him to think of "a circulation of the blood? he answered me, "that when he took notice that the valves in "the veins in so many parts of the body were "so placed, that they gave a free passage of the "blood towards the heart, but opposed the pas-"sage of the venal blood the contrary way, he "was invited to imagine that so provident a "cause as Nature had not placed so many valves "without design; and no design seemed more "probable than that since the blood could not "well, because of the interposing valves, be sent "by the veins to the limbs, it should be sent "through the arteries, and return through the "veins, whose valves did not oppose its course "that way*."—Thus the consideration of the

* "Harvey saw," says Professor Robison, "that the "valves in the arteries and veins were constructed precisely

final cause actually led to the discovery of the physical truth.

" like those of a *double forcing pump*, and that the muscles " of the heart were also fitted for an alternate systole and " diastole, so corresponding to the structure of those valves, " that the whole was fit for performing such an office. With " boldness, therefore, he asserted, that the beatings of the " heart were the strokes of this pump; and laying the heart " of a living animal open to the view, he had the pleasure of " seeing the alternate expansion and contraction of its au- " ricles and ventricles, exactly as he had expected. In pre- " cisely the same way have all the discoveries in anatomy " and physiology been made. A new object is seen. The " discoverer immediately examines the structure. Why? " To see what it can perform; and if he sees a number of " co-adaptations to a particular purpose, he does not hesitate " to say, 'This is its purpose.' He has often been mis- " taken; but the mistakes have been gradually corrected. " How? By discovering what is the real structure, and what " the thing is really fit for performing. The anatomist " never imagines that what he has discovered is of no value." The learned Professor subjoins to this passage the following Note, which I trust the candid reader will believe I quote from a better motive than vanity. " I would earnestly re- " commend to my young readers some excellent remarks on " the argument of Final Causes, (without which Cicero " thought there is no philosophy,) in the Preface by the " Editor of Derham's *Physico-Theology*, published at Lon- " don in 1798. He there considers the proper province of " this argument, its use, and incautious abuse, with the great- " est perspicuity and judgment." *Elements of Mechanical Philosophy*, by Professor J. ROBISON, vol. i. p. 681.

Another beautiful instance of the utility of attending to Final Causes in the prosecution of science, is to be found in the *Elementa Catoptricæ et Dioptricæ Sphæricæ* of the celebrated David Gregory, Savillian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford. In the end of this treatise is an observation, which shews that what is generally believed to be a discovery of a much later date, the construction of achromatic telescopes, which was first actually put in practice by Mr Dolland, and has since been brought to great perfection by Mr Ramsden and other opticians, had suggested itself to the mind of David Gregory, "from "the reflection on the admirable contrivance of "Nature, who does nothing without an useful "purpose, in combining the different humours "of the eye."—"Quod si, ob difficultates phy-"sicas in speculis idoneis torno elaborandis et "poliendis, etiamnum lentibus uti oporteat, for-"tassis media diversæ densitatis ad lentem ob-"jectivam componendam adhibere utile foret; ut "a Naturâ factum observamus in oculi fabricâ, "ubi chrystallinus humor (ferè ejusdem cum vi-"tro virtutis ad radios lucis refringendos) aqueo "et vitreo (aquæ quoad refractionem haud ab-"similibus) conjungitur, ad imaginem quam dis-"tinctè fieri poterit, a Naturâ nihil frustrà mo-"liente, in oculi fundo depingendam."

Through the whole works of Sir Isaac Newton, we perceive a constant attention to Final Causes, or to the great purposes of the Deity in the structure and support of the universe. It was the firm opinion of that great philosopher, that, as we are every where encountered, in our researches, by powers and effects which are unaccountable upon any principles of mere mechanism, or the combinations of matter and motion, we must for ever resort to a Supreme Power, whose influence extends over all nature, and who accomplishes the wisest and most benevolent ends by the best possible means. Of his sentiments on this subject, his excellent abridger and commentator, Mr Maclaurin, gives the following brief detail, with which we shall close the subject:

"There is nothing we meet with more frequently and constantly in nature, than the traces of an all-governing Deity. And the philosopher who overlooks these, contenting himself with the appearances of the material universe only, and the mechanical laws of motion, neglects what is most excellent; and prefers what is imperfect to what is supremely perfect, finitude to infinity, what is narrow and weak to what is unlimited and almighty, and what is perishing to what endures for ever. Such who attend not to so manifest indications of supreme wisdom and goodness,

" perpetually appearing before them, wherever
" they turn their views or inquiries, too much
" resemble those ancient philosophers, who made
" *night*, *matter*, and *chaos*, the original of all
" things.

" The plain argument for the existence of the
" Deity, obvious to all, and carrying irresistible
" conviction with it, is, From the evident con-
" trivance and fitness of things for one another,
" which we meet with throughout all parts of the
" universe. There is no need of nice or subtle
" reasonings in this matter: a manifest contri-
" vance immediately suggests a contriver. It
" strikes us like a sensation; and artful reason-
" ings against it may puzzle us, but it is without
" shaking our belief. No person, for example,
" who knows the principles of optics, and the
" structure of the eye, can believe that it was
" formed without skill in that science; or that
" the ear was formed without the knowledge of
" sounds; or that the male and female of ani-
" mals were not formed for each other, and for
" continuing the species. All our accounts of
" nature are full of instances of this kind. The
" admirable and beautiful structure of things for
" final causes, exalts our idea of the *Contri-*
" *ver:* the unity of design shews him to be *One.*
" The great notions in the system, performed
" with the same facility as the least, suggest his
" *almighty power*, which gave motion to the earth

" and celestial bodies, with equal ease as to the " minutest particles. The subtilty of the mo- " tions and actions in the internal parts of bo- " dies, shews that his influence penetrates the " most inmost recesses of things, and that he is " equally *active* and *present* every where. The " simplicity of the laws that prevail in the world, " the excellent disposition of things, in order to " obtain the best ends, and the beauty which " adorns the works of nature, far superior to any " thing in art, suggests his consummate *wisdom*. " The usefulness of the whole scheme, so well " contrived, for the intelligent beings that enjoy " it, with the *internal disposition and moral struc-* " *ture* of those beings, shew his unbounded *good-* " *ness*. These are the arguments which are " sufficiently open to the views and capacities " of the unlearned, while, at the same time, they " acquire new strength and lustre from the dis- " coveries of the learned *."

To these illustrious testimonies in favour of the research into Final Causes, I might add that of Dr Reid, who though in all his philosophical disquisitions he has been particularly cautious to separate the distinct provinces of Physical and Metaphysical inquiry, to the latter of which the consideration of Final Causes most properly belongs, yet

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* *An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries*, by COLIN MACLAURIN, A. M. F. R. S. Book iv. ch. 9.

he admits, not only the certainty, but the high value and dignity of such researches, as well as the delight with which they are attended:

" As to Final Causes, they stare us in the face " wherever we cast our eyes. I can no more " doubt whether the eye was made for the pur- " pose of seeing, and the ear of hearing, than I " can doubt of a mathematical axiom. Yet the " evidence is neither mathematical demonstra- " tion, nor is it induction. In a word, final " causes, good final causes, are seen plainly every " where; in the heavens and in the earth, in the " constitution of every animal, and in our own " constitution of body and of mind. And they " are the most worthy of observation, and have a " charm in them that delights the soul." *Letter from Dr Reid to Lord Kames, 16th December* 1780.—*N. B.* This letter is printed in No. IX. of this Appendix.

APPENDIX.—NO. IV.

LETTER *to Lord* KAMES, *from the Reverend Dr* JOHN MACFARLAN, *Minister of Canongate, Edinburgh, and Author of Inquiries concerning the State of the Poor, &c.*

MY LORD,

WHEN I read the first edition of your Lordship's *Essays on Morality and Natural Religion*, I was a very young man, educated with very narrow and illiberal notions both of men and things. You will not be surprised, that I was taught to regard you as an arch-heretic, and all your writings as from a suspected hand. It is unnecessary to say, that those unjust prejudices are long since removed. The agreeable and valuable instruction I have received since I have had the honour of your Lordship's acquaintance, I with reason consider as one of the happiest circumstances of my present situation *. But, though

* From Lord Kames's residing in the Canongate, Edinburgh, Dr Macfarlan was his parish minister.

this advantage had been denied me, the perusal of the last edition of your Essays, would have fully convinced me, that the person whom I once dreaded, is worthy of my highest esteem and respect. It was with great pleasure that I have found your Lordship successful in overturning those wretched systems which have a tendency to debase human nature, and reduce man to a little artificial machine, very different from what God created him. It was with greater pleasure I found you successful in restoring him to his just rank, in pointing out his obligations to duty, with the great foundation of religion and morality. By shewing us what we are, you animate us to act a part suitable to our rank and character as rational and immortal beings. It is the goodness of Providence which raises up such advocates for virtue, and still preserves in vigour that life which has been so long useful to the best interests of mankind.

May I presume, after this, to mention, that as I read your Essays with a critical eye, I have made some observations, in which, as I venture to differ from your Lordship, I am probably wrong; but I have that confidence in your candour, to trust that you will not impute them to petulancy, but a desire to receive better information. At your leisure, I shall submit them to

your correction. I have the honour to be, with great respect, &c.

JOHN McFARLAN.

Canongate, 30th November 1779.

APPENDIX.—No. V.

LETTER *from Dr* THOMAS REID, *Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, to Lord* KAMES, *on the Influence of the Doctrine of Necessity on Morals. Dated Glasgow College, December 3.* 1772.

MY LORD,

I WAS very glad to understand, by the letter you honoured me with of November 9., that you got safe home, after a long journey, in such dreadful rainy weather. I got to Mr C——'s on horseback soon after you left me, where I was in good warm quarters.

The case you state is very proper, to discover how far we differ with respect to the Influence of the Doctrine of Necessity upon Morals.

A man in a mad fit of passion stabs his best friend; immediately after he condemns himself; and at last is condemned by a court of justice, although his passion was no less irresistible than if he had been pushed on by external violence.

My opinion of the case, my Lord, is this: If the passion was really as irresistible as you represent it, both in its beginning and progress, the man is innocent in the sight of God, who knows that he was driven as by a whirlwind, and that the moment he was master of himself, he abhorred the action as much as a good man ought to do.

At the same time he reasonably may condemn himself, and be condemed by a court of justice.

He condemns himself, because, from his very constitution, he has a conviction that his passion was not irresistible. Every man has this conviction as long as he believes himself not to be really mad, and incapable of self-government. Even if he is a fatalist in speculation, that will not hinder this natural conviction when his conscience smites him, any more than speculative scepticism will hinder a man from apprehension of danger when a cart runs against him.

The court of justice condemns him for the same reason, because they believe that his passion was not irresistible. But if it could be proved that the man was really incapable of bridling his passion, that is, that he was really mad, then the

court of justice ought not to punish him as a criminal, but to confine him as a madman.

What is madness, my Lord? In my opinion, it is such weakness in the power of self-government, or such strength of passion, as deprives a man of the command of himself. The madman has will and intention, but he has no power to restrain them. If this madness continues so long as to be capable of proof from the tenor of a man's actions, he is no subject of criminal law, because he is not a free agent. If we suppose real madness to continue but for a moment, it makes a man incapable of a crime, while it lasts, as if it had continued for years. But a momentary madness can have no effect to acquit a man in a court of justice, because it cannot be proved. It would not even hinder him from condemning himself, because he cannot know that he was mad.

In a word, if, by a mad fit of passion, your Lordship means real madness, though temporary, and not permanent, the man is not criminal for what this fit of madness produced. A court of justice would not impute the action to him, if this could be proved to be the case. But if, by a mad fit of passion, you mean only a strong passion, which still leaves a man the power of self-government, then he is accountable for his conduct to God and man. For every good man, yea, every man that would avoid the most heinous crimes, must at some times do violence to very

strong passions. But hard would be our case indeed, if we were required, either by God or man, to resist irresistible passions.

You think that will and intention is sufficient to make an action imputable, even though that will be irresistibly determined. I beg leave to dissent, for the following reasons:

1. An invincible error of the understanding, of memory, of judgment, or of reasoning, is not imputable, for this very reason, that it is invincible; why then should an error of the will be imputable, when it is supposed equally invincible? God Almighty has given us various powers of understanding and of will. They are all equally his workmanship. Our understandings may deviate from truth, as our wills may deviate from virtue. You will allow, that it would be unjust and tyrannical to punish a man for unavoidable deviations from truth. Where, then, is the justice of condemning and punishing him for the deviations of another faculty, which are equally unavoidable?

You say we are not to judge of this matter by reasons, but by the moral sense. Will you forgive me, my Lord, to put you in mind of a saying of Mr Hobbes, *that when reason is against a man, he will be against reason?* I hope reason and the moral sense are so good friends as not to dif-

fer upon any point. But to be serious, I agree with your Lordship, that it is the moral sense that must judge of this point, whether it be just to punish a man for doing what it was not in his power not to do. The very ideas or notions of just and unjust are got by the moral sense; as the ideas of blue and red are got by the sense of seeing. And as by the sense of seeing, we determine that this body is red, and that is blue, so by the moral sense we determine this action to be just, and that to be unjust. It is by the moral sense that I determine in general that it is unjust to require any duty of a man which it is not in his power to perform. By the same moral sense, in a particular case, I determine a man to be guilty, upon finding that he did the deed voluntarily and with intention, without making any inquiry about his power. The way to reconcile these two determinations I take to be this, that, in the last case, I take for granted the man's power, because the common sense of mankind dictates, that what a man did voluntarily and with intention, he had power not to do.

2. A second reason of my dissent is, That the guilt of a bad action is diminished in proportion as it is more difficult to resist the motive. Suppose a man entrusted with a secret, the betraying of which to the enemy may ruin an army. If he discloses it for a bribe, however great, he is a

villain and a traitor, and deserves a thousand deaths.

But if he falls into the enemy's hands, and the secret be wrested from him by the rack, our sentiments are greatly changed; we do not charge him with villany, but with weakness. We hardly at all blame a woman in such a case, because we conceive torture, or the fear of present death, to be a motive hardly resistible by the weaker sex.

As it is therefore the uniform judgment of mankind, that where the deed is the same, and the will and intention the same, the degree of guilt must depend upon the difficulty of resisting the motive, will it not follow, that when the motive is absolutely irresistible, the guilt vanishes altogether?

3. That this is the common sense of mankind, appears further from the way in which we treat madmen. They have will and intention in what they do; and therefore, if no more is necessary to constitute a crime, they ought to be found guilty of crimes. Yet, no man conceives that they can be at all subjects of criminal law. For what reason? for this, in my opinion, that they have not that power of self-command, which is necessary to make a man accountable for his conduct.

You suppose, my Lord, a physical power to forbear an action even when it is necessary. But this I cannot grant. Indeed, upon the system of free agency, I can easily conceive a power which is not exerted; but, upon the system of necessity, there can be no such thing; every power that acts by necessity must be exerted.

I do indeed think, that a man may act without a motive; and that, when the motives to action lie all on one side, he may act in contradiction to them. But I agree with your Lordship, that all such actions are capricious; and I apprehend, that if there were no actions of this kind, there could be no such thing as caprice, nor any word in language to signify it: For why should every language have a word to signify a thing which never did nor can exist?

I agree also with your Lordship, that there can be no merit in such an action, even if it is innocent. But if it is vicious, it has the highest degree of demerit; for it is sinning without any temptation, and serving the devil without any wages. It ought to be observed, however, that a virtuous action can never be capricious; because there is always a just and sufficient motive to it. For, if I have no other motive, I must at least have this, that it is a worthy action, and is my duty; which in reason ought to weigh down all motives that can be put into the opposite scale. A capricious action may be innocent, and

then it is folly: Or it may be vicious, and then it is pure wickedness.

Liberty, like all other good gifts of God, may be abused. As civil liberty may be abused to licentiousness, so our natural liberty may be abused to caprice, folly and vice. But the proper exercise of liberty is, after weighing duly the motives on both sides, to be determined, not by the strongest motive, but by that which has most authority.

It is of great importance in this matter, to distinguish between the authority of motives and their force. The part that is decent, that is manly, that is virtuous, that is noble, has always authority upon its side: Every man feels this authority in his own breast; and there are few men so wicked as not to yield to it when it has no antagonist.

But pleasure, interest, passion, sloth, often muster a great force on the other side, which, though it has no authority, has often the greater power; and a conflict arises between these opposite parties. Every man is conscious of this conflict in his own breast, and is too often carried down by the superior force of the party which he knows to have no authority.

This is the conflict which Plato describes between reason and appetite; this is the conflict which the New Testament describes between the

spirit and the flesh. The opposite parties, like Israel and Amalek, dispute the victory in the plain. When the self-determining power, like Moses upon the mount, lifts up its hand and exerts itself, then Israel prevails, and virtue is triumphant; but when its hands hang down, and its vigour flags, then Amalek prevails.

I am, my dear Lord, most respectfully yours,

THO. REID.

Glasgow College, December 3. 1772.

APPENDIX.—NO. VI.

LETTER *from* DAVID HUME, *Esq. to the Author of the Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality.*

SIR,

WHEN I write you, I know not to whom I am addressing myself; I only know he is one who has done me a great deal of honour, and to whose civilities I am obliged. If we be strangers, I beg we may be acquainted, as soon as you think proper to discover yourself; if we be acquainted already, I beg we may be friends; if friends, I beg

we may be more so. Our connexion with each other, as men of letters, is greater than our difference, as adhering to different sects or systems. Let us revive the happy times, when Atticus and Cassius the Epicureans, Cicero the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could, all of them, live in unreserved friendship together, and were insensible to all those distinctions, except so far as they furnished agreeable matter to discourse and conversation. Perhaps you are a young man, and being full of those sublime ideas, which you have so well exprest, think there can be no virtue upon a more confined system. I am not an old one; but being of a cool temperament, have always found, that more simple views were sufficient to make me act in a reasonable manner: Νήφε, και μεμνησο ἀπιστειν *: in this faith I have lived, and hope to die.

Your civilities to me so much overbalance your severities, that I should be ungrateful to take notice of some expressions, which, in the heat of composition, have dropt from your pen. I must only complain of you a little, for ascribing to me the sentiments which I had put into the mouth of the sceptic in the Dialogue. I have surely

* i. e. Be sober-minded, and remember always to doubt.

endeavoured to refute the sceptic with all the force of which I am master; and my refutation must be allowed sincere, because drawn from the capital principles of my system. But you impute to me both the sentiments of the sceptic, and the sentiments of his antagonist, which I can never admit of. In every dialogue, no more than one person can be supposed to represent the author.

Your severity on one head, that of Chastity, is so great, and I am so little conscious of having given any just occasion to it, that it has afforded me a hint to form a conjecture, perhaps ill-grounded, concerning your person.

I hope to steal a little leisure from my other occupations, in order to defend my philosophy against your attacks. If I have occasion to give a new edition of the work which you have honoured with an answer, I shall make great advantage of your remarks, and hope to obviate some of your criticisms.

Your style is elegant, and full of agreeable imagery. In some few places, it does not fully come up to my ideas of purity and correctness. I suppose mine falls still further short of your ideas. In this respect, we may certainly be of use to each other. With regard to our philosophical systems, I suppose we are both so fixed, that there is no hope of any conversions betwixt us; and for my part, I doubt not but we shall

both do as well to remain as we are.—I am, Sir, with great regard, your most obliged humble servant,

DAVID HUME.

Edinburgh, 15th March 1753.

APPENDIX—NO. VII.

A Character of Dr THOMAS BLACKWELL, *written by Dr* ALEXANDER GERARD.

[Taken from the Aberdeen Journal.]

ON Sunday the 6th of March 1757, died at Edinburgh, in the fifty-sixth year of his age, Dr Thomas Blackwell, Principal and Professor of Greek in the Marischal College of Aberdeen. He became very early conspicuous in life for his masterly knowledge in all the several branches of polite literature; and, by his *Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer*, acquired at once that distinguished character in the learned world, which he ever after supported with so much credit and reputation. As in learning and knowledge he was exquisite and equal to any, so in the address of a teacher he was perhaps superior

to all. No man ever possessed in a more eminent degree the talent of inspiring young minds with a love of learning; of begetting among them a generous emulation; and of forming them to a taste and perception of what was elegant and beautiful in the admired productions of antiquity. On public occasions, when he appeared as head of the University, he acquitted himself with so much dignity, and delivered his orations with such just elocution, and in a manner so emphatic and graceful, as gained him not only the applause, but the universal admiration of his audience. His latter days were calm and resigned. He beheld the approach of death with fortitude, composure and serenity; like one who, having acted his part well, when he arrived at the brink of life, could look back with pleasure, and forward without apprehension. As on many other accounts, so particularly his loss is to be regretted, in that he was snatched away before he had put the finishing hand to a work which, from what of it has already appeared, will hand him down to posterity as a sincere lover of his country, and a friend to mankind.

APPENDIX.—NO. VIII.

ART. I.—*A* LIST *of the* MEMBERS *of the* RANKENIAN CLUB, *furnished by* GEORGE WALLACE, *Esq; Advocate, one of the last surviving Members.*

1. THE Reverend William Wishart, D. D. one of the Ministers of Edinburgh, and Principal of the University.
2. Archibald Murray of Murrayfield, Esq. Advocate.
3. The Reverend Robert Wallace, D. D. a Minister of the New North Church of Edinburgh, author of an *Estimate of the Numbers of Mankind*, and *Characteristics of the present Political State of Great Britain.*
4. The Right Reverend Isaac Madox, Lord Bishop of Worcester.
5. The Reverend John Horsley, Rector of St Martin's in the Fields, Westminster.
6. Mr John Stevenson, Professor of Logic in the University of Edinburgh.

7. The Reverend George Turnbull, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the Marischal College, Aberdeen, author of *Principles of Moral Philosophy*, and a *Treatise on Ancient Painting*.
8. Colin Maclaurin, A. M. Professor of Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, author of a *System of Fluxions*, *Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy*, and various other works.
9. George Young, M. D. Physician in Edinburgh.
10. John Smibert, a painter of reputation.
11. Mr Charles Mackay, Advocate, Professor of Civil History in the University of Edinburgh.
12. The Reverend William Hepburn, Minister of Inverkeilor, in Angus.
13. Nicol Graham of Gartmore, Esq. Advocate.
14. The Reverend George Wishart, D. D. Minister of the Tron Church, Edinburgh, Principal Clerk to the Church of Scotland.
15. Sir Alexander Dick of Prestonfield, Baronet.
16. Sir John Pringle, Baronet, M. D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, Physician to their Majesties, and President of the Royal Society of London.
17. Charles Maitland of Pitrichie, Esq. Advocate, Member of Parliament.
18. Alexander Boswell of Auchinleck, one of the Lords of Session.
19. Sir Andrew Mitchel of Thainston, Advocate, K. B. afterwards Plenipotentiary at the Court of Berlin.

After the Club had subsisted above forty years and its attending members were much diminished by death and accidental separation, it was resolved, that the sons of the original members should be invited to become associates. In consequence of this resolution, the following gentlemen were added to its number:

20. Thomas Young, M. D. Professor of Midwifery in the University of Edinburgh.
21. George Wallace, Esq. Advocate, author of *A System of the Principles of the Law of Scotland; Nature and Descent of Ancient Peerages; Origin of Feudal Tenures, &c.*
22. John Maclaurin of Dreghorn, one of the Lords of Session, author of a *Collection of Criminal Trials; Observations on some Points of Law, &c.*
23. Alexander Murray of Henderland, one of the Lords of Session.

In the winter of 1771, a few months after the death of Dr Wallace, the Rankenian Club resolved to discontinue their regular weekly meetings; and a few occasional meetings were afterwards held, down to the year 1774, from which time it ceased altogether.

ART. II.—*A* LIST *of the* MEMBERS *of the* POKER CLUB *in* 1774, *and downwards to* 1784, *taken from the MS. Memoirs of the Reverend Dr* ALEXANDER CARLYLE.

1. Lord Elibank.
2. Dr Alexander Carlyle.
3. Professor Adam Ferguson.
4. Mr John Fordyce.
5. Mr John Home.
6. Mr George Dempster, Advocate.
7. Mr James Ferguson Pitfour, Advocate.
8. Mr Andrew Crosbie, Advocate.
9. Mr William Johnstone Pulteny, Advocate.
10. Mr William Nairne Dunsinnan, Advocate.
11. Mr David Hume.
12. Mr James Edgar.
13. Mr John Adam.
14. Dr William Robertson.
15. Mr Andrew Stuart.
16. Mr Adam Smith.
17. Sir John Dalrymple, Advocate.
18. Dr Hugh Blair.
19. Sir John Whiteford, Advocate.
20. Mr Baron Mure.
21. Mr David Ross, Ankerville, Advocate.
22. Dr Joseph Black.

23. Lord Elliock.
24. Mr Baron Grant.
25. Mr Ilay Campbell, Advocate.
26. Mr Dundas of Dundas.
27. Mr John Clerk, Eldin.
28. Lieutenant-Colonel John Fletcher.
29. Sir James Stewart, Coltness.
30. Mr Andrew Grant.
31. Mr Hume of Ninewells.
32. Colonel Campbell, Finab.
33. Mansfeldt Cardonnel, Commissioner of Customs.
34. Mr A. Ferguson, Craigdarroch, Advocate.
35. Mr Robert Chalmers.
36. Mr Robert Cullen, Advocate.
37. Mr George Brown, Elliston.
38. Sir Adam Ferguson.
39. Professor John Robison.
40. Mr William Gordon, Advocate.
41. Mr George Home, Writer to the Signet.
42. Henry Dundas, Lord Advocate.
43. Captain John Elliott.
44. Mr James Russell.
45. Mr Robert Keith, Ambassador.
46. Mr William Graham, Gartmore.
47. Mr Alexander Home, Clerk of Session.
48. The Earl of Glasgow.
49. Mr Baron Norton.
50. Mr George Ferguson, Hermand, Advocate.
51. Sir John Halkett, Baronet.

52. The Duke of Buccleuch.
53. The Earl of Glencairn.
54. Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun.
55. Lord Mountstuart.
56. Mr Baron Gordon.
57. Mr F. Dundas, Lord Dundas.
58. Mr Kennedy of Dunure.
59. Lord Binning.
60. Mark Pringle, Esq. Advocate.
61. John Rutherford, Egerton, Advocate.
62. Earl of Haddington.
63. Mr William Muirhead.
64. Mr William Miller, Lord Glenlee.
65. Marquis of Graham.
66. Sir James Johnston.

Established LIST *of the* YOUNGER POKER CLUB, *about the year* 1786 or 1787.

Professor Dugald Stewart.
Lord Daer.
Dr W. Greenfield.
John Playfair, now Professor Playfair.
William Robertson, Advocate, Lord Robertson.
David Hume, Advocate.
Bannatyne Macleod, Advocate, Lord Bannatyne.
Patrick Brydone, Esq.
Dr Henry Grieve.
William Waite, Esq.

George Home, Esq.
William Craig, Esq.
Henry Mackenzie, Esq.
Solicitor Robert Dundas.
John Morthland, Advocate.
D. Rutherford, M.D.
Alexander Tytler, Advocate.

Old Members Attending.

John Home, Esq.
James Edgar.
Dr A. Carlyle.
Dr H. Blair.
Dr Joseph Black.
General Fletcher Campbell.

APPENDIX.—NO. IX.

LETTERS *from* THOMAS REID, D. D. *Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, to Lord* KAMES.

LETTER I.—*On the Laws of Motion.*

Glasgow College, May 19. 1780.

MY LORD,

IN order to understand the preliminary part of Newton's *Principia*, it is necessary to attend to his general design, both in his axioms and definitions.

First, As to his Axioms: He sets down the three laws of motion as axioms. But he does not mean by this, that they are to be held as self-evident truths; nor does he intend to prove them in what he says upon them. They are incapable of demonstration, being matters of fact, which universally obtain in the material world, and which had before been observed by philoso-

phers, and verified by thousands of experiments by Galileo, by Wren, Wallis, Huygens, and Mariotte, to whom he refers for the proof of them. Therefore, that he might not *actum agere*, he lays them down as established truths, saying some things upon them by way of illustration, and deducing some general corollaries from them.

That this was his view, he expressly says in his scholium following the axioms; *Hactenùs principia tradidi, a Mathematicis recepta, et multiplici experientiâ confirmata, &c.* The very same method he follows in his Optics, laying down as axioms what had before been discovered in that science.

The axioms, or established principles in the *Principia*, are three, 1*st*, Every body perseveres in its present state, whether of motion or rest, until it is made to change that state by some force impressed upon it. 2*d*, The change of motion produced is always proportional to the force impressed, and in the direction of that force. 3*d*, All action of bodies upon each other is mutual or reciprocal, and in contrary directions; that is, if the body *A* produces any motion, or change of motion in *B*; by the reaction of *B*, an equal change of motion, but in a contrary direction, will be produced in *A*. This holds in all action of bodies on each other, whether by a

stroke, by pressure, by attraction, or by repulsion.

Perhaps, you will say these principles ought not to be taken for granted, but to be proved. True, my Lord, they ought to be proved by a very copious induction of experiments; and if they are not proved, the whole system of the *Principia* falls to the ground, for it is all built upon them. But Sir Isaac thought they were already proved, and refers you to the authors by whom. He never intended to prove them, but to build upon them, as mathematicians do upon the *Elements of Euclid.*

Secondly, As to the Definitions: They are intended to give accuracy and precision to the terms he uses in reasoning from the laws of motion. The definitions are accommodated to the laws of motion, and fitted so as to express with precision all reasoning grounded upon the laws of motion. And, for this reason, even the definitions will appear obscure, if one has not a distinct conception of the laws of motion always before his eye.

Taking for granted the laws of motion, therefore, he gives the name of *vis insita*, or *vis inertiæ*, to that property of bodies, whereby, according to the first and second laws of motion, they persevere in their state, and resist any change, either from rest to motion, or from motion to

rest, or from one degree or direction of motion to another.

This *vis insita* is exercised in every case wherein one body is made to change its state by the action of another body; and the exertion of it may, in different respects, be called both resistance and impetus.

The reluctance which the body *A* has to change its state, which can be overcome only by a force proportioned to that reluctance, is resistance. The reaction of the body *A* upon *B*, which, according to the third law of motion, is equal to the action of *B* upon *A*, and in a contrary direction, is impetus.

Thus, in every change made in the state of one body by another, there is mutual resistance, and mutual impetus. The one never exists without the other. A body at rest not only resists, but gives an impetus to the body that strikes it. And a body in motion coming against a body at rest, not only gives an impetus to the body that was at rest, but resists that change of its own motion which is produced by the stroke. Each gives an impetus to the other, and exerts a resistance to the impetus it receives from the other.

This is the notion which Newton affixes to the words Impetus and Resistance; and I think it corresponds perfectly with the third law of mo-

tion, but may appear dark if that is not kept in view.

But, because this notion of resistance and impetus differs somewhat from the vulgar application of those words, in order to point out the difference, he contrasts it with the vulgar meaning in the words which your Lordship quotes. *Vulgus resistentiam quiescentibus et impetum moventibus tribuit: sed motus et quies, ut vulgò concipiuntur, respectu solo distinguuntur, neque semper verè quiescunt quæ vulgò tanquam quiescentia spectantur.* He considers both resistance and impetus as belonging to every body, in every case in which it is made to change its state, whether from rest to motion, or from motion to rest. It resists the change of its own state, and by its reaction gives an impetus to the body that acts upon it. The vulgar, having no notion, or no distinct notion, of this reaction established by the third law of motion, suit their language to their conceptions. He suits his to the laws of motion.

A post, you say, resists, but has no impetus. This is true in the vulgar sense of the word. But, in order to shew you that his sense differs somewhat from the vulgar, he would say, that the post has impetus in his sense. And by this he means only, that the post stops, or changes the motion of the body that strikes it; and in producing this change, exerts a force equal to

that with which it was struck, but in a contrary direction. This is a necessary consequence of the third law of motion. The vulgar both speak and judge of motion and rest in a body, by its situation with respect to some other body, which, perhaps from prejudice, they conceive to be at rest. This makes Newton say, "That motion "and rest, as commonly conceived, are distin- "guished by relation; nor are those bodies al- "ways really at rest which are commonly con- "ceived to be at rest."

Rest, when we speak of bodies, is opposed, not to self-motion only, but to all change of place. Absolute or real rest is opposed to real motion; and relative rest, that is, rest with relation to such a body that is supposed at rest, is opposed to relative motion with respect to the same body. But a body may be relatively at rest, and at the same time really in motion. Thus, a house rests upon its foundation for ages; but this rest is relative with respect to the earth. For it has gone round the earth's axis every day, and round the sun every year.

The distinction your Lordship makes between moving and being moved, belongs not to physics, but to metaphysics. In physics, you may use the active or the passive verb as you like best. The reason is, that in physics we seek not the efficient causes of phenomena, but only the rules

or laws by which they are regulated. We know, that a body once put in motion continues to move, or, if you please, to be moved, until some force is applied to stop or retard it. But whether this phenomenon is produced by some real activity in the body itself, or by the efficiency of some external cause; or whether it requires no efficiency at all to continue in the state into which it is put, is perhaps difficult to determine; and is a question that belongs not to physics, but to metaphysics.

Some divines and philosophers have maintained, that the preservation of a created being in existence, is a continued act of creation, and that annihilation is nothing but the suspending that exertion of the Creator by which the being was upheld in existence.

Analogous to this, I think, is the opinion, that the continuance of motion in a body requires a continued exertion of that active force which put it into the state of motion. I am rather inclined to the contrary of both these opinions, and disposed to think, that continuance of existence, and continuance of motion, in a body, requires no active cause; and that it is only a change of state, and not a continuance of the present state, that requires active power. But I suspect both questions are rather beyond the reach of the human faculties. However, they be-

long not to the province of physics, but to that of metaphysics.

I wish I may be intelligible, and that I do not oppress your Lordship with the garrulity of old age. I find myself indeed growing old, and have no right to plead exemption from the infirmities of that stage of life. For that reason, I have made choice of an assistant in my office. Yesterday, the College, at my desire, made choice of Mr Archibald Arthur, preacher, to be my assistant and successor *. I think I have done good service to the College by this, and procured some leisure to myself, though with a reduction of my finances. May your Lordship live long and happy. Yours,

THO. REID.

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* Mr Arthur, a man of learning, abilities and worth, filled the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow for fifteen years, with a reputation which did not disappoint the hopes of his respectable predecessor. A volume of *Discourses on Theological and Literary Subjects*, which give a very favourable idea of his talents, the justness of his taste, and the rectitude of his moral and religious principles, has been published, since his death, by Professor Richardson of the same College,—a gentleman distinguished in the literary world; and who has done honour to the memory of his friend, by an interesting sketch of his Life and Character, subjoined to these Discourses.

Letter II.—*From Dr* Reid *to Lord* Kames.

On the use of Conjectures and Hypotheses in Philosophical Investigation; and on the meaning of Cause *when applied to Natural Philosophy. —The distinct Provinces of Physical and Metaphysical Reasoning pointed out.*

My Lord, *16th December* 1780.

1. I am now to answer the letter you honoured me with of 7th November. And first, I disclaim what you seem to impute to me, to wit, "the valuing myself upon my ignorance of the "cause of gravity," To confess ignorance when one is conscious of it, I take to be a sign, not of pride, but of humility, and of that candour which becomes a philosopher; and so I meant it.

2. Your Lordship thinks, "That never to "trust to hypotheses and conjectures about the "works of God, and being persuaded that they "are more like to be false than true, is a dis-"couraging doctrine, and damps the spirit of "inquiry," &c. Now, my Lord, I have, ever since I was acquainted with Bacon and Newton, thought that this doctrine is the very key to Na-

tural Philosophy, and the touchstone by which every thing that is legitimate and solid in that science, is to be distinguished from what is spurious and hollow; and I can hardly think, that we can differ in so capital a point, if we understood each other's meaning.

3. I would discourage no man from conjecturing, only I wish him not to take his conjectures for knowledge, or to expect that others should do so. Conjecturing may be a useful step even in natural philosophy. Thus, attending to such a phenomenon, I conjecture that it may be owing to such a cause. This may lead me to make the experiments or observations proper for discovering whether that is really the cause or not: And if I can discover, either that it is or is not, my knowledge is improved; and my conjecture was a step to that improvement. But, while I rest in my conjecture, my judgment remains in suspense, and all I can say is, it may be so, and it may be otherwise.

4. A cause that is conjectured ought to be such, that if it really does exist, it will produce the effect. If it have not this quality, it hardly deserves the name of a conjecture. Supposing it to have this quality, the question remains, Whether does it exist or not? And this, being a question of fact, is to be tried by positive evidence. Thus, Des Cartes conjectured, that the planets are carried round the sun in a vortex of

subtile matter. The cause here assigned is sufficient to produce the effect. It may, therefore, be entitled to the name of a conjecture. But where is the evidence of the existence of such a vortex? If there be no evidence for it, even though there were none against it, it is a conjecture only, and ought to have no admittance into chaste natural philosophy.

5. All investigation of what we call the causes of natural phenomena, may be reduced to this syllogism, If such a cause exists, it will produce such a phenomenon: but that cause does exist: Therefore, &c. The first proposition is merely hypothetical. And a man in his closet, without consulting nature, may make a thousand such propositions, and connect them into a system; but this is only a system of hypotheses, conjectures or theories; and there cannot be one conclusion in natural philosophy drawn from it, until he consults Nature, and discovers whether the causes he has conjectured do really exist. As far as he can shew that they do, he makes a real progress in the knowledge of nature, and not a step further. I hope in all this your Lordship will agree with me. But it remains to be considered how the second proposition of the syllogism is to be proved, to wit, that such a cause does really exist. Will nothing satisfy here but demonstration?

6. I am so far from thinking so, my Lord, that I am persuaded we never can have demonstration in this case. All that we know of the material world, must be grounded on the testimony of our senses. Our senses testify particular facts only: from these we collect, by induction, general facts, which we call Laws of Nature, or Natural Causes. Thus, ascending by a just and cautious induction, from what is less to what is more general, we discover, as far as we are able, natural causes, or laws of nature. This is the analytical part of natural philosophy. The synthetical part takes for granted, as principles, the causes discovered by induction, and from these explains or accounts for the phenomena which result from them. This analysis and synthesis make up the whole theory of natural philosophy. The practical part consists in applying the laws of nature to produce effects useful in life.

7. From this view of natural philosophy, which I have learned from Newton, your Lordship will perceive, that no man who understands it, will pretend to demonstrate any of its principles. Nay, the most certain and best established of them may, for any thing we know, admit of exceptions. For instance, there is no principle in natural philosophy better established than the universal gravitation of matter. But, can this be demonstrated? By no means. What is the evidence of it then? It is collected by induction,

partly from our daily experience, and from the experience of all nations, in all ages, in all places of earth, sea, and air, which we can reach; and partly from the observations and experiments of philosophers, which shew, that even air and smoke, and every body upon which experiments have been made, gravitate precisely in proportion to the quantity of matter; that the sea and the earth gravitate towards the moon, and the moon towards them; that the planets and comets gravitate towards the sun, and towards one another, and the sun towards them. This is the sum of evidence; and it is as different from demonstration, on the one hand, as from conjecture, on the other. It is the same kind of evidence which we have, that fire will burn, and water drown, that bread will nourish, and arsenic poison, which I think would not properly be called conjecture.

8. It is proper here to explain what is meant by the cause of a phenomenon, when that word is used in natural philosophy. The word Cause is so ambiguous, that I fear many mistake its meaning, and take it to mean the efficient cause, which I think it never does in this science.

9. By the cause of a phenomenon, nothing is meant but the law of nature, of which that phenomenon is an instance, or a necessary consequence. The cause of a body's falling to the ground is its gravity. But gravity is not an efficient cause, but a general law, that obtains in na-

ture, of which law the fall of this body is a particular instance. The cause why a body projected moves in a parabola, is, that this motion is the necessary consequence of the projectile force and gravity united. But these are not efficient causes, they are only laws of nature. In natural philosophy, therefore, we seek only the general laws, according to which nature works, and these we call the causes of what is done according to them. But such laws cannot be the efficient cause of any thing. They are only the rule according to which the efficient cause operates.

10. A natural philosopher may search after the cause of a law of nature: But this means no more than searching for a more general law, which includes that particular law, and perhaps many others under it. This was all that Newton aimed at by his *ether*. He thought it possible, that if there was such an ether, the gravitation of bodies, the reflection and refraction of the rays of light, and many other laws of nature, might be the necessary consequences of the elasticity and repelling force of the ether. But, supposing this ether to exist, its elasticity and repelling force must be considered as a law of nature; and the efficient cause of this elasticity would still have been latent.

11. Efficient causes, properly so called, are not within the sphere of natural philosophy. Its bu-

siness is, from particular facts in the material world, to collect, by just induction, the laws that are general, and from these the more general, as far as we can go. And when this is done, natural philosophy has no more to do. It exhibits to our view the grand machine of the material world, analysed as it were, and taken to pieces, with the connexions and dependencies of its several parts, and the laws of its several movements. It belongs to another branch of philosophy to consider, whether this machine is the work of chance or of design, and whether of good or of bad design. Whether there is not an intelligent First Mover who contrived the whole, and gives motion to the whole according to the laws which the natural philosopher has discovered; or, perhaps, according to laws still more general, of which we can only discover some branches; and whether he does these things by his own hand, so to speak, or employs subordinate efficient causes to execute his purposes. These are very noble and important inquiries, but they do not belong to natural philosophy; nor can we proceed in them in the way of experiment and induction, the only instruments the natural philosopher uses in his researches.

12. Whether you call this branch of philosophy Natural Theology or Metaphysics, I care not; but I think it ought not to be confounded with Natural Philosophy; and neither of them

with Mathematics. Let the mathematician demonstrate the relation of abstract quantity; the natural philosopher investigate the laws of the material system by induction; and the metaphysician, the final causes, and the efficient causes of what we see, and what natural philosophy discovers in the world we live in.

13. As to Final Causes, they stare us in the face wherever we cast our eyes. I can no more doubt whether the eye was made for the purpose of seeing, and the ear of hearing, than I can doubt of a mathematical axiom; yet the evidence is neither mathematical demonstration, nor is it induction. In a word, final causes, good final causes, are seen plainly every where; in the heavens and in the earth; in the constitution of every animal, and in our own constitution of body and of mind; and they are most worthy of observation, and have a charm in them that delights the soul.

14. As to Efficient causes, I am afraid our faculties carry us but a very little way, and almost only to general conclusions. I hold it to be self-evident, that every production, and every change in nature must have an efficient cause that has power to produce the effect; and that an effect which has the most manifest marks of intelligence, wisdom and goodness, must have an intelligent, wise and good efficient cause. From these

and some such self-evident truths, we may discover the principles of natural theology, and that the Deity is the first efficient cause of all nature. But how far he operates in nature immediately, or how far by the ministry of subordinate efficient causes, to which he has given power adequate to the task committed to them, I am afraid our reason is not able to discover, and we can do little else than conjecture. We are led by nature to believe ourselves to be the efficient causes of our own voluntary actions; and from analogy, we judge the same of other intelligent beings. But with regard to the works of nature, I cannot recollect a single instance wherein I can say, with any degree of assurance, that such a thing is the efficient cause of such a phenomenon of nature.

15. Malebranche, and many of the Cartesians, ascribed all to the immediate operation of the Deity, except the determinations of the will of free agents. Leibnitz, and all his followers, maintain, that God finished his work at the creation, having endowed every creature, and every individual particle of matter, with such internal powers as necessarily produce all its actions, motions, and changes, to the end of time. Others have held, that various intelligent beings, appointed by the Deity to their several departments, are the efficient causes of the various operations of nature. Others, that there are beings endowed with power without intelligence, which are

the efficient causes in nature's operations, and they have given them the name of Plastic Powers, or Plastic Natures. A late author of your Lordship's acquaintance, has given it as ancient metaphysics, That every body in the universe is compounded of two substances united, to wit, an immaterial mind or soul, which, in the inanimate creation, has the power of motion without thought, and of inert matter as the other part. The celebrated Dr Priestley maintains, that matter, properly organized, has not only the power of motion, but of thought and intelligence; and that a man is only a piece of matter properly organized.

16. Of all these systems about the efficient causes of the phenomena of nature, there is not one that, in my opinion, can be either proved or refuted from the principles of Natural Philosophy. They belong to Metaphysics, and affect not Natural Philosophy, whether they be true or false. Some of them, I think, may be refuted upon metaphysical principles; but as to the others, I can neither see such evidence for them or against them as determines my belief. They seem to me to be conjectures only about matters where we have not evidence, and, therefore, I must confess my ignorance.

17. As to the point which gave occasion to this long detail, Whether there is reason to think

that matter gravitates by an inherent power, and is the efficient cause of its own gravitation, I say, first, This is a metaphysical question, which concerns not Natural Philosophy, and can neither be proved nor refuted by any principle in that science. Natural philosophy informs us, that matter gravitates according to a certain law, and it says no more. Whether matter be active or passive in gravitation, cannot be determined by any experiment I can think of. If it should be said that we ought to conclude it to be active, because we perceive no external cause of its gravitation, this argument, I fear, will go too far. Besides, it is very weak, amounting only to this; I do not perceive such a thing, therefore it does not exist.

18. I never could see good reason to believe that matter has any active power at all. And, indeed, if it were evident that it has *one*, I think there could be no good reason assigned for not allowing it *others*. Your Lordship speaks of the power of resisting motion, and some others, as acknowledged active powers inherent in matter. As to the resistance to motion, and the continuance in motion, I never could satisfy myself, whether these are not the necessary consequences of matter being inactive. If they imply activity, that may lie in some other cause.

19. I am not able to form any distinct conception of active power, but such as I find in myself. I can only exert my active power by will, which

supposes thought. It seems to me, that if I was not conscious of activity in myself, I could never, from things I see about me, have had the conception or idea of active power. I see a succession of changes, but I see not the power, that is, the efficient cause of them; but having got the notion of active power, from the consciousness of my own activity, and finding it a first principle, that every production requires active power, I can reason about an active power of that kind I am acquainted with, that is, such as supposes thought and choice, and is exerted by will. But if there is any thing in an unthinking inanimate being that can be called active power, I know not what it is, and can not reason about it.

20. If you conceive that the activity of matter is directed by thought and will in matter, every particle of matter must know the situation and distance of every other particle within the planetary system; but this, I am apt to think, is not your Lordship's opinion.

21. I must therefore conclude, that this active power is guided in all its operations by some intelligent Being, who knows both the law of gravitation, and the distance and situation of every particle of matter with regard to every other particle, in all the changes that happen in the material world. I can only conceive two ways in which this particle of matter can be guided, in all the exertions of its active power, by an in-

telligent Being. Either it was formed, in its creation, upon a foreknowledge of all the situations it shall ever be in with respect to other particles, and had such an internal structure given it as necessarily produces, in succession, all the motions, and tendencies to motion, it shall ever exert. This would make every particle of matter a machine or automaton, and every particle of a different structure from every other particle in the universe. This is indeed the opinion of Leibnitz: but I am not prejudiced against it upon that account: I only wished to know whether your Lordship adopted it or not. Another way, and the only other way in which I can conceive the active power of a particle of matter, guided by an intelligent Being, is by a continual influence exerted according to its situation, and the situation of other particles. In this case, the particle would be guided as a horse is by his rider; and I think it would be improper to ascribe to it the power of gravitation. It has only the power of obeying its guide. Whether your Lordship chooses the first or the last, in this alternative, I should be glad to know, or whether you can think of a third way better than either.

22. I will not add to the length of so immoderately long a letter, by criticising upon the passages you quote from Newton. I have a great regard for his judgment; but where he differs from me, I think him wrong.

The idea of Natural Philosophy I have given in this letter, I think I had from him. If in scholia and queries he gives a range to his thoughts, and sometimes enters the regions of Natural Theology and Metaphysics, this I think is very allowable, and is not to be considered a part of his Physics, which are contained in his propositions and corollaries. Even his queries and conjectures are valuable; but I think he never intended that they should be taken for granted, but made the subject of inquiry.

THO. REID.

LETTER III.—*From Dr* REID *to Lord* KAMES.

On the Laws of Motion.—Pressure of Fluids, &c.

MY LORD, *January* 25. 1781.

To what cause is it owing that I differ so much from your Lordship in Physics, when we differ so little in Metaphysics? I am at a loss to account for this phenomenon. Whether is it owing to our having different conceptions to the same words? Or, as I rather think it is, to your being dissatisfied with the three general laws of motion? Without them, I know not indeed how to reason in physics. Archimedes reasoned from them both in mechanics and hydrostatics. Galileo, Huygens, Wren, Wallis, Mariotte, and many

others, reasoned from them, without observing that they did so.

I have not indeed any scruples about the principles of hydrostatics. They seem to me to be the necessary consequences of the definition of a fluid, the three laws of motion, and the law of gravitation; and, therefore, I cannot assent to your Lordship's reasoning, either about the pressure of fluids, or about the suspension of the mercury in the barometer.

As to the first, the experiments which shew that fluids do in fact press *undequaque*, are so numerous, and so well known to your Lordship, that I apprehend it is not the fact you question, but the cause. You think that gravity is not the cause, Why? Because gravity gives to every part of the fluid a tendency downwards only; and what is true of every part is true of the whole: therefore, the whole has no other tendency but downward. This argument is specious, but there is a fallacy in it. If the parts did not act upon one another, and counteract one another, the argument would be good; but the parts are so connected, that one cannot go down but another must go up, and, therefore, that very gravity which presses down one part presses up another; so that every part is pressed down by its own gravity, and pressed up at the same time by the gravity of other parts; and the contrary pressures being equal, it remains at rest.

This may be illustrated by a balance equilibrating by equal weights in both scales. I say each arm of the balance is equally pressed upwards and downwards at the same time, and from that cause is at rest; although the tendency of the weights in each of the scales is downwards only. I prove it *à posteriori;* because the arm of a balance being moveable by the least force, if it was pressed in one *direction* only, it would move in that direction: But it does not move. I prove it *à priori;* because the necessary effect of pressing one arm down, is the pressing the other up with the same force: Therefore, each arm is pressed down by the weight in its own scale, and equally pressed up by the weight in the other scale; and being pressed with equal force in contrary directions, it remains at rest. Your Lordship will easily apply this reasoning to a fluid, every part of which is as moveable as the balance is about its *fulcrum;* and no one part can move, but an equal part must be moved in a contrary direction. And I think it is impossible we should differ in this, but in words.

Next, as to the barometer. You say the mercury is kept up by the expansive power of the air: But you say further, that it is not kept up by the weight of the air. I agree to the first, but not to the last. The expansive power of the air is owing to its being compressed; and it is compressed by the weight of the incumbent atmo-

sphere. Its expansive force is exactly equal to the force that presses and condenses it; and that force is the weight of the air above it, *to the top of the atmosphere*. So that the expansive force of the air is the *causa proxima*, the weight of the atmosphere the *causa remota* of the *suspension of* the mercury. Your Lordship knows the maxim, *Causa causæ est causa causati*. The barometer, therefore, while it measures the expansive force of the air which presses upon the lower end of the tube, at the same time measures the weight of the atmosphere, which is the cause of that expansive force, and exactly equal to it. If the air was not pressed by the incumbent weight, it would expand in boundless space, until it had no more expansive force.

As to the observation in the postscript. It is true, that the gravity of the air, while it rests upon an unyielding bottom, will give no motion to it; but the mercury in the lower end of the tube yields to the pressure of the air upon it, until the weight of the mercury is balanced by the pressure of the air.

What your Lordship is pleased to call the *Opus Magnum*, goes on, but more slowly than I wish. —I am, most respectfully, my Lord, yours,

THO. REID.

Letter IV.—*From Dr* Reid *to Lord* Kames.

On the accelerated Motion of Falling Bodies.

Glasgow College, Nov. 11. 1782.

My Lord,

My hope that your Lordship is in no worse state of health than when I left you, and that the rest of the good family are well, is confirmed by your continuing your favourite speculations. I promised to call upon you in the morning before I came away. I sent in Samuel to see if you was awake: he reported that you was sleeping sound; and I could not find it in my heart to disturb your repose.

When we say, that, in falling bodies, the space gone through is as the square of the velocity, it must be carefully observed, that the velocity meant in this proposition, is the last velocity, which the body acquires only the last moment of its fall: But the space meant is the whole space gone through, from the beginning of its fall to the end.

As this is the meaning of the proposition, your Lordship will easily perceive, that the velocity of the last moment must indeed correspond to the

space gone through in that moment, but cannot correspond to the space gone through in any preceding moment, with a less velocity; and, consequently, cannot correspond to the whole space gone through in the last and all preceding moments taken together. You say very justly, that, whether the motion be equal or accelerated, the space gone through in any instant of time corresponds to the velocity in that instant. But it does not follow from this, that, in accelerated motion, the space gone through in many succeeding instants will correspond to the velocity of the last instant.

If any writer in physics has pretended to demonstrate mathematically this proposition, That a body falling by gravity *in vacuo*, goes through a space which is as the square of its last velocity; he must be one who writes without distinct conceptions, of which kind we have not a few.

The proposition is not mathematical, but physical. It admits not of demonstration, as your Lordship justly observes, but of proof by experiment, or reasoning grounded on experiment. There is, however, a mathematical proposition, which possibly an inaccurate writer might confound with the last mentioned. It is this, That a body uniformly accelerated from a state of rest, will go through a space which is as the square of the last velocity. This is an abstract proposition, and has been mathematically demon-

strated; and it may be made a step in the proof of the physical proposition. But the proof must be completed by shewing, that, in fact, bodies descending by gravitation are uniformly accelerated. This is sometimes shewn by a machine invented by S'Gravesend, to measure the velocities of falling bodies: Sometimes it is proved by the experiments upon pendulums; and sometimes we deduce it by reasoning from the second law of motion, which we think is grounded on universal experience. So that the proof of the physical proposition always rests ultimately upon experience, and not solely upon mathematical demonstration. I am, my Lord, respectfully yours,

THO. REID.

APPENDIX.—No. X.

On the Principles *of* Criminal Jurisprudence, *as unfolded in Lord* Kames's *Essay on the History of the Criminal Law: with an Examination of the Theory of* Montesquieu *and* Beccaria, *relative to Crimes and Punishments.*

[Intended as a Supplement to Lord Kames's Essay, and Illustration of its General Doctrines.]

I. It is a matter of equal regret to the politician and to the moralist, that the science of Criminal Jurisprudence, on which the good government and peace of society most materially depend, should, in this enlightened period, remarkable for its advancement in many of the branches of political economy, as well as of the philosophy of morals, remain in a state of great imperfection. If this imperfection be denied, it may be

made apparent, very shortly, from two separate considerations: *First*, The great discrepancy of opinions entertained by the ablest writers with regard to some of the most important doctrines of the science: *Secondly*, The barbarity and absurdity of many of the penal laws of the most enlightened nations.

1. Capital punishments have been reprobated by the Marquis de Beccaria, M. de Voltaire, and many other modern writers, as tyrannical, inhuman, and impolitic. On the other hand, the punishment of death applied to certain crimes, has been defended by lawyers, politicians, and philosophers, on the score of justice, wisdom, and the most enlarged humanity. Some enlightened men have justified the extension of the punishment of certain crimes to the family and descendants of the criminal*; while others strongly reprobate that extension, as a remnant of the most barbarous policy. A modern respectable writer, arraigns the practice of penal imprisonment, as contrary alike to good morals, and to good policy. "Imprisonment," says Lord Auckland, "inflicted by law as a punishment, is not "according to the principles of wise legislation. "It sinks useful subjects into burdens on the

* See *Considerations on the Law of Forfeiture*, by the Hon. PHIL. YORKE.

"community, and has always a bad effect on "their morals: Nor can it communicate the be- "nefit of example; being in its nature secluded from the eye of the people." The same writer maintains, that the sole end of imprisonment ought to be, "to keep those who are accused of "injuries to society, amenable to the decisions "of justice*." This is agreeable to the Roman law: *Carcer non ad puniendos, sed ad custodiendos homines adhiberi debet.* The law of England, however, and indeed that of most countries, repudiates this doctrine, and acknowledges imprisonment among its punishments for a variety of smaller offences. By the law of Scotland, imprisonment is not only the punishment of many of the lesser crimes; but it is even, in one instance, a species of torture, and has been vindicated as such by able writers. "After a debtor "is imprisoned," says Erskine, "he ought not "to be indulged with the benefit of the free air, "either on his parole, or even under a guard: "for every creditor has an interest that his "debtor be kept under close confinement, that, "by the *squalor carceris*, he may be brought to "the payment of his just debt."

2. An equally convincing proof of the imperfection of this science, arises from the many in-

* *Principles of Penal Law*, p. 44.

human as well as absurd penal laws, which disgrace the jurisprudence of the most civilized nations.

By the statute 39th Eliz. c. 17. which stands at this day unrepealed, a soldier or mariner who shall be found wandering through the country without a pass from a Justice of the Peace, or who exceeds the time limited by his pass, is to be punished with *death*.

By the statute 9th Geo. I. c. 22. the writing of an anonymous letter, demanding money, victuals, or any thing of value, is punishable with *death*.

By statute 20th Geo. II. c. 46. it is declared felony, without benefit of clergy, for the friends of any person transported, to hold any intercourse with him, by letters, messages or otherwise. This may be justified from good policy in a time of rebellion; but this statute is a permanent law; and thus a capital punishment is decreed for what in many cases may be an act of piety, of duty, and of humanity.

With what indignation do we read those statutes which enact the punishment of *death* for setting fire to a hay-cock, breaking down the head of a fish-pond, or cutting an apple-tree in an orchard! 9th Geo. I. c. 2 .; 9th Geo. III. c. 29.

The wretch who is impelled by misfortune, or by disease, to put a period to his own existence,

is an object of the deepest commiseration. The misery of his mind was insupportable, which could overcome the strongest instinct of nature. Of the quality and measure of his offence, that Almighty Being, who weighs the thoughts of the heart, is the only judge. His own act has put him beyond the reach of human punishment: every infliction of the law, therefore, which is consequent upon this crime, can be directed only against the innocent survivors. "What punish-"ment," says Blackstone, "can human laws in-"flict on one who has withdrawn himself from "their reach?" *None*, is the answer of reason and of humanity. But let us hear the response of the lawyer: "They can only act upon what he "has left behind him, his *reputation* and his *for-*"*tune*: On the former, by an ignominious burial "in the highway, with a stake driven through "his body; on the latter, by a forfeiture of all "his goods and chattels to the King: hoping "that his care for either his own reputation, or "the welfare of his family, would be some mo-"tive to restrain him from so desperate and "wicked an act *." This answer is a miserable sophism, and the doctrine it inculcates is revolting to humanity. It is allowed, that the offender himself is beyond the reach of human laws;

* BLACKSTONE, *Com.* b. 14. c. 14. § 3.

no punishment can extend to him. On what, then, can the punishment of the law operate? On his reputation, and on his goods and chattels. But who suffers from this punishment? Is it the dead offender? No; it is the surviving family: the miserable widow; the orphan children. Theirs is that ignominy, which this wise law inflicts; and theirs is that accumulated misfortune, to lose not only the protecting hand which fed and supported them, but the fruits of all his labour, the sole provision for their future subsistence.

Will a judicious foreigner, who has heard of the wisdom of the laws of England, believe that such doctrines as the following make a part of them at the present day? A man, shooting at a bird, happens to kill his neighbour. The guilt of this man will depend upon the nature of the bird, whether wild or tame, and the man's intention in shooting at it. If the bird chance to be wild, such as heron, crow, kite, or any other fowl which is *nullius in bonis*, the offence is excusable homicide: If a tame fowl, and shot at for amusement, the crime will be man-slaughter; because the offender was committing an unlawful trespass on the property of another: And, lastly, if the bird were private property, and the shooter intended to steal it, the crime will be *murder*, by reason of that felonious intent*. Can

* Kelv, 117.

it be necessary to prove, that as it is the intention alone that determines the nature of a crime, he who, intending to steal a pigeon, kills a man through pure accident, can never be guilty of murder?—In the same spirit of sophistry, the law of England holds, that if a man, in endeavouring to shoot another, is killed himself, by the bursting of his gun in his hand, it is wilful and deliberate self-murder*, and draws after it all the consequences of that crime.

Breaking a house by night, by unbolting the door, picking the lock, or opening the casement, is, by the law of England, burglary, and a capital crime. If the robber comes in at an open door or casement, the offence is of an inferior description. In the trial of a prisoner at Cambridge, it was doubted, whether a robber, who came down the chimney, was guilty of burglary, seeing the chimney is open. But as it appeared in evidence, that some of the bricks were loosened, and fell into the room, this, says Sir Matthew Hale, put it out of all question; and direction was given to find it burglary.

Mr Locke puts the following singular case with respect to justifiable homicide: "A man "with a sword in his hand, demands my purse

* BLACKSTONE, b. iv. c. 14. § 3.

" on the highway, when perhaps I have not " twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may " lawfully kill. To another I deliver £. 100 on- " ly whilst I alight, which he refuses to restore " me when I am got up again; but draws his " sword to defend the possession of it by force, if " I endeavour to retake it. The mischief which " this man *does* me is a hundred, or possibly a " thousand times more than the other perhaps " *intended* me, (whom I killed before he really " did me any,) yet I may lawfully kill the one, " and cannot so much as hurt the other *."

We may therefore very fairly state as convincing proofs of the imperfection of the science of Criminal Jurisprudence, *first*, The discrepancy in the opinions of able men with respect to its most important doctrines; and, *secondly*, The barbarism and absurdity of many of the penal laws of the most enlightened nations.

II. But the imperfection of any science is most likely to arise from one of two sources; either from its not being reduced to principles at all; or from its being founded on such principles as are erroneous. Now, we find that all or most of those authors who have written on Criminal

* LOCKE *on Civ. Gov.* b. ii. c. 18.

Jurisprudence, have laid down certain principles on which they have built the doctrines of the science: if, therefore, it still remains in a state of great imperfection, we are led very naturally to presume, that those principles are erroneous.

It is a certain proof that a principle is faulty, if it leads, by fair reasoning, to conclusions which are repudiated by the common understanding and feelings of mankind.

The leading principle of the penal law, according to Montesquieu, is, That all crimes are to be estimated solely according to the degree of injury which is done to society through their commission. This is likewise the fundamental principle of the Marquis de Beccaria in his *Essay on Crimes and Punishments*. The same principle is indirectly recognised by Dr Priestley, when he says, "The object of the criminal law, is to "lessen the number of crimes in future, and "thereby to give every man a sense of his per-"sonal security; and, if this could be done with-"out the actual punishment of any criminal, so "much evil would be prevented as his punish-"ment implies. *Consequently punishment has no "reference to the degree of moral turpitude in the "criminal**."

* PRIESTLEY'S *Lectures on General Policy*, p. 348.

The above conclusion seems to follow naturally from the premises; but it is a conclusion which we may boldly affirm to be contrary to the decision of the moral sense, and that natural feeling of justice which is implanted in the human breast. The atrocity of a crime, or the moral guilt which it involves, ought to be in every case, if not the sole, at least the leading principle in determining or proportioning the measure of the punishment; and wherever that proportion is violated, of which the mind itself forms a most accurate estimate, we feel that injustice is committed. Supposing, therefore, with Dr Priestley, that it were possible to lessen the number of crimes without having recourse to the punishment of any criminal, it may be affirmed, in direct opposition to this writer, that evil, instead of being prevented, would in reality be occasioned by this impunity, in as much as injustice is one of the greatest of evils; whereas the punishment of a criminal, being an act of justice, is a good, instead of an evil.

To lessen the number of crimes in future, is undoubtedly an important object of the criminal law: but it is neither its sole, nor even its primary object. The primary object of the criminal law, is the accomplishment of justice, by the proper punishment of crimes that have actually been committed. The prevention of future crimes, is

a secondary end, which, in most cases, will be best attained by a due attention to the primary.

The foundation of criminal law is retributive justice, that great principle which regulates the redressing of wrongs, and the avenging of injuries.

Among the original laws of our moral constitution, two of the most remarkable, and which tend most eminently to support the bonds of society, are, Gratitude for benefits received, which prompts to a return of kind offices; and Resentment of injuries, which incites to revenge, or to the punishment of the aggressor. As, on experiencing an important service from our neighbour, an emotion of gratitude arises in the mind, and we feel there is a debt created which we are uneasy till we discharge, by a reciprocal act or testimony of beneficence; so, upon the receiving of an injury, a feeling of resentment is roused which is not appeased till an adequate revenge is taken of the offender*.

A remarkable proof how congenial these feelings are to the nature of man, is, that the person who confers the benefit expects the return of gratitude as the repayment of a just debt, and feels disappointment and a sense of wrong, if

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* Lord KAMES's *Tract on the Hist. of the Criminal Law*, p. 1, 2. 4., &c.

that return is withheld; while, in like manner, the person who commits an injury, is conscious of his own deserts, makes his account with the vengeance that is awaiting him, and suffers a punishment in his own remorse till it is inflicted *.

Nor are these emotions confined to the persons themselves who confer, or who receive the benefits or the injuries. From that beautiful sympathetic frame of our nature, which leads us to participate in all the pleasures and pains, the happiness and misery of our fellow-creatures, we feel delight and satisfaction from every act of benevolence or of virtue, and experience pain and indignation from every deed of malice or of vice, though these in no shape are attended with consequences that affect ourselves. Hence we delight to hear or to read of the reward of virtue, or the punishment of vice; and this even in works of pure imagination. Hence we have a feeling of dissatisfaction, amounting even to indignation, when such acts of virtue or of vice are either entirely unrewarded and unpunished, or fail to receive that just proportion of reward or punishment, which the unerring criterion of the moral sense has ascertained to be their due recompence.

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* Hence, as Lord KAMES observes, come the expressions, *solvere et pendere pœnas.*

The preceding observations, clearly bring to view the great fundamental principle of Criminal Jurisprudence. Every act of wrong or injustice, excites indignation, and calls for revenge from the person injured; an indignation which is participated, and a vengeance which is approved of by the feelings of others; a retribution which is expected by the criminal himself, and justified by his own conscience.

III. This retribution or revenge, which, by the law of nature, belongs of right to the person himself who is injured, it has become necessary, in every civilized society, to surrender to the public; and that for many reasons both of justice and expediency *. I have already observed, that it is necessary for the accomplishment of justice, that the retribution should be precisely commensurate to the injury. But there is a natural propensity in every man to overrate those injuries he has sustained, and to exceed in the measure of his revenge. Now, revenge or punishment is no further just than as it is approved of by the conscience of every reasonable and impartial man. It is therefore necessary that punishment should be awarded only by those who are impartial, in

* Lord KAMES's *History of the Criminal Law*, p. 35.

order that injustice may not be committed *. Moreover, it must frequently happen, that the person who is injured is unable himself to take vengeance against the aggressor; for acts of violence and injustice are most commonly committed by the stronger against the weaker. It is therefore necessary, for the ends of justice, that punishment should be delegated to a hand which is always sufficiently strong to coerce the boldest and most powerful offender.

But expedience, or public utility, likewise requires, that there should be a delegation of the right of punishment from the private party who is injured, to the State. A bold aggressor defends himself by violence; the weak call in the

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* "All the passions of human nature seem proper, and "are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them. He therefore appears "to deserve reward, who to some person or persons is the "natural object of a gratitude which every human heart is "disposed to beat time to; and he, on the other hand, appears to deserve punishment, who, in the same manner, is "to some person or persons the natural object of a resentment, which the breast of every reasonable man is ready to "adopt and sympathize with. To us, surely, that action "must appear to deserve reward, which every body who "knows of it would wish to reward; and that action must as "surely appear to deserve punishment, which every body "who hears of it, is angry with, and, upon that account, rejoices to see punished."—SMITH's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, vol. i. part 2. § 1.

assistance of the strong; parties and factions are formed, to maintain, or to avenge the outrages of individuals, and the State is thrown into confusion. Thus, in all nations in that period of society when Criminal Jurisprudence is in its infancy, and the delegation of private revenge has but imperfectly taken place, we observe a perpetual series of feuds and hostile commotions, arising from the petty quarrels of individuals.

There is yet another reason why the power of punishing crimes should be vested in the State. Every criminal act is an offence or outrage against society. When murder or robbery is committed, the public peace is violated, the general security is broken, and every man feels, while the crime remains unpunished, that his own life and property are put in hazard. This injury, therefore, to the public peace, is with justice and propriety avenged by the public. He who commits an injury against society, incurs an obligation, and contracts a debt to society, of which the creditor is entitled to exact the payment. A criminal unpunished is a gainer at the expence of society *.

Equity, therefore, as well as sound policy, have, in every civilized community, accomplished the transference of the natural right of revenge from the private party who is injured, to the public,

* Lord KAMES's *History of the Criminal Law*, p. 38.

which is likewise a sufferer by the wrong; and this transference is made, as I have already said, to a power which completely sympathizes with the private party, so far as his resentment is just; but which, judging with more impartiality, limits that revenge which would otherwise have been excessive; and it is presumable will, as in every case it certainly ought, commensurate the punishment to the degree of the offence.

It seems highly probable, that most of those erroneous notions which have obtained, with regard to the fundamental principle of Criminal Jurisprudence, have arisen from this transference of the right of punishment from the private party to the public. The calm, equitable, and solemn procedure of public justice, cannot, at first view, be supposed to have its origin in a passion so impetuous, and often so outrageous in its operation, as revenge. Hence we lose sight of its real foundation, and are led to substitute in its stead what occurs more immediately to our view. The right of the State to punish criminals, appears at first sight to be a most wise political regulation for the prevention of crimes; and we look no further for its origin than to that political expediency. Having substituted this secondary object instead of the primary, it has come by degrees to engross an exclusive attention from the legislator and politician, whose views are very naturally directed to general interests, in prefe-

rence to such as are private and individual. In the mean time, the primary object is forgotten, and political expediency is held to be the sole foundation of the right of punishment.

IV. This radical error appears the more remarkable, that we discern, even in the exercise of the power of punishment by the State, very plain indications of its true foundation in the principle of revenge.

By the law of England, independently of the public prosecution for crimes, a suit is competent in all cases to the private party injured, against the aggressor, which is termed an *appeal*. In the case of murder, this appeal is competent to the wife, upon the slaughter of her husband, and to an heir-male, on the slaughter of his ancestor. By the statute of Gloucester*, all appeals of death must be sued within a year and day from the commission of the crime; which seems to be founded on this twofold reason, That revenge is less justifiable after a lapse of time; and That it is not equitable that a criminal suit should be long suspended, because the accused person may thus be deprived of the evidences of his exculpation.

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* 6th EDWARD I. c. 9.

This right of appeal, competent to the private party, the English derive from their Saxon ancestors. Among the ancient Germans, the fine imposed for a crime was divided between the public and the party injured. *Delictis pro modo pœnarum, equorum pecorumve numero convicti mulctantur. Pars mulctæ regi vel civitati, pars ipsi qui vindicatur, vel propinquis ejus exsolvitur* *. And so, in the progress of society, after the abolition of pecuniary compensation for crimes, the private party injured continued still to enjoy his right of revenge; and he was allowed his suit for bringing the aggressor to punishment, although the State should abandon its right of prosecuting. Upon the same principle, the Sovereign's right of pardoning went no further than to a remission of the *vindicta publica:* the claim of the injured party remained entire †. In an appeal of murder, it was the usage of England, even so late as the reign of Henry IV., that all the relations of the deceased dragged the murderer to the place of execution.

Similar to the law of England, in this respect, is the law of Scotland, which allows the party injured to claim a recompence or *assythement*, in-

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* TACIT. *de Mor. Ger.* c. 12.

† *Leg.* EDM. § 3.

dependent of the *vindicta publica:* And when a pardon is granted to a criminal under the Great Seal, he is set at liberty only on condition of finding surety to *assythe* and satisfy the injured parties, in a sum, which is to be taxed by the Barons of Exchequer. In the case of murder, it was, by the ancient law of Scotland, necessary for the wife or executors of the deceased, either to subscribe what were called *Letters of Slains*, (an acknowledgment that they had received complete satisfaction), or to concur in soliciting the pardon, before it could be obtained *.

V. It being therefore necessary, for the accomplishment of justice, that every crime should meet with an adequate punishment, it might appear at first view, that retaliation, where it can with propriety have place, is the nearest approach that can be made to perfect justice in the infliction of punishment; and that, where the criminal is made to suffer himself the same degree of loss or pain which he has occasioned to another, the balance is then even, and the end of punishment, in so far as retributive justice is concerned, is accomplished. This being a very natural view, the mind, at first, is disposed to rest upon it. An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, seem a

* Act 1592, c. 155. No. 1.

just and perfect retribution; and accordingly, retaliation makes a distinguished figure in the penal laws of many rude nations. But a little reflection dissipates this first impression. We perceive that it is contrary to justice, that the lot of the injured person and of the aggressor should be the same. Justice requires that there should be an overplus in the suffering of the aggressor, in order that the principle of vengeance, which is founded in justice, may be satisfied.

The adjustment of this overplus, is the great purpose of the penal law. Its object is, so to proportion punishments to crimes, that there shall neither be an excess of severity, nor of lenity; but the impartial mind shall remain satisfied, that justice is accomplished. It is equally contrary to justice, that the revenge should exceed in severity, as that it should err on the score of lenity; but the violation of justice in the former way, is of much more dangerous consequence than its infringement in the latter.

The extreme severity of many penal laws has been already remarked, as a proof of the imperfection of Criminal Jurisprudence. But whence has that disproportionate severity arisen? solely from our departing from the just principle of commensurating the vengeance of the law to the moral guilt of the offender; and from our resorting to the secondary end of punishment, the

prevention of crimes, instead of the primary, which is the avenging them. But, in fact, this secondary end will often be entirely frustrated, if the primary is neglected. If, for example, the crime of theft has become frequent in any state, it is a very natural idea, that the evil is most effectually to be cured by an increased severity of the punishment. But this increased severity defeats its own purpose. If the punishment shall exceed in any considerable degree, what the mind acknowledges to be a just vengeance on the offender, the sentiment of pity will take place of the feeling of indignation in the public mind; and, instead of a desire to bring the criminal to justice, there will be a humane endeavour to screen his offence from the cognisance of an unjust tribunal.

By the law both of England and Scotland, the man who steals a single sheep is punished with death; a retribution, which the moral feeling, the standard of right and wrong, declares to exceed most enormously the measure of the offence. But this severity is justified, it is alleged, by political expedience. The man is not hanged for stealing a sheep, but he is hanged in order that sheep may not be stolen. Does this plausible argument remove the impression of injustice in that particular case, or prevent us from feeling most sensibly, that the atonement does beyond all measure exceed the offence? Who that had

thus lost a sheep, would seek redress at his own hand, by murdering the man who stole it? Yet the law, to which he has transferred his right of punishment, does this for him. Will any man of common humanity apply for redress of such an injury to this merciless avenger? If he does, he is himself without mercy. He will put up with the loss of his sheep, rather than stain his conscience with the blood of his fellow-creature. Thus, an offence which merits a punishment even of a severe and exemplary nature, will often escape with impunity, because the law has decreed for it a punishment which is absurdly rigorous: And thus, the secondary object of the criminal law, and in which society is most interested, the prevention of crimes, is entirely frustrated, because the primary has been overlooked, which is the accomplishment of retributive justice.

VI. This capital error, of substituting the secondary object of the criminal law for the primary, if in some cases it leads to a prejudicial and inhuman severity, conducts in others to an absurd and impolitic lenity.

The Marquis de Beccaria, whose *Essay on Crimes and Punishments* breathes a very amiable spirit of humanity, has founded all his reasonings on that mistaken idea of Montesquieu, which

makes the prevention of crimes the sole end of punishment, and therefore the principle of Criminal Jurisprudence. The arguments which he employs, and the conclusions which he draws, are such as may be expected from the assumption of false premises.

The punishment of death, according to Beccaria, is neither just nor useful in a well governed state. "What right," says he, "have men to cut "the throats of their fellow-creatures? Certain- "ly not that on which the sovereignty and laws "are founded. The laws are only the sum of "the smallest portions of the private liberty of "each individual, and represent the general will, "which is the aggregate of that of each indivi- "dual. Did any one ever give to others the "right of taking away his life? Is it possible, "that, in the smallest portions of the liberty of "each, sacrificed to the good of the public, can "be contained the greatest of all good, life *?"

This reasoning has the appearance of being logical, and therefore capable of analysis and examination. Let us proceed to try it as such. The author assumes it to be a just definition of Laws, "that they are the sum of the smallest "portions of the liberty of each individual, and "represent the general will, which is the aggre-

* BECCARIA *on Crimes and Punishments*, c. 28.

" gate of that of each individual." And this definition forms the major proposition of a syllogism, of which the conclusion is, That men have no right to inflict capital punishments. Now, in this definition of Law, there are two separate propositions, which, though thrown together in one sentence, are totally unconnected with each other; nay, so entirely distinct, that the one is true and the other false. It is a true proposition, that laws represent the general will, which is the aggregate of that of each individual. Under every government, unless a perfect despotism, the laws may be said to represent the general will; because they receive either the express or the tacit consent of the people whom they bind. In the British Government, the laws may be said to receive the express consent of the people; for it is the representatives of the people who frame, who alter, who amend, and who annul them. But under most governments, the laws may be considered as representing the general will. A man consents to the laws of his country, simply by living under them, and taking the benefit of their protection, which creates a counter obligation on him to obey them*.

* Plato says, " When any one has seen our form of go-
" vernment, and chooses to remain under it, then we say,
" Such an one does indeed agree with us: Ηδη φαμεν τουτον
" ὁμολογησειν ἐργῳ ἡμιν."

But it is a false proposition, "that laws are "the sum of the smallest portions of the private "liberty of each individual." There are many laws in every well regulated government, which affect not in the smallest degree the private liberty of individuals. Such are all remuneratory laws; such are those that regard the performance of all the various species of contracts; such are those which regulate successions and heritages; such are the laws that protect and administrate the property of infants, and of those who are incapable themselves of guarding their own interests. All these, which form the great mass of the municipal laws in every country, imply no abandonment of the private liberty of individuals.

If it is said that in the above definition by Beccaria, penal laws alone are meant, I affirm, that neither is his proposition true with respect to these. By penal laws, is meant the expression of that right which belongs to the State of punishing crimes, which Beccaria supposes to have been surrendered to the community by some deed of the individual: and he puts two questions, Did any one ever give to others the right of taking away his life? And since individuals have transferred to the State only the *smallest* portion of their natural liberty, how can this include the *greatest*, which is life? Now, all this reasoning is mere verbal sophistry. The right of

punishment is not formed out of any portions, great or small, of the liberty of individuals, voluntarily given up by them to the State. No man ever voluntarily gave away any part of his liberty, unless a servant or bondsman, for a price. But this surrender, according to Beccaria, has been universal. Every individual has consented to give up the smallest portion of his liberty for the sake of the public good; and the question is, What is this smallest portion which every man has agreed to surrender? If any surrender of liberty has been made at all, we might agree with Beccaria, that it cannot be the right of taking away life, which is the greatest of all invasions of liberty. What then can it be? Is it the right of whipping, or pillorying, or banishment? But who ever gave his consent to be whipped, or pilloried, or banished? By what general convention were these portions of his liberty ever surrendered by an individual, any more than that other portion which Beccaria has excluded? The notion, in short, is altogether absurd. No man ever gave any other consent to the State's right to inflict a punishment, than that tacit consent which all men give to the laws of their country, by living under them; and this consent applies equally to the right of inflicting capital punishments, as of inflicting any other punishment which those laws authorise.

The right of the State to punish crimes, does not arise from any sacrifice made by individuals, of a part of their liberty; for even under the law of nature, no man has the liberty of committing crimes. He subjects himself to vengeance or to punishment by the very act; which sufficiently demonstrates, that he was not at liberty to commit it. But this right in the State arises from the transference which the individuals have in every community made to the State, of their right of private revenge. Their privileges, or the sum of their liberty, is not abridged by this transference. On the contrary, they are gainers instead of losers; even in the power of revenge, which was the object of the transfer: for that right of revenge which they have by the law of nature, is better carried into effect, when, instead of the weak arm of the individual, the awful vengeance of the sovereign power is exerted in his behalf.

VII. The question, therefore, with regard to the right of the State to inflict capital punishments, will come to this short issue, "Are there "any crimes, which, in justice, deserve the pu- "nishment of death?" For if there are, the State, which is the general avenger, must have the right of inflicting that punishment. Now, there must be no just criterion of right and wrong in the mind of that man, who does not instantly

acknowledge, that there are crimes of that degree of atrocity, for which no other punishment than death is an adequate retribution.

The hardened and incorrigible offender, whom no laws can bind, and no moral principle teach to respect the rights of his fellow-creatures, whose life has been a series of acts of violence, fraud and injustice, and whom every man has reason to regard as a beast of prey; this wretch is the object of a feeling of resentment at once so deep and so universal, that it can be satisfied with no measure of vengeance short of the absolute extirpation of the offender. Our sympathy with those whom such an aggressor has injured, is the more complete, that we perceive our own rights to have been equally liable to invasion as theirs; and we cordially approve of the vengeance taken of the common enemy. *Corrigi nequeunt*, (says Seneca), *nihilque in illis bonæ spei capax est. Tollantur è cœtu mortalium facturi pejora quæ contingunt, et quo uno modo possunt, desinant esse mali**.

But if our moral feelings give entire approbation to that punishment which cuts off from society the habitual violator of the property of his neighbour, how perfectly do they approve and ratify the sentence of death, which the laws of every nation, truly civilized, have pronounced

* SENECA *De Ira*, cap. 15.

against the murderer? Let any man in such a case make the appeal to his own breast, and say what are his feelings, on hearing of the perpetration of a deliberate act of murder. Does he begin coolly to speculate on the injury done to the community by depriving it of a useful member, and the necessity of a powerful remedy to prevent the like evil in future? No, the unnatural scene immediately presents itself to his imagination, in all its circumstances of horror. He is filled with the keenest indignation: His whole soul rises in arms against the murderer; and, sympathizing in all the misery of the unfortunate victim, struck with his irreparable wrongs, he feels that he could himself be the instrument of vengeance, and drag the monster to his deserved fate. "With regard at least to this most dread-"ful of all crimes," says a great moralist, "Na-"ture, antecedent to all reflections upon the uti-"lity of punishment, has stamped upon the hu-"man heart, in the strongest and most indelible "characters, an immediate and instinctive ap-"probation of the sacred and necessary law of "retaliation *." Upon what pretence of a moral

* The excellent writer from whom I have quoted the above passage, has minutely unfolded, on the principles of his theory of *Sympathy*, the various concurring emotions, which, in the

principle shall we spare the life of this atrocious offender, who, to gain perhaps a few pounds, could deliberately embrue his hands in blood?

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case of murder, irresistibly incite to the highest vengeance against the criminal. His observations, which are a very happy specimen of his method of copious and eloquent illustration, I shall here subjoin. "If the injured should perish "in the quarrel, we not only sympathize with the real re- "sentment of his friends and relations, but with the imagi- "nary resentment which, in fancy, we lend to the dead, who "is no longer capable of feeling that, or any other human "sentiment. But, as we put ourselves in his situation; as "we enter, as it were, into his body, and, in our imagina- "tions, in some measure animate anew the deformed and "mangled carcase of the slain; when we bring home in this "manner his case to our own bosoms, we feel upon this, as "upon many other occasions, an emotion which the person "principally concerned is incapable of feeling, and which yet "we feel by an illusive sympathy with him. The sympa- "thetic tears which we shed for that immense and irrepara- "ble loss which in our fancy he appears to have sustained, "seem to be but a small part of the duty which we owe to "him. The injury which he has suffered, demands, we "think, a principal part of our attention. We feel that re- "sentment which we imagine he ought to feel, if, in his cold "and lifeless body, there remained any consciousness of "what passes upon earth. His blood, we think, calls aloud "for vengeance. The very ashes of the dead seem to be "disturbed at the thought that his injuries are to pass un- "revenged. The horrors which are supposed to haunt the "bed of the murderer, the ghosts which superstition ima-

What claim has he to the compassion or to the mercy of man, whose breast was steeled against every feeling of humanity: who could coolly meditate the destruction of his fellow-creature, perhaps his friend, his master, his protector? When the miserable victim of his murderous avarice supplicated him for mercy, he had no compassion. His ear was deaf to the cry of misery; his heart was insensible to the appeal of nature. Let the sword of justice be unsheathed, and injured nature have her full revenge.

VIII. It is the vice of the present age, and the sickly cast of its morality, to have substituted a species of metaphysical sentiment for genuine feeling. It has become a fashionable cant to declaim against the inhumanity of capital punishments; as if that just indignation which arises in every well ordered mind, upon the commission of an atrocious crime, were not itself the genuine offspring of humanity. And by what paltry sophistry are these false notions justified? Every crime, say these reasoners, is an evil; but pu-

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"gines rise from their graves, to demand vengeance upon "those who brought them to an untimely end, all take their "origin from this natural sympathy with the imaginary re- "sentment of the slain." SMITH'S *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, edit. 2., part ii. sect. 2. chap. 2.

nishment is likewise an evil. To punish a crime, therefore, is to add one evil to another. "If "crimes could be diminished without the actual "punishment of any criminal, so much evil "would be prevented as his punishment im-"plies*." The futility of this reasoning hardly needs to be exposed. A crime is an evil done to an innocent person, and to society, which is innocent. Punishment is not an evil done to an innocent person; it is an act of just vengeance against the guilty. One evil is therefore not superadded to another; for what is evil to the criminal, is a positive good to the injured individual, and to society; to the former as avenging his wrong, and to the latter as restoring that order which was violated, and preventing the like evils in future.

Of a similar nature to the above argument, is the following: If a man is murdered, society loses one citizen; if the murderer is put to death, society loses two. The term citizen must be understood to mean a useful member of society; for it is only by the deprivation of such that society can suffer a loss. But, is a murderer a useful member of society? Is he who has broken the strongest bond of the social compact, a valuable citizen? On the contrary, society is a gainer by

* PRIESTLEY'S *Lectures on General Policy*, 4o, p. 348.

the extirpation of a noxious animal, whose ferocity she has experienced. By his destruction, she is secure from his future ravages.

But society, it is alleged, may enjoy the same security, by the substitution of a milder punishment; and the criminal, sufficiently restrained from doing further harm, may still be rendered a useful citizen. But, in the *first* place, Supposing it easily practicable, that a malefactor shall be so restrained, that he shall no longer have the power to commit a crime, while his labour is beneficial to society; it would be sufficient to answer, that simple restraint from the commission of evil is not punishment; nor, in the case of an atrocious criminal, is hard labour to be considered as such: it is often the necessary lot of virtue, cheerfully and contentedly undergone, and therefore cannot be the proper punishment of vice. If, therefore, the hardened malefactor shall receive no other retribution, the primary object of punishment is not attained; justice is not accomplished. But, *secondly*, What is this gain to society, which we purchase by the violation of eternal justice? Suppose twenty inhuman murders to be committed in a year; and that the perpetrators of those crimes, instead of suffering a capital punishment, are confined to hard labour; what is the amount of the gain to the public by this commutation? It is well if these twenty men earn the value of their own subsistence, together with

the expence of an establishment for their restraint. And thus, the balance of pecuniary loss and gain is equal; and all that results from this humane device is the fine consideration, that we have spared the lives of twenty monsters, who had renounced humanity, and who, like tigers, must be restrained from further violence by chains and fetters.

IX. As the principal arguments against capital punishments are drawn rather from political than moral considerations, it may be proper to bestow some attention in examining that reasoning by which it is endeavoured to be shewn, that such punishments are less efficacious in the prevention of crimes, than those that are of a milder nature.

"Let us," says Beccaria *, "consult human "nature in proof of this assertion. It is not the "intenseness of the pain that has the greatest "effect on the mind, but its continuance; for "our sensibility is more easily and more power-"fully affected by weak, but repeated impres-"sions, than by a violent, but momentary im-"pulse. The death of a criminal is a terrible, "but momentary spectacle, and therefore a less "efficacious method of deterring others, than "the continued example of a man deprived of

* *Essay on Crimes and Punishments*, chap. 28.

" his liberty, condemned as a beast of burden, to " repair by his labour the injury he has done to " society. *If I commit such a crime*, says the " spectator to himself, " *I shall be reduced to that " miserable condition for the rest of my life:* a " much more powerful preventive than the fear " of death, which men always behold in distant " obscurity."

This argument possessing a show of reason, betrays in reality an ignorance of human nature. All continued impressions lose their force by their continuance. That which was at first strongly felt, becomes gradually weaker; and if the impression is not at first very powerful in its nature, it will soon, from habit, cease to be felt at all. This is true, as we all experience, with respect to our own personal sufferings, which are real; and if so, it follows *à fortiori*, that it must be true with respect to what we feel by sympathy, from witnessing the sufferings of others. In the case of malefactors condemned to hard labour, we know, that, however severe at first may be the sense of their sufferings, their condition becomes gradually more tolerable; the body is rendered fitter for its toil; its animal strength is actually increased; it performs without difficulty what required at first a painful exertion; and the mind, conforming itself to what it knows to be necessary, sustains its burden at first with patience, and afterwards with ease. Besides, in every

species of bondage or slavery there is hope. If the servitude is for a limited period, its term will be anticipated and enjoyed by the imagination: if it is perpetual, there is still the hope of escape: in both cases, the bitter of the present hour is sweetened by the prospect of the future. If such is the natural progress in the feelings of the sufferers themselves, we know what must be the sympathetic emotions of those who are the witnesses of their occupations and behaviour. We cannot feel much horror for that situation, which we see is endured with ease, and even cheerfulness: we look with a perfect indifference on their condition, who seem to have no concern for it themselves. For the truth of these observations, we may appeal to all who have seen the convicts at their usual labours.

But, widely different indeed are those emotions which are excited by the spectacle of a *capital punishment.* There is no passion so strong or so universal as the *fear of death.* It is implanted in our nature as the preservative of life, and is therefore sufficient singly to overbalance all the evils to which the human condition is subjected. We find innumerable instances of life endured by man, not only under the utmost exacerbation of bodily suffering, but under the keenest misery of mind. How strong must that passion be, which can overcome the anguish of remorse, the shame at-

tendant on detected guilt, the consciousness of lasting infamy? Yet these are all endured, and life still continues to have its attractions. "Per- "mit me," said the wretched Dodd, in his petition to the Sovereign, "to hide my guilt in "some obscure corner of the earth. May I "humbly hope that justice may be satisfied with "irrevocable exile, perpetual disgrace, and hope- "less penury *!"

If it be urged, that the frequent example of those who fly to death as a relief from the miseries of life, proves that the former has often less of terror than the latter; I answer, that this holds true only with respect to that very small proportion of mankind, whose minds are endowed with that most acute and morbid sensibility, which, while it doubles the pressure of real evils, is ingenious in creating to itself those that are

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* Nam quod sæpè homines morbos magis esse timendos,
Infamemque ferunt vitam, quàm Tartara lethi,
—— Hinc luet advertas animum, magis omnia laudis
Aut etiam venti, si fert ita fortè voluntas,
Jactari causa, quàm quod res ipsa probetur.
Extorres iidem patriâ, longèque fugati
Conspectu ex hominum, fœdati crimine turpi
Omnibus ærumnis affecti denique vivunt;
Et quocunque tamen miseri venêre, parentant.

Lucret. lib. 3.

imaginary; who inherit that proud spirit, and high sense of their own desert, which is wounded by the smallest neglect, and rankles with the slightest disappointment; who possess that jealous feeling of honour which cannot bear reproach, and are stung even by the most unmerited suspicion of unworthiness. These are they who seek relief in death from the miseries of existence. But this very constitution is in itself the most effectual guard against the commission of all such actions as subject to the punishment of the laws. When we reason as to the effect of punishment, or its operation, by way of example, on the minds of mankind, it is not minds of this constitution and character that are at all the objects of our view. These must be removed entirely from our contemplation. The objects of the penal law are to be found among that abandoned and most abject class of men, who are the disgrace of the species; who either have no feelings at all of honour, justice, and humanity, or possess those sentiments in so weak a degree, as to have no effect in regulating their conduct, or subduing the force of the selfish passions. It is the wretch who seeks his own gratification at the expence of the dearest interests of his neighbour: it is the cold and callous heart that never felt compassion or benevolence: it is the hardened nature, insensible to shame, and regardless alike of

the praise or reproach of the world: it is the degraded and brutal appetite, which knows no enjoyments beyond those of sense, no pleasures but what are common to the inferior animals. To these miserable outcasts, death, which deprives them of all the present good, and promises nothing but future evil, is the most horrible idea that can be presented by the imagination. Every other situation admits of hope. It is here alone that every avenue of comfort is shut up. With those, therefore, whose obduracy of nature sets at defiance the ordinary restraints against the commission of crimes, a capital punishment is the only engine that has sufficient force to curb their ferocity, and restrain their depredations on society.

The argument in favour of the political expediency of capital punishments, may be summed up in one sentence. The preservation of life is the first concern of man; the fear of losing life is the greatest of all fears; this fear is, of consequence, the greatest of all restraints on the commission of such actions as are punishable by the loss of life.

X. But, if capital punishments are both warranted by our moral feelings, and justified by good policy, the same considerations will strongly dictate, that such punishments ought not to be frequent. In conclusion, therefore, it may be

useful to endeavour to ascertain, in what cases they ought to be resorted to.

And here we must again recur to that great principle, which, I think, we may assert, is demonstrated to be the foundation of the penal law,—the sentiment of Retributive Justice. It is this principle alone which can regulate the due proportion of the punishment to the crime; and all penal laws are wise, equitable and politic, or the contrary, solely according to their conformity or departure from the standard of a just retribution.

As justice requires that every injury should be followed by an adequate portion of vengeance against the offender, so the resentment or indignation which the injury excites, ought in every case to be the measure of this vengeance. In civilized society, the State and not the private party is the avenger; the adequate portion of vengeance, therefore, comes to be determined by the degree of resentment or indignation which arises in the breast of unprejudiced individuals, upon the commission of a crime. Let us here remark, to the honour of human nature, how few in number are those offences, which excite such a measure of indignation, as prompts an impartial individual to desire the death of the offender. Yet if there be any truth in the doctrine I have endeavoured to establish, this is the only

warrant for a capital punishment. Examined by this standard, what judgment must we form of the criminal codes of the most civilized nations in Europe? "It is a melancholy truth," (says the commentator on the laws of England *,) "that among the variety of actions which men "are daily liable to commit, no less than a hun- "dred and sixty have been declared by act of "Parliament to be felonies, without benefit of "clergy, or, in other words, to be worthy of in- "stant *death*;" and the catalogue has been since enlarged!

The apology for many of those sanguinary enactments is, that although the offence, in point of moral turpitude, may not seem to merit so severe a punishment, its frequency had rendered it equally detrimental on the whole to society, with those less common, but more atrocious crimes. This apology proceeds on the false principle, That the sole object of the criminal law is to lessen the number of crimes in future, and "that "punishment," (as it is expressed by Dr Priestley,) "has no reference to the degree of moral "turpitude in the criminal." The error of this notion has already been sufficiently exposed; and it has been shewn, that even that purpose of

* BLACKSTONE'S *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, b. iv. c. 1.

punishment which is held to be its sole object, is counteracted entirely, if the punishment exceed that just measure of vengeance which the impartial mind has ascertained to be equal to the offence.

But let it, for argument's sake, be supposed, that the lessening the number of crimes were the chief, or even the sole object of the criminal law, it would neither follow, that the punishment of death, which our moral feelings declare to be a just retribution for the most atrocious crimes alone, is necessary to check the frequency of the smaller offences; nor that it is just to employ that remedy, although, according to the refined mode of argument employed for that purpose, it may be true, that "the accumulation of such petty offences may produce to the State a sum of "evil, equal, or perhaps superior, to what arises "from the less frequent, though more enormous "crimes."

As to the first consideration, although the dread of a capital punishment may be necessary to restrain that ferocity of nature which prompts to crimes of the deepest dye; it certainly will not be denied, that inferior punishments are sufficient to restrain every ordinary species of criminality. Of all offences, petty thefts are the most common, from the frequency of temptation, and easy opportunity. But that degree of vice which li-

mits itself to petty thefts, may be sufficiently curbed by a variety of inferior punishments, proportioned to the measure of the offence. The frequency of such crimes is to be counteracted more effectually, by an increased vigilance of the law in their detection, than by an increased severity in their punishment: for as the penalty, in every instance where the crime is discovered, far exceeds the gain resulting from its commission, the extreme probability of that penalty taking place, and the small chance of escaping it, will always amount to a sufficient restraint.

With regard to the second consideration, the argument is too refined to produce conviction; and, in reality, when examined, it is a pure sophism. It may be allowed, that petty offences, from their frequency, may produce on the whole a greater sum of evil to the State than the more enormous crimes, which are but rarely perpetrated: but this will not vindicate the justice of repressing the former by capital punishments. The sum of evil is not produced by the crime of one offender, but by those of many offenders. Therefore, as it is altogether contrary to justice to punish one person for the crime of another, so the frequency of a crime ought not, in point of justice, to render the punishment more severe to any individual, than if he had been the sole offender. For even were we to consider the crimes of different individuals in the aggregate, and as form-

ing one mass of evil to the State, it is equally reasonable that we should consider the punishments of different individuals in the aggregate, and accumulate them to form a counterpoise; and thus we should still find the balance even, between the mass of crime, and the mass of punishment.

We may, therefore, confidently conclude, that it is safe to adhere to the great principle of Retributive Justice, which teaches, That the measure of the punishment of crimes ought in every case to depend on the moral turpitude of the criminal, of which Nature has furnished an infallible criterion, in that indignation which arises in the impartial mind upon the commission of a crime, and which always keeps its just proportion to the magnitude of the offence. By an adherence to this principle, in our reasonings upon Criminal Jurisprudence, we have a guide which will clear our path amidst all the mists of error and sophistry.

APPENDIX

TO

VOLUME SECOND.

APPENDIX.

NO. I.

LETTERS *from the Reverend Dr* JOSIAH TUCKER, *(Dean of Gloucester), to Lord* KAMES, *on subjects chiefly relating to Political Economy.*

I. *On the Comparative Advantages of a Rich and a Poor Country for Manufactures.*

London, July 6. 1758.

MY LORD,

I HAVE many excuses to make, and apologies to offer, for not writing sooner. But though my particular situation in regard to my views of preferment, (of which 'tis possible that Mr Robertson may have given your Lordship some information), might plead in my favour, yet I rely more on your goodness, than on any other con-

sideration. However, I have at least succeeded in my wishes, having had the honour to kiss his Majesty's hand, four days ago, for the Deanery of Gloucester.

When persons are desirous of atoning for their offences, they generally make presents. I will try to appease your Lordship in the same way: and if I am not mistaken, the inclosed will be no unacceptable present to one of your Lordship's character. The author is my honoured friend, and formerly my patron; and as he does not make the piece public, I requested of him to give me some copies for the use of my friends, and particularly for your Lordship.

I beg my respectful compliments to Mr David Hume, with thanks for his ingenious animadversions. They are very plausible and well urged; but fall short of conviction: And I must observe in general upon this argument, both to your Lordship and Mr Hume, That as you allow all the matter of fact, viz. That the rich industrious country doth sell all manner of *complete* manufactures cheaper than the poor industrious country, it is of little consequence to the main of the argument, whether I can rightly account for this phenomenon or not. Be it, that I am mistaken, yet the matter of fact is the same: and while that holds good—and no one exception can be brought against it in all history—my general position must be right, though my method of ac-

counting for it may be judged unsatisfactory. If such is the effect, a cause there must be; though I may have assigned a wrong one.

As to the phrase of a country increasing in commerce and manufactures *ad infinitum;* I except against the term; and would not choose that my poor *finite* understanding should be involved in disquisitions about *infinites.* It is sufficient for this purpose to say, That the progress would be indefinite: for I apprehend, no man can mark out the limits, or reasonably affirm, "*Hi-*"*therto* shall an industrious and moral nation "increase in the quantity of their manufactures, "the numbers of their people, and stock of "wealth, and *no farther.*"

In regard to the monopoly which the rich country would thus acquire over a poor one, in the sale of its manufactures, the fact must be acknowledged; but the consequences supposed to result from it, may be obviated to such a degree, as to prevent any dangers arising from it. True it is, that *cæteris paribus*, the rich industrious country would always undersell the poor one; and by that means attract the trade of all poorer countries to itself;—but it is equally true, that if either of these poor countries hath any *peculiar* produce of its own, it may prohibit its exportation till it be wrought up into a complete manufacture. It is true likewise, that all of them have it in their power to load the manufactures of the

rich country upon entering their territories, with such high duties as shall turn the scale in favour of their own manufactures, or of the manufactures of some other nation, whose progress in trade they have less cause to fear, or envy. Thus it is, in my poor apprehension, that the rich may be prevented from swallowing up the poor; at the same time, and by the same methods, that the poor are stimulated and excited to emulate the rich.

The last objection of Mr Hume's was, That as the poorer country, by having wages and raw materials cheaper, would certainly undersell the rich one in the coarse and more imperfect manufactures, so likewise it would from thence gradually ascend to others, till at last it equalled, and perhaps exceeded the rich country in every thing. But, with deference to Mr Hume, I would beg him to reconsider this argument. The point he builds upon, is the cheapness of wages and of raw materials: But will the wages and raw materials remain still at the same low price, after the country is become so much the richer than it was before? Surely not: Surely they will advance in price, in proportion to the advancement of every thing else. And therefore the grand advantage which he supposes the poor country to have over the rich, in point of cheapness of wages, and of raw materials, will grow less and less every day. In short, though both countries

may still go on in their respective improvements, the poor country, according to my apprehension, can never overtake the rich, unless it be through the fault and mismanagement of the latter.

I was extremely hurt in observing with what arrogance and indecency Mr H. was treated by that superficial writer, the author of the *Estimate*. He is himself below Mr H's notice; and just vengeance has been taken on him by several writers; particularly one, who has wrote the *Vindication of Commerce*, styling himself J. B. *M. D.* This *M. D.* is no other than a clothier of Trowbridge, one *Temple*, who has immense erudition in his way,—understands the principles of commerce extremely well, but pushes some of them too far.——In my next, I shall send your Lordship your plan for a *National Militia*, with a few remarks; and am, with great esteem, your Lordship's most obedient and obliged humble servant,

JOSIAH TUCKER.

II. FROM THE SAME.

On Charitable Collections, &c.

Gloucester, October 18. 1761.

My Lord,

I just have had the honour of receiving a letter of your Lordship's, without a date. Your opinion, that my *marriage-portion* scheme savours of Utopia, is not singular: many of my friends have thought the same. And yet, my Lord, I have succeeded almost up to my expectation in one respect, and much beyond it in another. I did not dare to hope, that the collection would exceed £ 100. Many obstacles besides those of novelty lay in the way; such as a lately contested election on the spot, heart-burnings, jealousies, &c.: And yet it rose to £ 90 : 12 : 6; and several persons are desirous of an annual subscription for continuing the charity. But my chief dependance lies in a codicil of a gentleman near Bristol, who is very rich, childless, and very old. I cannot tell what the sum is: but by his manner of talking concerning the scheme, I should judge that it will be considerable.

I cannot agree with your Lordship, that charitable collections are best promoted in our grave

and serious moments. Did mankind act upon the steady principle of true charity, it would be so: But, in fact, charitable collections are best promoted, at least in our part of the Isle, by mixing a little jocundity and dissipation of thought, with the serious design of social benevolence. I have known a good dinner do great things at a country entertainment; and a merry song of *Beard's* do still more. This is not the first time that I have applied public rejoicings to charitable purposes, with good success. The scheme for making a collection on the Thanksgiving-day in 1759, for clothing the French prisoners, was mine; as was also the paper that appeared in the *Chronicle*, and other newspapers. And in regard to the marriage-portion scheme, the real and insuperable difficulty was,—what I am persuaded your Lordship has not yet thought of, viz. That in promoting marriages among the poor, we should increase the poor's-rates. Could I have been able to have removed that scare-crow of a poor's-rate, I could easily establish an annual subscription of £100 and upwards.

Your Lordship very kindly upbraids me with delaying the publication of my work*. But, my

* A work, which was to be entitled, "The Elements of Commerce, and Theory of Taxes;" but which he never completed; probably for the reasons here assigned.

Lord, to what purpose should I publish it? War, conquests and colonies, are our present system; and mine is just the opposite. Were I to publish at this juncture, the best treatment I could expect is, to be taken for a *knave* or a *madman:* and as I know myself not to be the one, I would not willingly be thought the other. So let them pursue their wars, their conquests, and the extension of their colonies, till they have had enough of them: and then, when they have tried the experiment, and found that all has ended in a gay delusion, and been attended with bitter consequences, they may be the more disposed to listen to the cool dictates of reason, and the maxims of common sense. I look upon the nation at present, to be frantic with military glory; and therefore, no more to be argued with, than a person in the raving fit of a high fever. And if my book should at all happen to be read, (which with me is a great question), every newswriter would be pelting me, and saying, that I was the dirty mercenary tool of some great man, who envied *The Great Minister* his glory. Indeed, by his resignation, and accepting a pension, that point is altered for the present: But still, as the people are as mad as ever for carrying on the war, and even extending our conquests and our quarrels, any system built upon maxims opposite and repugnant, would only

raise their bile, without any prospect of making converts.

Your Lordship, in your new work*, walks in a safer path: You have no popular measures to oppose; nor French smugglers to detect, bellowing forth, "O liberty! O my country!" while they are supplying their country's enemies with every thing necessary to prolong the war. *This I know to be the fact*, in London, Bristol, Liverpool, and all over North-America. And if you in North-Britain do act upon more generous and honest principles, you are a rare example, which none will follow.

I know nothing of your Lordship's subject but from the title. This indeed is prodigiously extensive. But I suppose you will contract your views to some particular end or use. Each sensation was certainly designed to answer some one particular end; the gratification of which, under the guidance of reason and reflection, is human happiness: and the non-gratification, if I may use that term, is present misery; and misapplication is misery in reversion. But I am to learn, and not to teach: I shall therefore be very attentive to the advertisements of new books; and I am, my Lord, with true regard and great esteem, your, &c.

J. TUCKER.

* *Elements of Criticism.*

III. FROM THE SAME.

On the same Subjects.

Bristol, December 10. 1763.

My Lord,

A LETTER from your Lordship, dated November 26, has been travelling in pursuit of me several days. It went first to London, according to your Lordship's direction, and having sought me there in vain, it was sent down to Gloucester, and from Gloucester it was yesterday brought here.

Your Lordship's goodness in calling upon me to explain my motives for abandoning my offspring, and exposing my deserted political children to the wide world, certainly entitles you to know the best reasons that I can give for such a conduct: and I wish that they were not so good as they really are.

In the *first* place, I have been too forward in my publications already: and those who think the most favourably of my performance, consider them as the flights of a well-meaning visionary; who, like a second Jacob Henriques, is always obtruding his absurd impracticable schemes upon the public. Others impute my writings to a worse motive; and very few indeed can be

brought to believe that I have a sound and solid judgment, in the affairs about which I have written so much. I remember, that I have often complained to your Lordship, that my fate was like Cassandra's: none would believe me till it was too late.

In the *next* place, I can see nothing in the present disposition of the times which gives any encouragement to a man to hope, that his labours could do good at the present juncture. In former times, the regal scale preponderated; but now, popular fury bears every thing down before it: and nothing is read or regarded, but as it suits the fashionable frenzy.

I would not have your Lordship think that I utter these things in a gloomy hour. No: I was never more cheerful in all my life; and never enjoyed a better state both of mind and body, than since I gave up all thoughts of intermeddling any more with public matters. But I speak from conviction, and speak from experience. About twelve years ago, I determined to feel the pulse of the public once more, in regard to the publication of my great work; and resolved to act according to the fate which would attend that specimen of it. With this view, I selected a chapter which had reference to the disputes then on foot, and which are still the subjects of universal conversation. I worked this chapter into

a pamphlet, introduced several striking characters, and gave it all the colourings of popularity I could devise. It was styled, *The Case of going to War for the sake of Trade considered in a new light;* and printed for Dodsley. But neither the singularity of the title, nor the name of the publisher, could recommend it to the least regard. And though I mentioned, that it was a part of a greater work, and that the author neither sought the favour of the minister, nor of the mob, by the publication; yet I might almost as well have printed it among the savage, commerceless nations of America, as in the capital of the most commercial kingdom in the world. I will give orders for one of these pamphlets to be sent down to Bristol; and then I will do myself the honour of transmitting it to your Lordship. The last news I heard of it was, that it had not paid for advertising; though Dodsley made no scruple of naming the author.

The inclosed printed paper is another proof, both of my willingness to serve my country and mankind, and of the discouraging circumstances attending my best endeavours. In the beginning of the summer 1762, I went with a friend to Ireland, merely to see the country. And after having been entertained in various houses, with a profusion of hospitality; the next subject with the Irish patriot, as your Lordship may very well know, is the complaint of the manifold hardships

which the English impose upon the Irish nation. This topic of conversation being daily repeated, I thought I should do an acceptable piece of service to the Irish in general, and discover a grateful disposition towards my particular friends, if I pointed out such articles as would greatly benefit Ireland, and yet not excite the narrow, jealous, monopolizing spirit of the English. But how great was my surprise when I found, that my endeavours only exposed me to their sneers, instead of acquiring their thanks; and that they meant nothing else by all their doleful complaints, but what Wilkes and his associates, *mutatis mutandis*, mean now.

I am glad I found your Lordship's MSS. relative to a *militia*. This letter will not allow me to expatiate upon it; neither can I add here any thing relating to the *Elements of Criticism*, but that I greatly admire them, and that, on their account, and for every other, I profess myself the learned and patriotic author's most obliged, &c.

JOSIAH TUCKER.

IV. FROM THE SAME.

On Elements of Criticism, &c.

Bristol, December 26. 1763.

My Lord,

After repeated trials, I am fully convinced, that I have not a capacity for making proper remarks on your Lordship's book. How should a man who understands not a note in music, be able to write a criticism on the finest of Handel's compositions? Now, this is exactly my case. I know not one of the fine arts; and I find moreover, that I have nothing within me which can be called a genius for them, or be made capable of cultivation. Fine strains of music delight me; but I can give no reason why. And so does good poetry, and good painting. But I cannot describe my own feelings upon the occasion; much less can I enter into the rules of the art, or explore its heights or depths.

Your Lordship's book seems to me to be calculated for those happy few in the scale of being, whose souls are of a superior make. *We*, the bulk of mankind, are impelled by a kind of mechanism

to love certain beauties; just as animals are prompted to seek their food, or seize their prey: But *you* have added the rules of art to the workings of nature, and have made that a *science*, which in us is only a blind *instinct*.

In this situation, what can I do better than turn informer against myself, and confess my own ignorance? In one word, I know nothing of the matter: And if this be guilt, I dare believe, that your Lordship will pardon it much more readily, than if I had added to it the provoking aggravation of a dull, impertinent criticism.

In my former letter, I mentioned a Tract which I had lately printed, with a view of feeling the pulse of the public in regard to such kinds of subjects. This is the pamphlet which I now take the liberty of inclosing to your Lordship. It is full of errors of the press, having never had the correcting hand of the author. But as these errors are easily distinguishable, I must impute the total disregard shewn to it, to other causes than to the faultiness of the impression. And as I find my prediction in the advertisement so fully verified by the event, I have now nothing more to do, but to keep my former resolution;—which has already greatly contributed both to the ease of my mind, and the health of my body. If I should ever publish this work, it shall be after the manner of your countryman, Bishop Burnet, viz. to

give orders for the publication of it after my decease. I am, my Lord, with unfeigned regard, &c.

JOSIAH TUCKER.

P. S. Your Lordship is extremely welcome to any MS. of mine in the hands of Mr Robson, or of any other, if you can find it.—In regard to militias, my notion is this: When people had no money, they paid their soldiers with lands; and those troops were called Militias: they now pay them in money; and they are, therefore, better disciplined, and called Standing Armies. Troops paid with lands could not be well disciplined, if they were to cultivate those lands.

V. FROM THE SAME.

On his own Writings, and Literary and other Occupations.

MY LORD, *Bristol, February* 15. 1764.

As soon as I had the honour of your letter, I wrote to Mr Robson the bookseller in New-Bond Street; and I find from him that the MS. is the same which your Lordship mentioned. By the last post he had orders to send it away for Edinburgh; and I hope it is now upon the road travelling to your Lordship.

I wish I could be of your opinion in regard to the short duration of the present frenzy. But I see it with very different eyes, and expect that each succeeding paroxysm will be more violent than the former. This has certainly been the case for thirty years past: and there is nothing in the present appearance of things, which seems to indicate, that the strength of the disease is abating, but rather the contrary.

But quitting all metaphor, I take the case to be plainly this: Violent opposition hath been of late years, the sure and *safe* road to the great preferments: and this amounts to the same thing, (upon commercial principles,) as offering a premium, or giving a bounty for the continuance and increase of opposition. At least, the effect must be thus, till it is publicly known that those premiums or bounties are discontinued:—which is not likely to be soon the case.

I have often made the same reflections which your Lordship makes on the case of those who write with an attempt to instruct others, and to make them better. Their reward, if they are to have any, is to be as Dr Young expresses it,

> "A late reversion, at their own decease."

But with regard to my great work, the fact is, that I am not ready for a publication, were I ever so willing: nor can I say when I shall be. For

the avocations belonging to my new office of Dean, are very many, and too important to be omitted. I came into an house, which wanted to be almost rebuilt, and into a chapter, where many disorders required to be rectified: and I have a cathedral and cloisters to examine and repair, which, in some respects, are the finest Gothic structures in the world; and which are now perhaps the best kept. Add to this, that though I do not understand music, yet, *fungendo vice cotis*, as Horace says, I have, for the number of voices, the best choir in the kingdom, out of London. After this I need not mention family-concerns, which are very perplexing: for though I have no children of my own, I have no less than eight of an only sister, all thrown upon me, whom I must breed up to get their living in some shape or other.

I am afraid I have tired your Lordship with this long apology. But there are two resolutions which I cannot depart from. The first is, That as charity begins at home, I must give up as much time as is necessary for the service of my own family: And the second, That I will not put it in the power of any one to say, that I neglected the proper business of my function and station, upon any pretences of serving the public: I have always kept clear, I thank God, of this imputation, even

my adversaries being judges: and I trust, I ever shall *.

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* That the worthy Dean did not deserve this harsh imputation, may be readily allowed; as no clergyman, it is believed, ever entertained a more proper sense of the duties of his sacred function, or more faithfully discharged them; but it is equally certain, that he did not escape that censure which he thus warmly deprecates. It was on him that Bishop Warburton threw out the sarcastic witticism, "That he made religion his trade, and trade his religion;" a reflection to which the Dean thus replies: "It is true, that commerce and its connexions have been favourite objects of my attention; and where is the crime? As for religion, I have attended carefully to the duties of my parish: nor have I neglected my cathedral. The world knows something of me as a writer on religious subjects*; and I will add, which the world does not know, that I have written near three hundred sermons, and preached them all again and again. My heart is at ease on that score; and my conscience, thank God! does not accuse me." And his character in this respect does not rest on his own testimony: The venerable Bishop Newton gives him ample praise "as an excellent parish-priest, and most exemplary in the performance of his duty."—*Bishop* NEWTON'S *Life*, p. 60.

* The principal theological writings of Dean Tucker are: 1. A Volume of Sermons, 8vo. 2. An Apology for the Church of England. 3. Two Letters to the Reverend Dr Kippis. 4. Religious Intolerance no part either of the Mosaic or Christian Dispensation. 5. Two Dissertations against Mr Chubb. 6. A Brief and dispassionate View of the Difficulties respectively attending the Trinitarian, Arian, and Socinian Systems. 7. Four Sermons. 8. An earnest and affectionate Address to the Common People of England, on their barbarous custom of Cock-throwing on Shrove Tuesdays: distributed *gratis* to the People.

If I shall be able to complete my work, consistently with these points, I then shall have no objection against publishing: Provided that your Lordship, upon perusal of the MS., (which favour I shall entreat you to grant me,) shall judge it to be deserving of the public view. I am, my Lord, with the highest regard, &c.

J. TUCKER.

P. S. When your Lordship shall see Mr D. Hume, be pleased to give my compliments to him. I think I may gather from several passages in the two volumes of his History last published, that I have had the honour of making him a convert, in regard to the notion, *That cheap countries do not produce cheap manufactures.* The more he reflects on that matter, the more he will be convinced that a rich industrious country can never be overtaken, much less outdone by a poor one; equal industry operating in both. Modern Scotland is a rich country, compared with Scotland a hundred years ago: and yet I will be answerable for it, that as good linen may now be bought for 3 s. per yard, as then would have cost 4 s., if not more.

In Mr Hume's history of the Anglo-Saxons, he follows the stream of historians in asserting, that they exterminated all the natives; and consequently had no slaves or villains. But I could never find any proofs of this: and the appearance

of things during the Heptarchy, strongly indicates the contrary: the feudal system being as evidently the system among them, as among all the other northern nations. And it is hard to say what could induce them to be so very singular in this respect. I am myself a Welshman: and we have no tradition in our country of any such measure: on the contrary, we suppose, that all the slaves remained slaves to their new masters; and the gentlemen fled into Wales: *Ergo*, the Welsh are all gentlemen. Moreover, the Danes and Swedes never mention this circumstance, when they mention the expedition and victories of the Anglo-Saxons, their ancestors. And if Mr Hume will reflect on the price settled for killing a Welshman in Cambridgeshire, taken out of *Hickes*, he will conclude, that that Welshman must have been a slave.

VI. FROM THE SAME.

On some of Mr Locke's Political Notions.—Errors in the Conduct of Britain to the American Colonies.

Gloucester, June 16 1782.

MY GOOD LORD,

YOUR Lordship's favour of the 16th of April is now before me. It was brought by my worthy

friend and neighbour in Bristol, Dr Drummond; and a few days ago I received it at Cheltenham, where I was drinking the waters for my health. ——————Thus far I proceed with pleasure, because I see the way plain and smooth before me. As to what is to follow, I own I have my fears; because I know I have been guilty; and therefore, I throw myself on the mercy of the Court, as my safest refuge. The little I have to say in my own defence is this, That, when at Taymouth, I altered my route, on purpose to have the power of waiting on Lord Kames at his own house at Blair-Drummond; and therefore, instead of returning to Perth, and from thence through the Carse of Gowrie to St Andrew's, (as I first proposed,) I crossed the mountain to go to Crieff and Dumblain. When at Dumblain, I was informed at the inn, that your Lordship had set out that very morning at four o'clock, to go your circuit. I then gave up the cause for lost; and the æra of my wrong conduct, (I will add, of my guilt and ingratitude,) commenced from that moment: for I ought immediately to have acknowledged the sorrow which I really felt at that disappointment.

With respect to Mr Locke, could I have considered his assertion, "That no man (no moral "individual of either sex) ought to be subject to "any government, or to any mode of taxation, "which he himself had not, by some explicit

" and personal engagement, chosen for that pur-
" pose," only as a slip of the pen, I should have esteemed myself highly to blame for having animadverted so severely upon so respectable a writer. But it was no accidental slip,—it was his grand *postulatum* throughout; without which, there is nothing in this book which differs from any other *liberal treatise* on a free government. And it is in conformity to the same principle, he expressly says in another place, That no man is bound, in a political sense, by the act and deed of his father, to submit to any laws, or any government, (good or bad,) till such time as he has made his own option. These are positions big with mischief, if reduced to practice: and the salvo of yielding to a majority, (which is a poor salvo at best,) will not atone for the evils done by the foregoing positions. Nay, indeed if the right of choosing his own governors, and of consenting to the mode and quantum of the tax to be levied upon him, be an *unalienable right*, no majority of voters whatever, ought to deprive a man of the exercise of such a right. To suppose *that* right to be an unalienable right belonging to human nature, and inseparable from each individual; and yet to allow, that a majority of only *one* vote is sufficient to deprive millions of the exercise of it, is such a new species of reasoning, as is only to

be found in modern times, and among modern patriots.

I think, my Lord, you are under some mistake relative to the case of the Americans, and their quarrel with the mother country. Had they declared at once, That though they were formerly in the situation of infants, nursed and supported by an indulgent parent, they are now grown up to a state of maturity, and therefore no longer to be treated as children or minors, but to judge and act for themselves; and that, as they no longer chose to submit to our burdens and restrictions, *they do not expect, and have no title to our benefits and protection*:—Had they said these things, my Lord, or even had their advocates at home so much as insinuated the same, their plea would have appeared in a very different light in the eyes of all reasonable and impartial men. But, my Lord, they, and their friends, even to this hour, do insist upon it, that they, (to carry on the same allusion,) have a right to every part of the paternal estate which is *worth having*, without contributing a farthing towards taxes and repairs, and other incidental charges attending the same. These are the children, or colonists, or fellow-subjects, or allies, or whatever else you please, in whose quarrel we have spent so many millions, and spilt such torrents of blood! In short, and to sum up all at once, I look upon it to have been a very *imprudent act*, to have settled any distant

colonies at all, whilst there remained an inch of land in Great Britain capable of further cultivation:—Afterwards, to have been very *foolish and absurd* to have engaged in their disputes either with the French or Spaniards, and to have espoused their quarrels:—and, lastly, to have been *the height of madness* to have endeavoured to conquer them after they had broken out in open rebellion. They were always, from first to last, a heavy weight upon us; a weight which we ourselves ought to have thrown off, if they had not done it for us. When I first broached this doctrine, almost twenty years ago, I stood alone; and had the honour to be treated by the late Ministry as a *fool*, and by the present, then in opposition, as a *knave*. But the time is come that both sides think very differently of my well-meant endeavours.

Having only two franks at present for your Lordship, and not having the little Treatise on *Wool* now at hand, I beg leave to send you a new (the third) edition of my *Cui Bono*, with a long preface; and shall transmit the other tracts with all convenient speed. Be pleased to accept of my repeated thanks for your Lordship's indulgence and promise of pardon, (for such I understand it) on my repentance: And believe me to be, with the sincerest esteem and regard, your Lordship's most obliged, &c. JOSIAH TUCKER.

VII. FROM THE SAME.

Absurd inferences of Political Writers, drawn from the Saxon Government.

Gloucester, June 24. 1782.

My good Lord,

I am happy to transmit to your Lordship the remaining part of my *Cui Bono.* Together with this, I likewise send a little postscript to a Sermon which was preached by a member of our church on the 29th of May.

In one part of my answer to Mr Locke, I had asserted from the authorities of Lyttelton and Sir Walter Raleigh, that soccage *anciently* was rather a *base* than a noble tenure; and that though it afterwards came into good repute, yet that in the times of the Saxons, it was not considered as entitling the socman to the rank of being a member either of the greater or lesser *Gemot.* The matter is in itself of no consequence: nor granting that I am mistaken in this particular, is my argument against Mr Locke at all affected by it. But great triumphs have been raised on this head, for want of something more substantial and more to the purpose. If your Lordship has ever thought it worth your while to make this point a particular subject of inquiry, I should be glad to know

whether I am right or wrong. Great and glorious things are now said of the nature and constitution of the Saxon Government; as if it had been a model of the most perfect freedom. I know no other grounds for these assertions than the distance of the time and the unimportance of the subjects, which render a confutation unnecessary as well as difficult. A government expressly founded on conquest and slavery, (and where slaves were the objects, and end and aim of all their endeavours, and the *staple-trade* of the times,) would not, as one would have thought, have been held up as a pattern for a civilized nation to copy after. But what will not modern politics arrive at?

I was going on in this way: but the influenza, —not the political, but the physical, has ordered me to stop. I conclude, therefore, with my most respectful thanks for your great condescension to your Lordship's most obliged, &c.

JOSIAH TUCKER.

APPENDIX.—No. II.

Letter *from* Robert Adam, *Esq. to Lord* Kames.

London, 31st March 1763.

My Lord,

I am ashamed to say I have had the honour of your letter of the 2d *ult.* so long, without its being in my power to answer it sooner. The practice of architectnre rushes so fast upon me, that I have but too few moments to dedicate to theory and speculation. Your Lordship's ideas with regard to the improprieties of the *Doric* and *Corinthian* orders, seem at first to be too well founded: but, upon considering the nature of these orders more fully, and reflecting how an architect of superior abilities would dispose of them, I am convinced the strength of your objections would vanish, I may say, entirely as to the first, and in a great measure be removed as to the second of these orders.

If you wish that the *Doric* order should appear simple and solid, you ought not to *flute* your columns, nor carve any of the *mouldings* of your capitals and bases; keep the *entablature* of the

plainest kind, no *guttæ* to your *mutules*, no ornaments in your *metops:* in which case you will find no one part too much or too little ornamented for the others; and I have already experienced this in many buildings I have executed. If you flute your columns, you must then enrich your capitals and bases, carve your cornices, and put ornaments on the metops of the frieze. This degree of enrichment I would seldom use without doors; but it is very proper in halls, insides of temples, &c. I have ventured to alter some parts of this order, particularly in its mouldings; rejecting some of the common ones, and adopting or substituting others in their stead. These alterations, most people have allowed to be much for the better: But I have always been very cautious in this way, and it is a dangerous licence, and may do much harm in the hands of rash innovators, or mere retailers in the art, who have neither eyes nor judgment.

The capital of the *Corinthian* order demands delicacy and richness in every other part belonging to that order; and when that necessary profusion of ornament cannot be afforded, the architect ought to reject this order altogether. The Fable of Callimachus, the basket and acanthus leaves, I never had any faith in. The Egyptians had a kind of Corinthian order, and in many parts so similar to that which the Grecians used, that we cannot doubt, of the latter having only chang-

ed and improved (as they imagined,) many parts of the Egyptian capital. If your Lordship will look into Norden's Antiquities of Egypt, you will see the capitals I refer to. I own that there appears an absurdity in supporting any weight by a combined cluster of light foliage: but if you suppose a column to represent a tree, I shall suppose a palm-tree, which grows of a pretty equal thickness, and of which the branches grow near the top, and that part of the top of this tree is cut off, and the branches or leaves left: you will find that tree able to support a weight, and these branches by no means impairing its strength, nor in any danger of being broken off: they will bend down their heads with the beam or entablature that lies upon them, and connects them together, as those of the Corinthian capital do, but the main weight will still rest for its support upon the upright stem*. This I take to be the

* The late William Craik, Esq. of Arbigland, in Kircudbrightshire, (one of the first and most intelligent agricultural improvers in Scotland, and equally remarkable for a cultivated mind and elegant taste,) in a letter to Lord Kames on this subject, of the different orders of architecture, obviates his Lordship's objection to the apparent weakness of the Corinthian capital, in a still simpler, and therefore more satisfactory manner than Mr Adam.

"We must not consider the capitals of the columns in the "different orders, as detached pieces set upon the shafts, but "for what they truly are, viz. a continuation of the shaft pas-

true origin of the Corinthian order. Some other leaf has been substituted as more beautiful than that of the palm, or any other tree which grows in that manner, and by degrees the acanthus has prevailed. Many trees grow 20 or 30 feet high in one stem; then split into two or three large boughs. If you cut the tree two or three feet above the separation of these boughs, it occasions that swell at the top which gives the appearance of the basket or base your Lordship mentions, which all architects have split upon; resorting to this foolish fable, when it may be accounted for in the simple and natural manner I have mentioned.

As to the proportions of the column, we might also suppose these taken from the proportions of

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" sing as it were through the *astragal* up to the *abacus*; and " therefore we must conclude that they retain at that part just " as much strength as at any other part of the column: and " as the ornaments are all superadded, these may increase, but " they cannot possibly diminish that strength. That this is " truly the case, is evident from the slightest inspection in the " Tuscan, Doric, and Ionic columns; and if you strip the Co- " rinthian and Composite capitals of their dress of leaves, &c. " it will be equally manifest in these. But even when clad " with their ornaments, these, if properly disposed, leave in- " tervals and openings in various parts, through which the " solid body and form of the capital may be traced by an " attentive eye, and thus every suspicion of infirmity is re- " moved."

the human figure, and the leaves at the top to correspond to the hair. The introduction of Caryatides and Terms amongst the Greeks gives some plausibility at least to this conjecture; though I own I think it extends little farther than to the general proportions of columns, but not at all to the particular parts of the order.

The Ionic order ought only to be used in gay and slight buildings; as the meagreness of its capital never fills the eye sufficiently, on the outside of a mass of solid architecture. I always thought this order destined for insides of houses and temples: but the universal practice to the contrary in all countries, shews how much I stand single in this opinion. The false and destructive prejudice in favour of lightness in buildings, I imagine is the cause of this custom. I would only ask any man, if the buildings of the Egyptians, Greeks or Romans had been light, according to modern ideas, whether we would have seen any remains of them in our day?

If a building were not so immensely great as to demand a variety of orders, I would omit entirely the two mongrel orders, the Composite and Tuscan; and, God knows, our confined ideas of magnificence in building do but too little require that variety. The Composite capital is by no means so fine as the Corinthian; and the Doric order can, without great variation, supply every purpose of the Tuscan.

These are my real sentiments with regard to the orders of our art. I shall be happy if any of these observations are worth your Lordship's attention.

I flatter myself, that the arts in general are in a progressive state in England. If the King builds a palace in a magnificent and pure style of architecture, it will give a great push at once to the taste of this country; as it will not only furnish ideas for lesser buildings, but shew effects both of external and internal composition, which this country as yet is entirely ignorant of. If it is done meanly, or in bad taste, I should apprehend the worst of consequences. Painting and sculpture depend more upon good architecture than one would imagine. They are the necessary accompaniments of the great style of architecture; and a building that makes no provision for them, and does not even demand them as necessary adjuncts, I would at once pronounce to be wretched.

My brother James writes with that love and enthusiasm of architecture, which no one could feel that has not formed very extensive ideas of it. It is easy to tame and bring under proper management these large views; and the detail of our profession comes naturally to the man who understands its great principles, in the laws of beauty and grandeur: but the architect who begins with *minutiæ*, will never rise above the race

of those reptile artizans who have crawled about and infested this country for many years.

I have been twice in the country since I received your Lordship's letter, and if I may judge by my own employment, private buildings go on apace. I expect to be very little in London all this summer, having business in various quarters of England, which I am with difficulty able to get managed with honour to myself, and satisfaction to my employers.

I hope you will forgive the length of this Epistle, and believe most respectfully, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient and very faithful humble servant, ROBERT ADAM.

APPENDIX.—NO. III.

LETTERS *from Lord* KAMES'S *Correspondence, on certain subjects of Physiology and Natural History.*

I. LETTER *to Lord* KAMES *from the Reverend Dr* JOHN WALKER, *Minister of Moffat, afterwards Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Edinburgh.*

On the Analogy between Man and the inferior animals; and that between animals and Vegetables.

Moffat, February 18. 1773.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship's letter, which would at any time have been most acceptable, was peculiarly so in my present situation; blocked up with snow, and not within eighteen miles of a person I can converse with. Nothing is pleasanter at such a time than new views upon an old subject. I have taken up my pen, and may begin, but I know not when, or where I shall end. When engaged upon a subject, I know with what avidity I have

sometimes attended to the most crude discussions of others; and have seen even light issue from very muddy understandings, like lightning, from a dark cloud. This at present makes me hope for a hearing.

The analogy between man and the inferior animals, and between them and vegetables, is one of the most obvious of all human speculations;—a field of inquiry which has always been full of labourers, and never more cultivated than at present, or to such good purpose. Yet, to raise Monkeys to Men; to degrade Men to Monkeys; to attempt to annihilate or even to extenuate the line of partition between them, is a reigning taste in philosophy, which gives me great disgust. Linnæus has long ranked us in the same order of animals with the Bat; and though in this article I perhaps justify his method, as much as any individual of my species, yet I could never look at it without umbrage. He still placed Man however in a genus by himself at the head of the system. He stickled a little indeed for combining us with the Ouran-outang; but finding that the creature had a *membrana nictitans*, he allowed him to remain with his companions. This was well enough. But his behaviour in his last book is truly provoking. He has there given us a brother-german.—a *Homo Lar*, forsooth! some little scoundrel of a monkey, picked up in the woods of Macassar, whose very name I have in

such detestation, that I am persuaded I am not a drop's blood to him.

Let your Lordship pursue the analogy between Plants and Mankind, as far as you will, it is not likely I shall be as much offended, as with my friend Linnæus. I have been from the cradle fond of vegetative life; and though I like my species, and the rank I hold in the creation, I declare I would sooner claim kindred to an oak or an apple-tree than to an ape.

Your Lordship well knows what copious disquisitions have been made upon the scale of being. It is called a *chain*, and it has been traced in most of its parts from nature to mind. Could we take hold of the one end of this chain as we can do of the other, we might know by one shake whether or no it is entire, as we suppose. Many links remain still undiscovered, but we have reason to think that there are none wanting.

The analogy between plants and animals, as members of this scale, has been chiefly pursued in the track of organization. Your Lordship, by what I can perceive, intends a different route, and I think indeed a pleasanter path, that of sensibility. Though by different ways, they lead to the same object, and I believe are always parallel. Organization and sensibility constantly rise and fall together. They go hand in hand in nature, and should do so in philosophy.

With regard to the similarity between plants and animals, in the article of self-motion, my views are as follow; nor do they differ materially from the strictures in your Lordship's letter.

But before we go to the plants. From whence do the self-motions of animals proceed?

It appears, that all animal motions arise either from irritation or volition. The first is a mechanical cause, but the other is of a different nature.

The motions from volition are obvious. By the motions from irritation, I mean not only the accidental involuntary motions of nerves and muscles, but the involuntary vital motions: those of the intestines, of the lungs, of the heart, of the arteries; and in fine, all motions which are not effected by an act of the will.

After full recollection, I think all the motions of plants flow from irritation. I know of none from volition. They are endowed with self-motion unquestionably, but it always proceeds from this single source: Whereas, animals are likewise endowed with a self-motion that is voluntary.

The motions of instinct in animals are motions likewise of volition. But as there are no motions of volition in vegetables, I would argue, that they are void of instinct. At least, the apparently instinctive motion of vegetables, must, in this article, be essentially different from the instinct of animals, however much they may resemble it; and it would be proper indeed, that two

things so different should be known by different names; such as Voluntary and Involuntary Instinct. The first, peculiar to animals; the latter, the only instinct of vegetables. Instinct, both in the animal and vegetable world, is divisible into many subordinate degrees, and each should have its place upon the scale of being: but, from this distinction, does there not result a capital division of instinct in general, subsisting as a common principle in the two kingdoms of nature?

Instinct in animals is confined to two objects: The safety of the individual, and the preservation of the species. The same two objects are pursued by plants, and by means indeed similar, but not quite the same. Most of the attempts made by plants to gain these two ends, can be accounted for, I think, mechanically: but the attempts of animals cannot. A tree receding from the perpendicular, till it finds an open passage upward, I consider as a motion quite mechanical. But the flight of a woodcock, at his season, from Cape Breton to Scotland, can be accounted for by no mechanism. These things may serve, I imagine, to establish an essential difference between the instinct of plants and animals, if in both it must have the same name.

The motions of plants, like those of animals, answer determinate purposes: They are the means to an end.

But that end the plant pursues, by an impulse surely void of intelligence. It may indeed resemble the instinct of animals, but it is far inferior. At the utmost, I suspect it to be little above mechanical, if it is above it at all; and I am sure, that in most cases it can be so accounted for.

We can trace the causes of the motions of plants and animals mechanically a certain length, and then indeed we are brought to a stop. When I ascribe these motions, therefore, to irritation, I mean it only as their proximate cause. Beyond this there no doubt lies a cause of another nature. But of this I know nothing. Here I own my philosophy fails me.

The most striking property in common to animals and vegetables, is their mode of generation; a modern discovery, by which we are assured, that plants are propagated by male and female, as well as animals; and that every organized body proceeds from a fecundated egg or seed. But further than this the subject of generation has been in vain pursued; and the *punctum saliens vitæ*, the ultimate origin of life and of vital motion, both in plants and animals, is all darkness still.

Sensation in animals is the effect of irritation. The same effect we cannot deny to vegetables. But the sensation of a plant is so inferior in degree, and of such a different nature, that it would seem, like the vegetable instinct, to require a different denomination. Pleasure and pain, for ex-

ample, arise in animals upon sensation; but where or how shall we discover these in vegetables?

Sensibility, though diffused over the whole animal, has its head-quarters in the brain. From this focus the rays of sensibility diverge to every fibre and every pore. But we can find no such *sensorium* in plants. The sentient principle, if it may be called so, is *totum in toto, et totum in qualibet parte.*

It appears to me, that the sensibility of the nerves in the human body, if it does not entirely depend, is at least generally in proportion to the rarity or density of the medium in which they are lodged. The firmer the fibre, the less sensibility; and *vice versâ.*

Hence the greater sensibility of mankind in a warm than in a cold climate; greater in an effeminate than a rude age; greater in the female than the male sex; greater in a tender lady than in a robust dairy-maid; and greater in the sedentary student than in the active ploughman. The medium in the one being to that in the other, as pulp to bend-leather.

The same thing we find in the different parts of the same body. Let the hands or feet be hardened, and their sensibility is diminished, The sensibility of the neves in the firmer muscles, is nothing to what it is in the finer membranes. The sensibility is next to nothing in the firm and callous

medium of the ligaments; and yet, let the firmest of these ligaments be rarified by inflammation, and it becomes sensible. The sensibility of the nerves is plainly nothing in the bones; and yet there, I make no doubt, they likewise exist, though totally insensible, from the great compactness of the medium in which they are lodged.

All that I find in vegetables analogous to this, is, that in young plants, and in the young and tender parts, there is most sensibility; and that, by becoming firmer in substance, they become more insensible: Which is saying little more, than that a sheet of cambric paper is more susceptible of every breath than a sheet of lead: For though it is common to speak and write about the nerves of plants, it is an impropriety. They have no organs so similar to animal nerves as to authorise the name. They have indeed bundled fibres; but these correspond to the muscular fibres, not to the nerves of animals.

There is one article of the analogy between animals and vegetables that has scarce ever been touched upon,—the article of habit; a source of much curious speculation, and of more useful discoveries than any other part of the subject. In the view I have of it, it promises much for the advancement of agriculture, of gardening, of the management of cattle and other animals, and even of the management of man; as much may be learnt from it in preventing and curing diseases.

We have here no occasion to force an analogy; for in this article plants and animals are quite the same. It is the consequence of their being organized bodies; and hence every useful discovery in the one, can be applied and rendered useful in the other. It is indeed one great disadvantage of the subject, that it hinges every where upon minutiæ; I may say minutiunculæ, which require a microscopic observer: Upon small observations and slight circumstances, seemingly trivial apart, but collectively of importance.

To instance, in the point of naturalization to climate and country.

Rice is a native plant of the torrid zone, but has been long cultivated without the tropic; in South Corolina, the Canaries, and northern parts of Africa. About 100 years ago it was first sown in Italy, and has ever since been creeping gradually northwards in Europe. They have now fruitful fields of rice upon the Weser, in the north of Germany. Bnt they must use German seed: That of Carolina, and even of Italy, will not ripen: being destitute of that power to withstand cold which the other has gradually acquired by habit, or a tract of years.

The yew tree is a native of Sweden, and braves all the rigour of the climate; but yews brought from France to ornament the Swedish gardens, were found unable to withstand it.

The passion-tree, a native of the Brazils, is there an ever-green. I remember it at Edinburgh, when a boy, a regular perdifol. But I have been witness to its becoming gradually so inured to the climate, that in a good exposure it now retains its foliage the whole winter.

The same effect of habit we find in animals.

The Canary bird brought to London directly from these islands, cannot be kept alive without a great deal of artificial heat. But after many successive generations in Germany and in this country, it is found to stand the open air almost equally with our own linnets. And the same thing is beginning to appear in the golden and China pheasant.

The horse and sheep, both natives of the hottest parts of the earth, were they brought from thence to winter on the mountains of Ross-shire, would undoubtedly perish; and yet both animals, by travelling gradually northwards in the course of ages, live on these mountains in health and vigour.

The power of habit, however, in naturalization, appears not so conspicuous in our own species as among the inferior animals, and in plants. And the reason appears to be this. Every plant and every animal is evidently designed by Nature to occupy some particular climate or track of the globe; but it is equally evident, that man is destined to possess the whole. And yet, though man-

kind live both under the equator, and within the polar circle, we may safely suppose, that the natives of Sumatra, transplanted at once to Greenland, would certainly not be able to subsist.

I shall mention another instance of the force of habit in plants and animals; that is, the alteration it produces in their external characters by climate and culture.

The most remarkable instances of this kind in vegetable life are to be found in the kitchen-garden.

There, we find cabbage, cauliflower, savoy, kale, brocoli, and turnip-rooted cabbage. But would any person who had not made plants his peculiar study, ever imagine that these were the same species? It is impossible I think he should; their aspect is so different: and yet nothing is more certain, than that they are only varieties produced by the cultivation of the *brassica oleracea*, a plant which grows wild on the sea-shores of Europe, and which, in its external appearance, is as different from any of those above mentioned, as any two of them are from one another. These alterations, produced in the phasis of the plant by various cultivation in different countries, are now so rivetted by habit, that they appear upon sowing the seeds of each variety. The alterations are retained by habit, and descend upon the offspring, even when the causes which occasioned them are gone. These varieties, however, like the varieties of every other

plant, are liable without care to degenerate into one another. But by the art of gardening they are preserved distinct, each having its peculiar value, as a garden production.

In animal life, the most remarkable instances of this kind are to be found among domestic animals.

The dog is evidently designed by Nature to be man's companion, and has accordingly attended him to every country and climate. In consequence of this, he has suffered more alteration in his external habit than any other animal. Many distinct species of animals are more similar to one another in their appearance than the English bull-dog is to the Italian greyhound. Yet these and all the other sorts of dogs are but the varieties of one species. By mixing, they are capable of degenerating into one another; yet will always produce perfect animals of their species. But by mixing with any other species of animal, they can afford but an imperfect production, a mule.

The same alteration in external characters is at first produced by climate and manner of life, and afterwards entailed by habit upon our own species.

Hence arise varieties in the human race similar to those we find in other animals and in plants. Many considerable writers have spoken of different species of mankind. I have bestowed much attention all my life upon the specific characters of

the various tribes of animals, yet have never seen nor have ever read but of one species of man. The varieties of the human species are indeed numerous and remarkable: but they are neither so remarkable nor so numerous as those of the dog, and are only such as may be both produced and destroyed by habit.

I find but few tracts of any consequence among the ancients relative to the rise and progress of those varieties which have taken place in our species. One however I cannot but mention, as it is one of the most valuable upon the subject. It is related by Hippocrates in his book, *De Aëre, Aquis, et Locis*, and I think shews as fine observation and as great sagacity in the knowledge of animal nature as any passage in his writings.

The Macrocephali, a nation of Cappadocia, near the city of Cerasus, were so called by the Greeks on account of the extraordinary length of their heads; and that father of physic gives us the following satisfactory history of this singular appearance.

In that nation, says he, the persons who have the greatest length of head are accounted the most honourable. Hence it became a practice to bandage the heads of their new-born infants in such a manner as to hinder their growing round, and to force them out in length. This practice, says he, first gave rise to that form of head for which they

are so remarkable; but in process of time it became so natural to the race, that there was no further occasion for continuing the practice.

I know not of any two varieties in the human race more widely different than the fair-haired European and the Angola Negro. But I am certain that, upon the principle of Hippocrates, I can account for all the peculiarities in the aspect of the African. That the difference in his hair proceeds from the climate; his splay-feet from the soil; and his colour, his flat face and features, and prominent belly, from his manner of life.

In the scale of Nature, there are chasms which late discoveries have indeed rendered less discernible, but still they are not completely filled up. These lie between unorganized and organized matter; between vegetable and animal life, and between the most perfect brute-animal and man.

Organization was not so well understood formerly as at present. I was taught from a Professor's Chair when I was fourteen, that there was an organization in the fossil kingdom; but I have long found that there is not. It is now universally admitted, that there is no seminal principle in fossils, no containing vessels nor contained fluids, no organization, no species, but possible combinations, innumerable as the sand of the sea. All this we are warranted to conclude from undoubted facts, but further than this we are not permitted

to go. Some curious observations remain still, I think, to be made with fine miscroscopes upon animal and vegetable organization in their lowest stages, and upon those fossils which approach nearest to organized bodies.

Forty years ago we were little acquainted with the links which unite vegetable and animal life. But by the discoveries of Peyssonel, Trembly, and their followers, we now see where and how they run into one another, or at least that they are divided by such a nice barrier, that it is no sooner touched than passed. Formerly a plant and an animal appeared as beings essentially different, and widely distant from one another; but the tribe of *Zoophyta* have now extenuated the distinction.

Philosophers to this day are fighting strenuously, whether these bodies should be considered as animals or vegetables. The truth, I think, is, that they are neither, but an amazing mixture of animal and vegetable nature; which lays the most natural, and the firmest foundation I know of for an analogy between the two kingdoms.

I am now afraid I rather tire than entertain your Lordship; but I own these speculations are so pleasant to myself, that if I did not reflect, I might be led on to a letter which would reach to Edinburgh: I mean not by the post, but by actual extension: I would otherwise have added here some further observations on that *hiatus* in the scale of being which subsists between the most

perfect animal and man; and likewise on that illimitable and unfathomable gulf which is interposed between the most perfect creature and the Creator.

I shall now subjoin, as your Lordship desires, a list of the apparently instinctive motions of plants, confining myself to such as are most remarkable, most obvious, and most unquestionable.

1. The leaves of trees and herbs have an upper and under surface; the one constantly turned to the heavens, the other to the earth. If a branch of a tree is bended, and so fixed, that this order of its leaves is inverted, and the under side exposed to the heavens, by a wreathing motion of their footstalks, they will all in a little time recover their former and natural direction. This, I am satisfied from repeated observations and experiments, is owing to an attraction between the upper surface of leaves and light, though it is ascribed by others to different causes. If a plant in a flower-pot is placed in a window, in a few days the upper surface of all its leaves will be directed to the window. Let it be so turned about, that the under side of the leaves point to the window, in a few days they will all resume their former position.

2. Many plants upon the sun's recess alter the position of their leaves, which maintain a different form during the night from what they observe during the day. This is termed the *Somnus Plan-*

tarum. Every body since Pliny's time has observed it in a field of clover.

3. Every seed when it germinates, shoots forth a plumula and a radicle: The first, the embryo of the stem, which always ascends; the other, of the root, which always descends. It is amazing how hard these little tender bodies will struggle against the most powerful obstacles which may offer to obstruct or alter these two directions.

4. The seeds of all plants, when sown in the earth, will rise when within a certain depth, but will not rise if placed beyond it. I know for example, that barley will rise, though sown to the depth of ten inches, but will not rise if placed twelve inches deep.

5. The claspers of briony have both a progressive and retrograde motion. They shoot forwards in a spiral, to lay hold of whatever comes in their way for their support; but if they meet with nothing after completing a spiral of about three circles, they alter their plan, and shoot away in another direction; that if they miss one way, they may hit the other.

6. Among the ruins of the old monastery of New Abbey, in Galloway, there is a plane-tree, about twenty feet high, which grows on the top of a wall built with stone and lime. Being straitened for nourishment in this situation, many years ago it shot forth roots into the open air. These did neither die nor draw back, but descended by the side of the wall, which is ten feet high. It was

several years before they reached the ground, during which time they conveyed no nutriment to the tree, but were supported by it. At length they dipped into the earth, and have since enabled the tree to grow with vigour. Between the top of the wall and the surface of the earth, they have never thrown out either branches or leaves, but have coalesced into a sort of trunk ten feet high, and pretty thick; which is very singular, in being now terminated by roots, both at top and bottom.

7. The leaves of many plants, especially of the mallow tribe, move daily with the sun, following him with the upper surface of their leaves, from east, by south, to west.

8. The petals of many flowers expand in the sun, but contract at night, or on the approach of darkness or rain.

This is evidently to protect the tender parts of the fructification from injury.

9. But when once the seeds are fecundated, though the petals still subsist, they no longer contract.

This is one of the finest instances I know of these instinctive motions, and one of the strongest evidences of the sexes of plants.

10. Every honeysuckle twig shoots straight forward, till it becomes too long to support its weight. It then immediately curls into a spiral: for the spiral figure gives it further strength. If alone, or if it meet with a dead branch, it screws always

from the right to the left; but if it meets with another twig, they coalesce for mutual support, and the one screws to the right, and the other to the left.

11. Dodart first observed that trees pushed their branches in a direction parallel to the surface of the earth. If a tree stands on a steep, it pushes both towards the hill, and towards the declivity; but on both sides it still preserves its branches parallel to the surface. As there is an attraction between the upper surface of leaves and light, I am also persuaded, though not equally certain of it from experiment, that there is an attraction of the same nature between the under surface of leaves and the surface of the earth. This I consider as the cause of the phenomenon.

I had long observed, that the most fruitful orchards, and the most fertile trees, are those planted on a declivity, and the steeper it is, though not quite a precipice, the more fertile they prove. But I was never satisfied as to the cause of it, till I called to mind the observation of Dodart; which occurred to me when I was in the town of Jedburgh. There is more fruit about that place, and more fruit-bearing wood upon the trees, than I have seen in any other part of Scotland: But its orchards and fruit-gardens are mostly situated in very steep places.

It is well known that the spreading of trees always renders them fruitful. On a plain, however, they incline to shoot upwards; and therefore art is called in by skilful gardeners, and applied in various ways to check their perpendicular, and to promote their lateral growth. But this point, which can only be gained upon a plain by art, is obtained upon a declivity by Nature. There a tree loses its tendency to shoot upwards, and in order to preserve its branches parallel with the surface, is constrained to put them in a lateral direction.

Hence an important rule in the choice of orchards and fruit gardens.——I ever am, with the most sincere respect, my Lord, &c.

JOHN WALKER.

II. *Lord* KAMES *to Sir* JAMES NASMITH *of New Posso, Baronet.*

On the Analogy between Animals and Vegetables.

Blair-Drummond, September 27. 1773.

DEAR SIR,

THE rich, by Christian duty, are bound to supply the wants of the poor. My wants are urgent; your treasures are great; and I trust I shall find

your charity proportionally liberal. It is the quality, too, of that wealth of yours I chiefly covet, that it may be freely imparted without impoverishing the giver. But to come to the point without further preface. I have been thinking a good deal of late, now that I have some leisure for amusement, on a comparison between animals and vegetables, with respect to the curious principle of *instinct*. You, of all mankind, are the best fitted to give me clear ideas upon the subject; and, therefore, without scruple, I will throw out my crude notions, to prompt you to an opening of your stores for my benefit.

Many are the actions of brute animals, and even of the human race, that are directed by blind instinct, without the intervention of reason or reflection; and I think actions somewhat similar may be discovered in vegetables. The growth of plants, their production and decay, come not under my consideration; but certain motions varying from the ordinary course of Nature, like voluntary actions in animals. All roots, when, in their direct progress, they meet with a ditch, and are laid open to the air, immediately dip and hide themselves in the earth, as if they knew what they were about. A tree oppressed by another hanging over it, recedes from the perpendicular, till it finds an open passage upward. A tree growing under a dark cover, with a single hole to let

in the light and air, always pushes to get out at that hole. A water-lily grows from the bottom of the water to the top, and stops there, whether the water be shallow or deep, spreading its leaves on the surface. The sensitive plant closes its leaves on the slightest touch. Here is self-motion, similar to that of a snail, which withdraws itself within its shell on an appearance of danger. Is not the nettle a sensitive plant of a different kind? It stings when gently touched; but is inoffensive when squeezed hard in the hand. I mention these things merely to show what I am pointing at; for these facts must be quite familiar to you, with many more that I am ignorant of.

The efficient cause of such phenomena, as well as of many of the operations and works of Nature, is far beyond the reach of human intellect: but the final causes, in many instances, do not seem to me beyond our reach; and I wish to point them clearly out, in such and similar instances as I have mentioned.

But what I chiefly desire to make out, is a comparison between animals and vegetables, with respect to the before-mentioned particulars, and others of the same nature. The moment a duck is hatched, it waddles into the water; and this not by imitation or experience; for it happens to duck-chicks hatched by a hen, who is alarmed for the safety of her supposed progeny. By what means, then, does this happen? By means of an

internal impulse, termed Instinct. What reason is there, then, for not applying the same term to to that impulse which actuates vegetables in similar actions, such as those already mentioned? When a sensitive plant withdraws itself from the hand, and hastily closes its leaves, as if feeling the injury done it, is it not by an internal principle that it does so, a principle having all the qualities of instinct?—If so, here is a point of view, in which animals and vegetables are brought very near together. Such speculations carefully pursued, may tend much to enrich philosophy.

But, my good friend, besides wishing for knowledge on a subject on which you are very capable to furnish it, I have a plot in this letter. Our neighbour, Callendar of Craigforth, has more than once given us the flattering hope of seeing you here. My spouse is an eminent florist, and not a despicable botanist. Now, she vows to treat you as Mahomet did the Mountain. If you will not come to her, she is resolved to go to you: and what a shame would that be to a man of spirit? You must give us a meeting on more gallant and knightly terms. I ever am, yours, &c.

HENRY HOME.

III. *Sir* James Nasmith *to Lord* Kames.

On the same Subject.

New Posso, November 8. 1773.

My Lord,

I had made a little excursion for some weeks; and upon my return here, found your Lordship's letter upon my table. I wish it were in my power to give you any light on the curious comparison you suggest between animals and vegetables, with respect to the principle of instinct. I cannot well say how far they may agree in this particular, as I confess I have no clear idea of this same thing called *Instinct*. But if, as your Lordship says, the duckling runs to the water the moment it is hatched, from an internal impulse called Instinct, I will venture to say, that we see vegetables endowed with the same internal impulse, or something very similar to it. The red whortleberry was planted here by way of edging to a border, under a fruit-wall: in two or three years, it overran all the adjoining deep-laid gravel walk, and seemed to fly from the rich border, where never a single runner appeared. This low ever-green plant grows naturally on the tops of our highest hills, amongst stones and gravel; and if the Court of Aldermen had its sagacity, turtle and venison

would not be so fatal to them. Is not this instance, with many others that might be given of the election which plants make, in receding from what is hurtful, and flying to what is agreeable to their natures, very analogous to the conduct of the duckling? But, my Lord, there are now growing in Mr Lockhart's paddock at Lee, a parcel of willow-trees that have been repeatedly cut over, at about eight or ten feet from the ground: their trunks are about fifteen inches diameter; generally open on one side, and so much decayed, that hardly any thing remains but the bark, and a little of what is called the blea: yet these trees are furnished with fine shoots at top, placed round so much of their edges as remain; and these shoots finding themselves starved for want of nourishment from the mother plant, have put out roots in great number from where they are connected with the tree: these roots have run down, some on the outside, and some on the hollow inside, till they have reached and penetrated the ground; and, what is very remarkable, have made no attempt to put out lateral shoots or fibres, as knowing them to be of no use, till they arrived at the place of their destination. They are generally about the size of a walking cane; and in their way down, have clung so close to the old stem, as to have impressed a groove in which they lie a little sunk; and into which, if you draw them from the tree, they spring back with great elasticity. This, I

dare say, your Lordship will consider as a very strong effort in Nature: and yet you may see the like in a tree that is not so vivacious as the willow. It is at the New Abbey in Galloway; where a plane-tree that has grown on the top of a wall about eight feet high, finding a lack of provision there, has put out roots, sent them down the face of the wall, and struck into the ground, from whence it now draws its principal nourishment.

But neither animals nor vegetables can be supported "by bread alone;" so benign and necessary a thing is light to both their natures. Were you to confine an animal in a dark place for some considerable time, and afterwards admit a ray of light, I imagine it would run towards it. Be that as it may, I am sure a vegetable would do so; and am satisfied this is not owing, as is commonly alleged, to their drying sooner, and consequently bending to the side the light comes from. Plants never incline towards the flues placed in the back part of a stove. And pray, my Lord, may not this longing after light, account for the stems of all seedling plants taking the shortest way to get at it, while their roots strike into the ground. The blind puppy tries every thing that touches his lips, and when he finds the teat, never fails to fix to it. Animals and vegetables have their organs, and while left to Nature, will ever make the proper use of them.

It is beautiful to observe how the scandent plants stretch out to lay hold of any thing that can support them. Thrust a stick into the ground, within a moderate distance of any of these, and, every thing else equal, it will push towards the stick, and on this it will raise itself to its appointed height.

That the sensitive plant is possessed of self-motion, and at least of as much feeling as the snail, I have no doubt: But, my Lord, that all plants are sensitive, the different appearances they put on at different times, evidently shew. They are the best *hygrometers* in the world. They open and close their flowers and leaves at different hours of the day, some before, and some after sun-set; some to receive, some to avoid rain: some follow the sun, some turn away from it. Put the leaves of any plant out of their natural situation, by nailing a branch to a wall, or by any other means, they will all soon redress themselves; and this not by a sudden jerk, as a bent twig: you must wait some days before all is put to rights again. We see what pains fowls take to adjust and dress their feathers, as other animals do their furs; surely finding something disagreeable when they are out of order.

Thus, we perceive what vegetables can do to serve themselves: but their powers go further; even to the propagation and preservation of the species; and in this the water plants are very re-

markable. The *farina fœcundans* could not have its effect under water; therefore, these put up their flower-stems, be the water deep or shallow, till they emerge and get into the open air then, and not till then, they flower. Do we not see something akin to this in some animals, who leave their own elements on the same occasion? The crocodile, &c. deposit their eggs on the shore: the salmon leave the sea, run up every fresh river as far as we have water to carry them; and we see their errand. Your Lordship asks, Is not the nettle a sensitive plant of a different kind: it stings, you say, when gently touched, but is inoffensive when squeezed hard. Are you certain that this is a fact: or may it not be a deception? The palms of the hand are callous, and not so easily wounded as other parts. I think I have been stung, even with a glove on my hand; though I grasped the nettle hard, in order to pull it out: but this fact another season will clear up. It would be curious indeed, if the nettle should be found to instil its poison into the wound it makes, by a power it may be deprived of by squeezing it hard.

I have now troubled you, my Lord, too long, and I am afraid to little purpose. Whether you may discover the traces of mechanism, or ascribe these phenomena to some unknown principles, I am sure it would give me very great pleasure to

learn from you what I am to think of the matter.

I shall most certainly take the first opportunity I can find, either at Edinburgh or in the country, to wait upon your Lordship, and to pay my respects to the botanic Lady who threatens me with a visit. She shall certainly find me more complaisant than Mahomet did the mountain; though I believe the best way to ensure the visit she promises, would be to keep out of her sight till she sees me here.—With respectful compliments to her, I am, with entire esteem and regard, your Lordship's, &c.

J. NASMITH.

Here is a bit of more paper, and therefore I will add, that they have got of late into some of the gardens, a new species of the sensitive plant, that is so very feeling, that if a fly pitches upon a leaf, it closes so suddenly, and with so much force, as to catch and crush the insect to death.

IV. *From Dr* THOMAS REID *to Lord* KAMES.

On some Doctrines of Dr Priestley; and of the French Philosophers.

——————— 1775.

——————— Dr Priestley, in his last book, thinks, that the power of perception, as well as all the other powers that are termed mental, is the result of such an organical structure as that of the brain. Consequently, says he, the whole man becomes extinct at death, and we have no hope of surviving the grave, but what is derived from the light of Revelation. I would be glad to know your Lordship's opinion, whether, when my brain has lost its original structure, and when, some hundred years after, the same materials are again fabricated so curiously as to become an intelligent being, whether, I say, that being will be *me;* or, if two or three such beings should be formed out of my brain, whether they will all be *me,* and consequently all be one and the same intelligent being.

This seems to me a great mystery, but Priestly denies all mysteries. He thinks, and rejoices in thinking so, that plants have some degree of

sensation. As to the lower animals, they differ from us in degree only, and not in kind. Only they have no promise of a resurrection. If this be true, why should not the King's Advocate be ordered to prosecute criminal *Brutes*, and you Criminal Judges to try them. You are obliged to Dr Priestley for teaching you one-half of your duty, of which you knew nothing before. But I forgot that the fault lies in the Legislature, which has not given you laws for this purpose. I hope, however, when any of them shall be brought to a trial, that he will be allowed a *jury of his peers*.

I am not much surprised, that your Lordship has found little entertainment in a late French writer on Human Nature*. From what I learn, they are all become rank Epicureans. One would think, that French politesse might consort very well with disinterested benevolence; but, if we believe themselves, it is all grimace. It is flattery, in order to be flattered; like that of the horse, who, when his neck itches, scratches his neighbour, that he may be scratched by him again. I detest all systems that depreciate human nature. If it be a delusion, that there is something in the constitution of man that is venerable, and worthy of its Author, let me live and die in that delusion, rather than have my eyes opened to see my

* Helvetius, *De l'Esprit*.

species in a humiliating and disgusting light. Every good man feels his indignation rise against those who disparage his *kindred* or his *country*; why should it not rise against those who disparage his *kind*? Were it not that we sometimes see extremes meet, I should think it very strange to see atheists and high-shod divines, contending as it were who should most blacken and degrade human nature. Yet I think the atheist acts the more consistent part of the two: for surely such views of human nature tend more to promote atheism, than to promote religion and virtue.——

V. FROM THE SAME.

On the Conversion of Clay into Vegetable Mould.

October 1. 1775.

——— The theory of agriculture is a wide and deep ocean, wherein we soon go beyond our depth.

I believe a lump of dry clay has much the same degree of hardness, whether the weather be hot or cold. It seems to be more affected by moisture or drought: and to be harder in dry weather, and more easily broken when a little moistened. But there is a degree of wetness in

clay which makes it not break at all when struck or pressed: it is compressed and changes its figure, but does not break.

Clay ground, I think, ought to be ploughed in the middle state, between wetness and dryness, for this reason: When too dry, the plough cannot enter, or cannot make handsome work. Those clods are torn up, which require great labour and expence to break them. And unless they are broken, the roots of vegetables cannot enter into them. When too wet, the furrow, in being raised and laid over by the plough, is very much compressed, but not broken. The compression makes it much harder when it dries, than it would have been without that compression. But when the ground is neither too wet, nor too dry, the furrow, in being raised and laid over by the plough, breaks or cracks with innumerable crevices, which admit air and moisture, and the roots of vegetables.

Clay, when exposed in small parts to the air, and to alternate moisture and drought, mellows into mould. Thus a clod of clay, which is so hard in seed-time, that you may stand upon it without breaking it, will be found in autumn of the colour of mould, and so softened, that when you press it with the foot it crumbles to pieces. On some clays this change is produced in a shorter time, in the same circumstances; others are more refractory, and require more time.

If wet clay is put into the fire uncompressed, I am informed that it burns to ashes, which make no bad manure.

But if the clay be wrought and compressed when wet, and then dried, and then put into the fire, it burns into brick, and with a greater degree of heat, into a kind of glass.

These, my Lord, are facts; but to deduce them from principles of attraction and repulsion, is beyond the reach of my philosophy: and I suspect there are many things in agriculture, and many things in chemistry, that cannot be reduced to such principles; though Sir Isaac Newton seems to have thought otherwise.

Human knowledge is like the steps of a ladder. The first step consists of particular truths, discovered by observation or experimeent; The second collects these into more general truths: The third into still more general. But there are many such steps before we come to the top; that is, to the most general truths. Ambitious of knowledge, and unconscious of our own weakness, we would fain jump at once, from the lowest step to the highest. But the consequence of this is, that we tumble down, and find that our labour must be begun anew. Is not this a good picture of a philosopher, my Lord? I think so truly; and I should be vain of it, if I were not afraid that I have stolen it from Lord Bacon. I am, &c.

THO. REID.

VI. FROM THE SAME.

On the Generation of Plants and Animals.

(No date, but supposed 1775.*)*

My Lord,

I have some compunction for having been so tardy in answering the letter which your Lordship did me the honour to write me of the 6th November, especially as it suggests two very curious subjects of correspondence. But, indeed, my vacant time has been so much filled up with trifles of College business, and with the frequent calls of a more numerous class of students than I ever had before, that there was no room for any thing that could admit of delay.

You have expressed with great elegance and strength the conjecture I hinted with regard to the generation of plants.

I am indeed apt to conjecture, that both plants and animals are at first organized atoms, having all the parts of the animal or plant, but so slender, and folded up in such a manner, as to be reduced to a particle far beyond the reach of our senses, and perhaps as small as the constituent

parts of water *. The earth, the water, and the air, may, for any thing I know, be full of such organized atoms. They may be no more liable to hurt or injury, than the constituent elementary parts of water or air. They may serve the purposes of common matter, until they are brought into that situation which Nature has provided for their unfolding themselves. When brought into their proper matrix or womb, perhaps after some previous preparations, they are commonly surrounded with some fluid matter, in which they unfold and stretch themselves out to a length and breadth perhaps some thousand times greater than they had when folded up in the atom. They would now be visible to the naked eye, were it not that their limbs and vessels are so slender that they cannot be distinguished from the fluid in which they float. All is equally transparent, and therefore neither figure nor colour can be discerned, although the object has a considerable bulk. The fœtus now has a fluid circulating in its vessels; all the animal functions go on; it is nourished and grows, and some parts, first the heart, then the head, then the spine, by getting some colour, become visible.

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* This opinion is similar to that of M. BONNET. See his *Considérations sur les Corps Organizés*, and his *Contemplation de la Nature*.

It is to be observed, that from the time that the heart first appears in the pellucid liquor, until the time of birth, the animal grows gradually and insensibly, as it does after birth. But before it is visible, it must have increased in size many thousand times in a few days. This does not look like growth by nourishment, but like a sudden unfolding of parts, which before were wrapped up in a small atom.

I go along with your Lordship cordially, till you come to the first formation of an organized body. But there I hesitate. "May there," (say you), "not be particles of a certain kind endowed "with a power to form in conjunction an orga-"nized body?" Would your Lordship allow that certain letters might be endowed with the power of forming themselves into an *Iliad* or *Æneid*, or even into a sensible discourse in prose? I confess our faculties carry us but a very little way in determining what is possible and what is impossible, and therefore we ought to be modest. But I cannot help thinking, that such a work as the *Iliad*, and much more an animal or vegetable body, must have been made by express design and counsel employed for that end. And an author whom I very much respect, has taught me, "That we form this conclusion, not by any pro-"cess of reasoning, but by mere perception and

" feeling*." And I think that conclusions formed in this manner, are of all others most to be trusted. It seems to me as easy to contrive a machine that should compose a variety of epic poems and tragedies, as to contrive laws of motion, by which unthinking particles of matter should coalesce into a variety of organized bodies.

" But," says your Lordship, " certainly the " Almighty has made none of his works so im- " perfect as to stand in need of perpetual mira- " cles." Can we, my Lord, shew, by any good reason, that the Almighty finished his work at a stroke, and has continued ever since an unactive spectator? Can we prove that this method is the best; or that it is possible that the universe should be well governed in this way? I fear we cannot.

And, if his continued operation be necessary or proper, it is no miracle, while it is uniform, and according to fixed laws. Though we should suppose the gravitation of matter to be the immediate operation of the Deity, it would be no miracle, while it is constant and uniform; but if in that case it should cease for a moment, only by his withholding his hand, this would be a miracle.

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* Lord Kames himself.—*Essays on Morality*, &c. Chapter *On the Idea of Power.*

That an animal or vegetable body is a work of art, and requires a skilful workman, I think we may conclude, without going beyond our sphere. But when we would determine how it is formed, we have no *data;* and our most rational conjectures are only reveries, and probably wide of the mark. We travel back to the first origin of things on the wings of fancy. We would discover Nature *in puris naturalibus*, and trace her first operations and gradual progress. But alas! we soon find ourselves unequal to the task: and perhaps this is an entertainment reserved for us in a future state.

As to what you say about Earth or Soil; there seems indeed to be a repulsion of the parts, when it is enriched by the air, or by manure. And in consequence of this, it swells, and occupies more space. But, I conceive, it gets an additional quantity of matter, from the moisture and air which it imbibes, and thereby increases both in bulk and weight. I have been told, that a dunghil made up of earth, dung, and lime, trenched over two or three times, at proper intervals, and then led out, will be found to make more cartloads than it received: and I believe this to be true. If the earth taken out of a pit does not fill it again, I am apt to think there must have been vacuities in the earth at first, perhaps made

by the roots of plants that have decayed, by moles, insects, or other causes.—I am, my Lord, &c.

THO. REID.

VII. *From Dr* WALKER *to Lord* KAMES.

On Hot-Blooded and Cold-Blooded Animals.

MY LORD, *Moffat, November* 8. 1775.

I thought till very lately that I should have had an opportunity of waiting upon your Lordship at Blair-Drummond, before the meeting of the session; but being disappointed in this, I must content myself with paying my respects to your Lordship in the present form.

I was much pleased with the Verulamian spirit of your Lordship's letter. It contains a number of facts which should point at something. In the mass, they are a Chaos or an Erebus. But even from such a mass, the power of just induction is capable of commanding some light or order.

The fact concerning the hot blood and hot breath of the Greenlanders and Esquimaux, I never met with, and would have no dependance

on, unless it were ascertained by the thermometer, in the hands of a person of skill.

We know that in the natives of the torrid zone, the heat of the blood, in perfect health, is the same with that of Europeans, which is 96° of Fahrenheit. But I can recollect nothing that can be called a provision given them by nature against heat, excepting a most profuse perspiration. Yet it is a certain fact, that the African negroes can labour in degrees of heat beyond the power of any white people, whether Europeans or Creolians.

The precise heat of the blood has been measured by the thermometer but in few animals. It is generally assumed, that in all animals which have a double heart, or two ventricles and two auricles, the blood is of the same, or nearly of the same heat with the human. I think this is likely, and I know nothing to the contrary, yet would not say, without actual trial, that there are no exceptions.

The double-hearted animals seem to inhabit all the regions of the earth indifferently. The elephant, the lion, and the monkey, occupy the hottest parts of the globe; and the beaver, the bear, the seal, and the whale, go as far north as man has travelled.

The animals which have a single heart, or only one auricle and one ventricle, are well known

to have colder blood than the former, and of course, to our touch, feel cold. These favour the theory your Lordship aims at, more than the former. Such of them as live in the air, are chiefly the inhabitants of the hotter parts of the earth, as the various species of tortoise and lizard. Such of them as live in the water, that is, all the fishes, can neither strengthen nor weaken your theory, as the disparity of heat between the polar and equatorial parts of the ocean, is small, compared to that of the air.

The serpent kind make a great part of the cold-blooded animals; and they too, in general, occupy the hotter climates. But we have a few species which inhabit the arctic regions, and these suggest this singular observation, That if their cold blood fits them for bearing the greatest heat, which it really seems to do, it also supports them under the greatest cold. No double-hearted animal seems capable of enduring the high degrees of cold, with as little detriment as a snake. It seems to be the only animal capable of being frozen, and not to death: For though frozen like water, and rigid as a road of ice, heat is capable of thawing again the vital principle, or at least of restoring it, after it was, to all appearance, gone.

As for Dr Reid's idea of organized atoms diffused at large through the universe, and detached

from all animal and vegetable bodies *, it is not countenanced by any thing within the sphere of my knowledge. He adduces no facts, nor do I recollect any, to support it. I should wish to know his illustration of it, as our worthy friend is not one who is ready to assume things upon slender grounds. Upon that subject, I have long despaired of our ever getting beyond this plain truth, "That all plants and animals are propa- "gated by seeds, or analogous organizations; "which organizations and seeds, are formed out "of unorganized matter by the power of the "vital principle of the animals and plants, in the "way of secretion."

By analogous organizations, I here mean the bud of a tree, the section of a polypus, and such like organized parts, which are capable, like seeds, of growing up into a complete plant or animal.

The power, indeed, by which this is performed; the secretory power of plants and animals, is a wonder of wonders! A Lyncean anatomist, with his greatest magnifiers, cannot penetrate the darkness in which this is involved. The transmutation of matter, by animal and vegetable secretion, is obvious to every eye, and must strike with wonder every contemplative mind. The

* See Dr Reid's Letter to Lord Kames, immediately preceding.

manner of this transmutation, however, seems to be that high legerdemain, which nature never will reveal. But if, by this power, bread and water can be changed into flesh and blood, bones and sinews, and into the Argus-eye on the peacock's tail; if by this power, water alone can be converted into the hardest wood, into aromatic flowers, and the richest fruits; I then cease to wonder, that the same water should, by this power, be converted into a seed, capable of unfolding itself into a future plant.

I require no aid, therefore, from previous, extraneous, or vagrant organized atoms. I see no assistance they can afford. The philosophy of particles I dislike, and especially of such as are of doubtful existence.——Yours, my very good Lord, most sincerely,

JOHN WALKER.

VIII. *From the same to Lord* KAMES.

On the Generation of Animals and Plants.—Wonderful provisions of Nature for the Dissemination and Preservation of Plants.

Moffat, February 29. 1776.

MY LORD,

I received on Saturday the honour of yours, and have sent inclosed the paper on the Propagation

of Plants, by the conveyance your Lordship directed. I should have been glad to have brought my thoughts upon the subject to Edinburgh, before the rise of the session, but I am so situated, that I can only send them. Nothing prevented their being sent sooner, but the apprehension of their being of little consequence.

The doctrine of *equivocal generation* was universally admitted, till about 130 years ago; but not so much indeed by the ancients, as by the half-enlightened moderns, before that period. Much longer it could not well continue, as it is a doctrine that can subsist only where human knowledge and human understanding are but in a glimmering state. In this state, philosophers saw mites generated from rotten cheese, and myriads of flies and creeping things arise from a dunghil, or a putrid marsh. Ignorant of the natural history and generation of these animals, what could they do, since philosophers must give a *ratio quare* for every thing, but conclude them to be mere spontaneous productions, and the effects, not of generation, but of corruption?

To add to their foolery, the degrading doctrine never was extended to a lion, or a horse, but confined to the poor insects; merely because they were creatures of whose nature they were ignorant. They knew not, that the same power and

wisdom were necessary to form a maggot, that are required to produce an elephant *.

The same conclusion, however, they always formed concerning many vegetables, whose seeds escaped their eyes, such as the ferns, mushrooms, and mosses. Because they saw no seeds in such vegetables, they asserted they had none: And while the oak and the laurel were dignified with generative faculties, these plants were vilified as the progeny of putridity. Equivocal generation thus became the asylum of their ignorance.

I am clear, therefore, for extending unequivocal generation to all vegetables, and in maintaining this fundamental truth in nature, '*Omne vivum ex ovo.*" By the *ovum* in vegetables, I mean a seed, or any part of a plant that contains a bud, or is capable of forming it. They are the same thing: for every bud, as well as every seed, contains the embryo of a future plant. I know of no way, therefore, in which Nature propagates plants, but by seeds, suckers, and layers. The

* Pliny has expressed this sentiment strongly, though with his usual quaintness: "In magnis siquidem corporibus, aut certè majoribus, facilis officina sequaci materia fuit. In his tam parvis, atque tam nullis, quæ ratio, quanta vis, quàm inextricabilis perfectio!——Sed turrigeros elephantorum miramur humeros, taurorumque colla, et truces in sublime jactus, tigrium rapinas, leonum jubas, quum rerum natura nusquam magis quàm in minimis tota sit."—PLIN. *Hist. Nat.* xi. 2. *(Editor.)*

last method is imitated by art, in *cuttings, grafting* and *inoculation.* I have heard of some late experiments of propagating trees by planting their leaves, but I do not believe the fact, and could demonstrate, I think, *à priori,* that it is impossible.

As plants are destitute of loco-motion, it may be urged, that other ways of propagation might be expected, in order more easily and fully to replenish the earth. The keen attention of the most discerning men for forty years past, has failed in discovering any other method of propagation them by seeds, suckers and layers. If there was any other general way of propagation observed in nature, I am at a loss how it could have escaped their observation. But, to go a step further, I do not hesitate to affirm, that the means of propagating plants already known in the economy of nature, are fully sufficient to answer all the purposes for which plants are designed.

By means of suckers and layers, plants indeed can only cover that spot of earth which is contiguous. But it is agreeable to observe, that those plants which are most unfertile in the production of seeds, are the most prolific in the production of suckers, and *vice versâ.* And hence arises a secret but fundamental principle in husbandry and gardening. The growth of unfertile suckers must be powerfully restrained, if you would obtain a large quantity of seeds or fruits.

Numerous and wonderful are the expedients practised by nature for the dissemination of plants. —Some seed-vessels burst with an explosive force, in order to throw the seeds to a distance. This is the case with our whin, (furze;) and was it otherwise, the seeds would fall, to be suffocated in the heart of an impenetrable bush.—Some seed-vessels do not burst till they are wet with rain; but those seeds are found to be more easily destroyed by drought than any others, and to require immediate moisture when they are sown. The ash and the plane have heavy seeds, but they are supplied with wings. A gale of wind can carry them from their lofty situation to a considerable distance, and they remain on the tree till that gale arrives. —The seeds of more humble plants, that they may rise and remove, spread more sail to the wind. The thistle spreads his beard, and away he travels to fix his residence in remote parts. A plant of this kind, the *Erigeron Canadense*, Linn. was received from Canada, about 100 years ago, into the Paris garden. It is now spread as a wild plant over France and Holland, over Germany and Italy; it is said over Sicily; and to such a degree over the south of England, that it is now enumerated in the English list of indigenous plants.—Some seeds, such as the clot-bur, are of an adhesive nature; they lay hold of animals that come near them, and they are carried off, and spread far and wide.

Many other agents are employed by nature to preserve the earth completely stocked with plants. The sea and the rivers waft more seeds than they do sails from one part of the world to another. I have found seeds dropt accidentally into the sea among the West India Islands, cast ashore on the Hebrides.——The Island of Ascension is but the dross of a volcano, and that of a recent date. Its immense distance from land, must render its acquisition of vegetable seeds very difficult and precarious. I know but two ways in which it could be supplied with plants by Nature. The one by the waters of the ocean, the other by birds. By one or other of these ways, it has now got possession of three species of plants, and only three: A singularity no where else known on the face of the globe.

The animal creation is supported by the vegetable: but in return, the vegetables owe much of their progress and propagation to animals. Nay, while an animal is supported by the apparent destruction of a vegetable, he is, in fact, only the instrument of its further propagation. The swine, the moles, the mice, the squirrels, and a thousand other animals, are constantly at work, though with other views, upon this employment. But among all the animals, the birds and graminivorous quadrupeds are the prime agents in the dissemination of plants.

Many birds live upon fruits and berries. The pulp is their aliment: But they discharge the

seeds unimpaired, and by that means spread them every where abroad. These seeds are heavy, and not provided, like others, with any apparatus for flight. But all this is abundantly supplied by the birds which devour them. Hence the bacciferous trees and shrubs appear sometimes whimsical in the choice of their situation. I have seen plantations of holly, yew, whitebeam, rowan, or mountain-ash, spindle-tree, hawthorn, and juniper, formed by the birds of the air, upon inaccessible precipices and impending cliffs, which far excelled, and even disgraced, in point of beauty, the plantations of men.

The mistletoe of old was deemed also, by the wise men, a product of equivocal generation; because it grew upon trees, and had no flower which they could perceive. They saw, indeed, its large, round, heavy berries. These they thought might fall to the ground, but never could mount up into trees; and it was therefore concluded, that they were not the seeds of the plant. It was long since discovered, however, that no berries are more grateful to the birds of the thrush kind; and it is by them they are evacuated, and planted upon high and remote trees.

It is remarkable, that the vegetating power of seeds, instead of being impaired by their passing through birds, seems rather increased. The seeds of the magnolias brought from America, have generally refused to vegetate under the manage-

ment of the most skilful gardeners. But I have been told a curious fact, brought from America by Lord Adam Gordon, That when these seeds are eaten and voided by turkies, they never fail to grow. As your Lordship is intimate with Lord Adam, you may be more certainly informed of this remarkable observation.

It is well known, that the dung of domestic animals, while it fertilizes a garden, likewise fills it with a great quantity and variety of weeds. All the seeds they eat, which are various and numberless, are discharged entire, and not less fit for vegetation. This to me is a miracle in nature; that seeds should withstand the power of animal digestion, which no other vegetable substance can, and which they are also unable to do once they are broken. This is such a provision for the preservation and dissemination of seeds, as I cannot look upon without wonder.

Thus much for the propagation of plants; any other method except by seeds, suckers, and layers, appears to me both unknown and unnecessary. And so farewel to equivocal generation. I can scarce write of it without being a little ruffled. So ill it corresponds with the more august and comfortable ideas of creation, which have made one of the principal articles of happiness in my life. I am afraid of going into detail up-

on the second article of your paper. My mind on the subject is shortly this.

The ultimate particles of the solids of all animals and vegetables, as far as glasses can go, appear organized:—That they were once unorganized, is unquestionable; for I allow of no organization, but what is perceptible to the eye, or by its effects:—That they are organized by the plant or animal, and lose their organization upon its dissolution:—That they have no power to organize themselves:—That they are purely passive, and formed into an organic body, by the assimilating power of the plant which assumes them:—All these points correspond with your Lordship's opinion in your letter. They may be misunderstood and controverted; they may be obscured by ingenuity, and opposed by one hypothesis piled upon another; but if I know any thing of Nature, they are positions which will stand the test.

As to the infinite series of embryo's in the seed of a plant, I have the same opinion of it as your Lordship. It is invisible and incomprehensible, two unlucky properties in a material subject; nor can it have any effects assigned to it which we cannot deduce from a more palpable and rational cause. I always looked upon it as a silly conceit, which arose from viewing the *plantula in semine*. I am so far from thinking that future plants subsist in a seed, that I am persuaded that the plant

immediately produced from a seed does not subsist in it, in its perfect form, and in all its parts. The plume and radicle do indeed subsist in it, and these have a power to produce all the parts of the plant complete. We can by culture, by cutting, clipping, and different ways, give such various forms to a plant, that to imagine these, or any one of these subsisted in miniature in the parent seed, is perfectly visionary.

Your Lordship next puts a puzzling question—By what cause does a seed begin to vegetate in the earth? Here the *primum mobile* is to me perfectly mysterious. I cannot form even in idea any explanation of it that is satisfactory. The original cause I doubt is placed beyond our view, but the secondary or immediate cause lies within our reach, and may be ascertained.

Animals have a circulation; but plants, so far as I have yet found, only a progressive motion of their juices. Harvey placed the life of animals in the circulation of the blood: and the opinion has ever since generally been received in medicine. Our great medical friend*, however, now demonstrates that it is an opinion void of foundation. The nerves in animals are a system of vessels upon which life does more immediately de-

* I presume Dr CULLEN.

pend, than either the blood-vessels or their contents. But as there is no such system in plants, I hold with respect to them the doctrine of Harvey; and am of opinion that life in them consists immediately and essentially in the motion of the sap. What is then the immediate cause of vegetation, that is, of the motion of the sap? I answer, heat.—Heat, figuratively speaking, is the heart of vegetables. It is the cause that moves and propels their sap into a progressive motion, as the heat does the blood of animals, into a motion that is circulatory. Thus far we can go, and I believe no farther. In both cases, the remote cause of motion is secret, and far removed from all human inspection.

The ascent of the plume and the descent of the radicle, is indeed a surprising phenomenon; yet I think it may be accounted for upon a mechanical principle. To ascend and descend is not the ultimate view of these two parts in their growth; but the endeavour of the one is to get into the air, and of the other into the earth. And to attain these two ends, as seeds are generally deposited in or near the surface of the ground, the plume must ascend, and the radicle descend. But place seeds in the roof of a cave, or in an inverted flower-pot. What is the consequence? I know it well from repeated observation. The radicle ascends, and the plume descends: That is, the first pursues its road into the earth, and

the other into the air, in whatever direction the air and the earth are placed. There is therefore a sympathy, an attraction, or if these displease, a something, I know not what, between the plume of a plant and air. But by whatever name it may be called, it is the immediate cause of plants shooting into that element, and quite different from a mere tendency to shoot upwards.

The point at the juncture of the two cotyledons, or seminal leaves, is the place from whence the plume and radicle spring; and this I look upon as the *punctum saliens vitæ*, both in seeds and plants. Here the radicle ends and the plume begins. I have examined, but have been able to discover nothing particular in this place upon dissection: and yet it is the chief seat of the vegetating power in a seed. The cotyledons may be cut off; the plume or radicle may without detriment be impaired: But this point cut off or destroyed, the plant is gone.

I know something of Bonnet as a philosopher, and did not think he could have indulged such a chimera about a lobster. Yet I agree perfectly with your Lordship, concerning the bulk of the French and German writers. I know well how liable they are to run to the excess of riot. I find equal ingenuity and more sobriety in a Swiss, a Swede, or an Italian. In Germany, the human understanding is not yet perfectly enlightened

with respect to Nature. There is scarce a Prince, a Grandee, or a Professor, who is not in some degree a miner and a chemist. Yet few of them have yet got free of Kircher's subterranean people, of the spirit of the mine, or the *virgula divinatoria;* and many of them still labour under the power of the alchemist, as the Emperor's present physician does under the power of witchcraft. Many Germans excel in particular parts of natural history; but in such a country it is no wonder that men should fail, upon subjects where just and enlarged ideas of the powers of Nature are required.

The errors of the French proceed not so much from the country as the people. Those very qualities which make them shine in other parts of literature, make them bad theorists. From Des Cartes down to Buffon, France has certainly produced the worst system-mongers that ever put pen to paper, and more of them, too, than any other country.

I had written thus far when I just now received your Lordship's letter, dated yesterday. The alpine plants are the most difficult to preserve in a garden, as they suffer there more cold in winter, and more heat and drought in summer, than in their natural situation. Snow is their defence against the cold, where they grow naturally; and wherever they are cultivated, this

must be imitated by art. I have learned from this, in searching for alpine plants, about the summits of our highest mountains, where to find them in greatest plenty and variety. It is always in those places to which the snow is apt to be blown, where it lies thickest and remains longest. Let the cold of the atmosphere be what it will, the thermometer under snow never falls below 32°, the freezing point. None of the plants I have yet tried suffer any injury from this degree of cold under snow. In our last storm, when the thermometer was generally down from 20° to 12° at midnight, I had a parcel of plants kept under deep snow for six weeks. Some of them were plants that cannot stand the open air in winter; yet when the snow went off, they were fresher and in much better condition than if they had been standing all the while in a greenhouse.

Several different diseases in sheep pass by the name of Rot. Whenever sheep are suffered to grow lean to a certain degree, they always become diseased in some shape or other. The disease properly called the Rot, proceeds sometimes, I think, from their feeding through necessity on acrid plants. Yet I have no further evidence for this, than observing the disease most prevalent, where I see the pinguicula, drosera, and ranunculus in greatest abundance, and pastured by the sheep. It is the happy property of the

grasses, which form our pastures, that even after they have perfected their seeds, they revegetate directly from the root. They shoot away afresh in their foliage, to give a new and immediate supply of provision, and this lasts till the winter is somewhat advanced. One valuable grass we have on our mountains which feeds the sheep with its foliage in summer, and with its large white succulent roots in winter.

I beg leave to offer my most respectful compliments to Mrs Drummond. I was not unmindful of her heath, but it got only last week from under its snow cover, and it was rather too soon in the season to transport it. I have sent, however, two plants of it, which I would place in the open ground in a rich sandy soil, and cover them in frost or in dry weather with a bell glass.

I have inclosed the note sent by Miss Blackburne concerning the new sensitive plant discovered in the East Indies. I am, with the greatest respect, your Lordship's most obliged and most obedient servant,

JOHN WALKER.

IX. *From Lord* KAMES *to Dr* WALKER.

On the same Subject.

MY DEAR SIR,

Blair-Drummond, April 12. 1776.

I acknowledge myself your sincere convert about the propagation of plants; and zealous, like other new converts, I condemn myself for endeavouring to rear up conjectural causes, that in all appearance have no foundation, when the known causes are sufficient. This subject is to make an article in my present work; and if you do not put a negative upon me, honourable mention shall be made of the Reverend Dr Walker, and even passages of his letters quoted. Perhaps you despise such incense, as your fame extends already over a very wide territory; but I have some little vanity, and am not without the hope, that as my work will certainly be the better for your name, so it will do that name no discredit, that it finds an honourable place in it.

So frequently have I been indebted to you for knowledge, that in all my difficulties I lean to you for more. Supposing water, with what it contains, to be the food of plants, I cannot explain why certain plants, such as the whin,

(furze), Scotch fir, juniper, heath, thrive best in bad soil. If it be thought that a soil retentive of moisture may hurt them, by affording too much, I borrow an answer from Dr Hales, that superfluous moisture cannot hurt them, because it is discharged at the leaves.

Where plants flourish and bear fruit but once a-year, it is natural to think, that in a cold climate, this should be in summer. Yet the laurustinus flourishes all winter, and is without flowers in the heat of summer only. At the same time, it cannot stand much frost in our climate. The whin is in some measure similar, at least in flowering all winter, except during frost. I would gladly have some notion of the nature of such plants. I have begun a late acquaintance with plants, and am fond of arriving at a more intimate one.

You remember Van Helmont's experiment of a willow growing to a considerable size in a vessel of earth regularly watered, without exhausting any of the earth. Yet in the *Transactions of the Royal Society*, anno 1699, Dr Woodward proves, by several experiments, that a considerable quantity of the earth was exhausted. This is an article of importance concerning the food of plants. In my Theory, I have quoted Van Helmont, and it would vex me should I build upon a wrong foundation.

The Circuit begins at Dumfries on Friday the 17th of May. I expect you there, with an answer to my queries, there to remain *nolens volens*, as my assessor during the whole time. But perhaps you may be called up to the *General Assembly:* If so, resolve to be at Blair-Drummond, when it breaks up, at which time I shall have returned from my circuit. You need never otherwise venture to look Mrs Drummond in the face. —A delightful prospect of flowering shrubs and of fruit.—A young laurustinus, which, by your directions, I covered with snow, is at present in full blow, when all the rest of its tribe seem to be dying, having been miserably scorched by the severe frost.

I long to converse with you about your appearing in print. For that end, you proposed to be in Edinburgh about February, and you have never told me what prevented you. You must resolve to publish in parts, otherwise you may happen never to publish at all. Consider that every part you publish takes a load off your shoulders. There is besides an advantage in this method: It gives opportunity from time to time to improve or connect the parts published. Mahomet knew that cunning trick, when he published his *Coran* piece-meal. Yours, while I know myself to be,

HENRY HOME.

X. *Dr* WALKER *to Lord* KAMES.

On the Aliment of Plants, and the Soils they most affect.

MY LORD, *Moffat, July* 13. 1776.

I received on Friday the honour of your letter by Miss G., and was at any rate to have written this week. I have better reason than your Lordship to complain of not making good the visit to Blair-Drummond, because I am sure I was more disappointed. Dr Cullen was to come out with me on Monday, but was prevented by the illness of the Chief-Baron and Commissioner ———

As to the aliment of vegetables, Van Helmont's experiment has always been considered, and I believe justly, the *experimentum crucis* upon the subject. Woodward's trials, so far as they militate against it, I suspect to be fallacious. When he speaks of earth as the aliment of plants, I suppose he means generally, if not always, the earth in rain or spring water; and if he does, he differs not from Van Helmont. If I remember right, some of his trials indeed were made by mixing earth with the water in which the plants were nourished. If a little of this earth was lost, I would ascribe it rather to its diffusion in the wa-

ter, and to the evaporation, than to its being absorbed by the plant. Earth, indeed, strictly speaking, is not thus easy to evaporate; but the earth he used was soil, and this, especially if it is rich, always contains a large proportion of animal and vegetable substance, capable of evaporation. Besides we know, that without any soil, a plant can be raised to be considerable both in bulk and weight. By water alone, M. du Hamel raised an oak, which grew and increased for seven years, without any thing else.

But there is another medium, by which your Lordship's difficulty may be solved, and Van Helmont and Woodward reconciled. I am clear, that rain-water contains all the alimentary matter necessary for the support of plants, and that this matter is a subtile earth, or, to be less exceptionable, a subtile earthy substance. This I assume, as demonstrated by experiment. I next suppose, that this earth is not fossile, but animal and vegetable substance highly attenuated. This I think capable of being proved by induction. My conclusion follows: If plants are nourished by the animal and vegetable matter in rain-water, I see no reason why they may not absorb the same matter, when it is lodged in a rich soil, and dissolved in water. I am persuaded they do; and though in a small quantity, it may be sufficient to occasion a perceptible diminution of weight in the soil employed for the support of a plant.

By embracing this opinion, I must grant indeed the following inference; and I grant it readily, as I believe it to be the case, "That all animal and vegetable manures, though they act chiefly by altering the texture of the soil, yet in some degree they also serve as alimentary matter to plants, but that all fossile manures act only by altering the texture of the soil."

The attachment of plants to particular soils, is owing to different causes, but chiefly to the nature of their roots. The Scotch fir, and indeed all the pines, delight in blowing sand, more than any other trees, though the soil of all others the least tenacious of moisture. But besides moisture, these trees demand another property in their soil. They have exceeding long horizontal roots; they thrive best where they can most easily extend them; and therefore choose the most pervious soil. They have fewer absorbing fibres at their roots than any trees I know; and must, therefore, have a larger spread of roots, than those trees whose absorbing fibres are more numerous upon the roots.

Heath, likewise, is remarkable for the extraordinary length of its roots, and the scarcity of its fibres; but it stands in need of more moisture than the fir. It requires, therefore, a soil that is both pervious and wet, and it well knows where

these two qualities are combined in the highest perfection; as *Moss Flanders* * can testify.

Juniper requires not a moist soil, but a moist air, and is therefore a mountain plant. It can live on the poorest and driest soil, as it does on the mountains; but there it is sufficiently supplied by moisture from the air. If it is planted in a low station, or in a dry climate, it then requires a wet soil, as a succedaneum for the moist atmosphere, in which it naturally lives.

The same is the case with the yew. Where it grows naturally in Britain, in a low station, it is always in a damp soil. Sometimes it grows on the very driest soil, as in the clefts of rocks; but then at so great a height as to live in a very humid air. In a warmer climate, as in Italy, it requires a station still higher than with us: *Aquilonem et frigora taxi.*

These are a few instances to show why many plants affect to grow in a soil commonly reckoned infertile. Our idea of a perfect soil, we apply to that which affords the most luxuriant crops of eight or a dozen species of cultivated plants. But alas! what a small portion of the globe is occupied by such a soil! We are not, therefore, to imagine, that this is the most per-

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* Otherwise called the *Moss of Kincardine;* See p. 89. of Vol. II.

fect soil for all plants, nor reprobate all others as sterile and imperfect. A soil which a mere farmer would pronounce the most imperfect, is for many plants perfect in the highest degree. And without this, how could the earth be every where clothed with beauty? What diversity of soil, climate, and situation, must be required to suit the taste, and raise to perfection, above 20,000 species of vegetables, each of which almost has a different propensity in one or other of these three articles!

Plants translated from one climate to another, strictly observe their original season of flowering, unless prevented by some powerful cause. The climate of the shores of Spain and Portugal, in December and January, suits the flowering of the laurustinus; but the cold of Scotland, in these months, is not sufficient to deter him from his season. I mean the milder parts of Scotland; for in the higher and more rigorous parts of the country, I see the cold is really sufficient to put him past his season, and to prevent his spreading any flower till April. Was I to see a laurustinus flowering with us in winter, and had never heard of the shrub, I should, without scruple, pronounce it no native of this country. And for the same reason, I would deny the arbutus to be a native of Ireland, or the whin of Scotland. The fancy these shrubs have to flower with us in January, is plainly an outlandish fashion. No sensible

Scotch plant would ever think of such a thing. Plants brought from the southern hemisphere, and which flower there, when the sun is in Capricorn, never mind the sun one bit when he is in Cancer, but adhere to their old December rule.

If your Lordship is to build a new fruit-wall, I hope you can have it of brick. Let it have neither excavations nor projections. Instead of pillars, plant evergreen hedges, holly and yew, at large distances, for breaking the course of the wind along the wall. By all means let the trees have elbow-room; and for this purpose, they will require from five to fifteen feet greater distance than most gardeners will direct. Their distance, however, must be proportioned to the height of the wall. But at any rate, one good tree is better than half a dozen bad ones. There is one apricot at Prestonfield, capable to afford a sufficient quantity of that fruit; and this season, I believe, more than sufficient for any family. It is 120 years old; but this valuable tree would have been dead 70 years ago, if it had not had more wall to spread upon, than is allowed for any apricot at present.

All gardeners, and writers on gardening, advise the fronting of a fruit-wall to the south-east, rather than to the south or west. I own I am of a different opinion. I would rather choose the south; and if circumstances answer, I would

prefer two points to the west, or even the south-west exposure, to all others.

The only reasons I have heard given for a south-east exposure are these: That the trees receive the sun earlier in the day, and that they are sooner freed of the dew. But both, according to my mind, are erroneous.

In the months of May, June and July, fruits depend greatly upon the dew for their progress to maturity; more, I believe, than upon rains. The most dewy are always the best fruit seasons. A scarcity of dew in May and June, brings the fruit off the tree in myriads, and what remains is of a stunted growth, which no heat afterwards can bring to perfection. Therefore, instead of abridging, I would rather prolong the duration of dews upon my trees, so far as is consistent with their receiving the greatest heat of the day.

And to secure this great point, What are the six hottest hours of the day, from May to September? They are from eleven o'clock in the forenoon to five in the afternoon; and it is not a south-east, nor a south, but a south-west, that enjoys the sun during these six hours in its greatest strength.

By a south-west exposure, then, we obtain for fruits what above all things they want, the most moisture, and the greatest heat. By no other exposure can these two articles be had combined to such a degree.

Observe two borders in a garden, one upon an east, the other upon a west wall. If they are of the same soil, the west border, all the summer over, is the driest, because it receives most heat. A west wall at Moffat, can produce a magnum plum, large and well ripened; but an east wall can with difficulty ripen a heart-cherry.

It is throwing away a wall to bestow it upon vines, figs, and nectarines. These three fruits should with us be confined to the hot-house: For a good plum is certainly better than a bad nectarine.

Whatever way a wall is fronted, it is a great matter to have a dry and a deep soil, and a full shelter at a proper distance, either from trees or from rising ground.

But I am afraid of tiring your Lordship. I wish the thing has not happened two or three pages ago. Whatever is in any letter I write, is entirely at your Lordship's service, for whatsoever purpose you please; nor will I grudge to write, while I have reason to think they can afford any entertainment to your Lordship.—— I ever am, with the highest regard, your Lordship's most obliged and devoted servant,

JOHN WALKER.

APPENDIX.—No. IV.

On certain Critical Remarks by Dr WARBURTON *and M.* DE VOLTAIRE, *on some parts of Lord* KAMES's *Writings.*

IT was a well-known failing of Dr WARBURTON, a man certainly of very uncommon learning and genius, that presuming too much on the sufficiency of his own powers, he seemed to consider himself as having finally decided and set at rest every topic or matter of controversy which he ever treated in any of his numerous writings. Conceiving that Lord Kames, in his *Elements of Criticism*, when examining the question, Whether ridicule is a test of truth? had attacked his opinions on that subject; as if no other man had ever written on it but himself; he takes every opportunity that he can find to treat his supposed antagonist with sarcasm and abuse. His own notions regarding ridicule, are no other than what had been maintained by various other writers as

well as himself*; nor is there a single expression of the author of *Elements of Criticism*, from which it can be presumed, that he had ever read one word of what Dr Warburton had written on that subject. Indeed, the loose and desultory manner in which the latter treats the topic in question, in that extraordinary piece of writing, entitled a *Dedication to the Freethinkers*, (among whom we shall see he classed Lord Kames), prefixed to his great work of *The Divine Legation*, &c. was not suited to attract the attention of a metaphysical examiner. It is therefore not a little curious to remark the indignant air with which the author repels this supposed attack on his peculiar opinions, and the high strain of contempt with which he treats his imagined opponent.

'The author of a late book, called *Elements of Criticism*, speaking of mens various opinions 'concerning the *use of ridicule*, proceeds against 'what is here said, in the following manner:— "This dispute has produced a celebrated que- "stion, Whether ridicule be, or be not a test of "truth? which, (says he,) STATED IN ACCURATE "TERMS, is, whether the sense of ridicule be the "proper test for distinguishing ridiculous objects "from those that are not so? To answer the

* Addison, Bishop Berkeley, Brown, &c.

" question with PRECISION, I must premise, that " ridicule is not a subject of reasoning, but of " SENSE OF TASTE.' Vol. ii. p. 55.—The critic ' having thus changed the question, which he ' calls, *stating it in accurate terms;* and obscur- ' ed the answer, which he calls, giving it *with* ' *precision*, he concludes, ' that ridicule is not " only the best, but the only test of truth.'—His ' second change of the question is a new substi- ' tution, viz. Whether ridicule be a talent to be ' used or employed at all? Of which he supposes ' *me* to hold the negative. What else is the ' meaning of these words, ' TO CONDEMN A TA- " LENT FOR RIDICULE, because it may be convert- " ed to wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous. " Could one forbear to *smile* if a talent for rea- " soning was condemned, because it also may be " perverted?' p. 57.—He has no reason to *smile*, ' sure, at his own misrepresentation. I never ' condemned a talent for ridicule, because it may ' be abused.' *(Dedication to Div. Leg. of Moses.)* Might not Lord Kames here have put a question? " Did I ever charge *you* with having made this " misrepresentation, or ever take notice of you at " all, in the dispute? Are you the only writer " who has maintained that ridicule is not a test " of truth?"

Of a similar spirit, and equally characteristic of the writer, are the following observations, in the notes on Book ii. of the *Divine Legation of Moses,*

(Warburton's Works, vol. i. 4to. p. 244. and 294. In the text, it is said, "A principal reason for "Æneas' descent into hell, was, that Augustus, "who was shadowed in the person of Æneas, "had been initiated into the Eleusinian Mys- "teries." *Note* on this passage: Hence the reader will be able to judge of the delicacy of taste and accuracy of discernment in a late writer, who, in a book called *Elements of Criticism*, corrects Virgil's want of judgment in this part of the *Æneis*, after having given instances of defects full as notorious in the *Georgics*: "An Episode in "a narrative poem, (says this man of taste,) being "in effect an accessory, demands not that strict "union with the principal subject which is requi- "site betwixt a whole and its constituent parts. "The relation, however, of principal and accessory "being pretty intimate, an Episode loosely con- "nected with the principal subject will never be "graceful. I give for example, the descent of "Æneas into hell, which employs the sixth book "of the Æneid. The reader is not prepared for "this important event. No cause is assigned "that can make it appear *necessary*, or even na- "tural to suspend for so long a time the princi- "pal action." &c. &c.

"The critic" (says Dr Warburton,) "having told "us, that a *strict union is not required between the* "*principal and accessory*, finds fault with the acces-

" sory, that no cause is given to make it appear that " it is *necessary to the principal.* However, I ought " not to be too severe on this *great critic*, since the " observation was certainly made to recommend " my interpretation of this *descent into hell;* which " shews, if not the necessity, yet the infinite grace " and beauty of this noble *accessory*, and the close " and natural connection it has with its *principal.*"

The amount of this extraordinary piece of reasoning is, the severe conclusion, that the author of *Elements of Criticism* has neither taste nor discernment; since he has censured the *want of necessary connection* between the episode of the descent of Æneas into hell, and the principal story of the Æneid; which episode Dr Warburton has shewn, *if not necessary*, to be yet infinitely *graceful* and *beautiful;* because *Augustus, who is shadowed in the person of Æneas, had been initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries!*—a conclusion of which the connection with its premises, (to say the least of it,) is not extremely obvious.

Again, in a note of Dr Warburton's on Pope's second Dialogue of the Epilogue to the Satires, (*Warburton's Pope's Works*, vol. iv. p. 328.)

> O sacred weapon left for truth's defence, &c.
> To all but heaven-directed hands deny'd, &c.

' Mr Henry Home, a *Lord of Session*, and late ' writer of a book, entitled *Elements of Criticism*,

'replies to this character of ridicule, as follows:
'— 'Ridicule is but a gross pleasure. A people,
" it is true, must have emerged out of barbarity,
" before they can have a taste for ridicule. But
" it is too rough an entertainment for those who
" are highly polished and refined. Ridicule is
" banished France, and is losing ground daily
" in England.'—This observation is of so singu-
'lar a complexion, that one can hardly tell whe-
'ther it is to be taken in jest or earnest. By
'*highly polished and refined*, he tells us he means
'delicacy of taste; but as among the polite, deli-
'cacy is commonly understood to mean sickliness,
'and as, according to this writer's decision, ridi-
'cule is the best test of truth, and truth and
'liberty go together, when he talks of ridicule
'being banished France, his condemnation of this
'noble touchstone of truth must be altogether
'ironical. But as, on the other hand, this co-
'pious writer has composed three large volumes
'to substitute taste to common sense, I should
'suppose him to be in earnest.'

So likewise in a note of the same writer on the *Essay on Man*, vol. iii. p. 8.

Superior beings when of late they saw, &c.

'And here let me take notice of a new species of
'the sublime, of which our poet may be justly

'said to be the maker; so new, that we have yet 'no name for it, though of a nature distinct from 'every other beauty of poetry. The two great 'perfections in works of genius are *wit* and *sub-* 'limity: Many writers have been witty; some 'have been sublime; but none that I know of 'besides our poet, had the art to *incorporate* 'them; of which he hath given them many ex- 'amples, both in this Essay and in his other 'poems; one of the noblest being the passage in 'question. This seems to be the last effort of 'the imagination to poetical perfection; and in 'this compounded excellence, the wit receives a 'dignity from the sublime, and the sublime a 'splendor from the wit, which in their state of 'separate existence, they neither of them had. 'Yet a late critic, who *writes with the deci-* 'sion of a Lord of Session on Parnassus, thinks 'otherwise.— 'It may be gathered (says he) "from what is said above, that wit and ridicule "make not an agreeable mixture with grandeur. "Dissimilar emotions have a fine effect in a slow "succession; but in a rapid succession, which "approaches to co-existence, they will not be "relished.'—What pity it is that the poet should 'here confute the critic, by doing what the cri- 'tic with his *rules*, teaches us cannot be done. 'Boileau, who was both a poet and a critic, had 'a clear view of this excellence in idea; while

'the mere critic had no idea of what had been 'clearly set before his eyes:

> " *On peut être à la fois et pompeux et plaisant,*
> " *Et je hais un sublime ennuyeux et pesant.*"

Every one must be sensible that the question here disputed can be determined only by an appeal to feeling; and notwithstanding the concurring opinion of Warburton and Boileau, it is probable there may still be many good judges who will agree with Lord Kames in condemning this new kind of sublime, which the poet is here said to have had the merit of inventing, (though the passage from Boileau proves the contrary,) and which his commentator extols as the last effort towards poetical perfection. The impression made by wit is of a light and playful kind; *circum præcordia ludit;* that made by sublimity is grave and powerfully affecting. These impressions, so different in their nature, cannot aid each other by union, but must mutually destroy each other's influence. It has been justly observed, that *Lympha pudica Deum vidit et erubuit*, (which was not invented by Pope,) would be an ingenious piece of wit, if it did not excite too solemn an emotion; and it would be sublime, were it not for its wit. As it is, the thought is neither a good example of wit nor of sublimity: and the same observation, if I do not much mistake, will apply to the pas-

sage which gave rise to this criticism; in which, the thought of the "Angels shewing a *Newton* "as men show an *ape*," is neither truly dignified, nor truly witty; but an unnatural and fantastic compound, quite unworthy of the general good taste of the poet. In this, as in several other instances, the commentator has truly done his author no service by his misplaced encomium: the latter might say to him here with some justice, *Pol, me occidistis, amice.*

Again, in the first note on the *Dunciad,*

"The mighty mother," &c.

'The author of *Elements of Criticism, sits* '*from time to time* on our poets, whom he *tries* 'by critical rules which he has invented, and 'laid down for the purpose of his *general visita-* 'tion of English poets and poetry.—'The author "(Pope,) says he, is guilty of much greater de- "viation from the *rule.* Dulness may be ima- "gined a deity or idol, to be worshipped by bad "writers: but then some sort of disguise is requi- "site, some *bastard virtue* must be bestowed, to "give this idol a plausible appearance. Yet in "the *Dunciad,* Dulness, without the least dis- "guise, is made the object of worship. The "mind rejects such a fiction as unnatural.'—But 'is there no bastard virtue, (says Warburton) in

'the *mighty mother* of so numerous an offspring, 'which she takes care to bring *to the ears of* '*kings?* Her votaries would, for this single vir- 'tue, prefer her influence to Apollo and the nine 'muses. Is there no bastard virtue in the piece 'of which the poet makes her the author?— "*The goddess bade Britannia sleep.*'—Is she not 'celebrated for her beauty, another Bastard vir- 'tue?—'*Fate this fair idiot gave,*' &c.—But of 'all her bastard virtues, her *Free-thinking*, the 'virtue which she anxiously propagates amongst 'her followers in the 4th Book, might, one would 'think, have been sufficient to have covered the 'poet from *this* censure.' [Here the Critic betrays in plain words the radical ground of his enmity. He had *heard* Lord Kames vulgarly reported as one of the sceptical writers; and without farther examination or acquaintance with his works, he chimes in with the vulgar report.]— 'But, (continues he,) had Mr Pope drawn his 'goddess without the *least disguise*, it had not 'signified a rush. *Disguised* or *undisguised*, the 'poem had been neither better nor worse; and 'he has secured it from being *rejected as unnatu-* '*ral* by ten thousand beauties of nature.'—Now, what is all this to say? The critic first admits the propriety of the rule, which Lord Kames is said to have "invented for his own purpose," by endeavouring to prove, in opposition to him, the consonance of the imagined personage, the God-

dess of Dulness, to that very rule, as being endowed with many bastard virtues; and afterwards, being resolved to justify his favourite author, at all hazards, he concludes with his own *dictum*, that it is of no consequence whether the picture had been consonant to this standard or not; for however faulty in one particular, the poet had redeemed this fault by a thousand beauties. Does this prove, against Lord Kames, that the *fault* itself is a *beauty*, or even that it is of no consequence?

With respect to M. DE VOLTAIRE, Lord Kames was guilty of a complicated offence of a very heinous nature. He had censured the *Henriade* as cold and unnatural, from its treating its incidents too little in detail, *Elem. of Crit.* vol. ii. p. 333. He had blamed the action as being too recent, and consequently too familiar, *Ibid.* p. 382. He had found great fault with the introduction of the imaginary personages of Sleep, Discord, Fanaticism, &c.; and he had pronounced on the whole, that the *Henriade* must be a short-lived poem, *Ibid.* p. 389. This, no doubt, was a very heavy act of aggression in the critic. But he had dared, moreover, to extol *Shakespeare*, for his exquisite knowledge of human nature, and skill in touching the passions; while in some instances, he censured, in those respects, the great masters of the French drama, *Racine* and *Corneille*. The offence was

altogether of a nature quite unpardonable: We shall give a specimen of Voltaire's revenge. He had criticised with great freedom these writers of his own country, in a thousand instances, himself; and he had once been the most ardent of Shakespeare's panegyrists.

'Un Grand Juge d'Ecosse, qui a fait imprimer 'des *Elémens de Critique* Anglaise, en trois vo- 'lumes, dans lesquels on trouve des réflexions 'judicieuses et fines, a pourtant eu le malheur de 'comparer la première scène du monstre nommé '*Hamlet* à la première scène du chef-d'œuvre de 'nôtre *Iphigénie*. Il affirme que ces vers d'*Arcas*,

'*Avez-vous dans les airs entendu quelque bruit?*
'*Les vents nous auraient-ils evaucés cette nuit?*
'*Mais tout dort, et l'armée, et les vents, et Neptune;*—

'ne valent pas cette réponse vraie et convenable 'du sentinelle dans *Hamlet: Je n'ai pas entendu 'une souris trotter.*—Oui Monsieur, un soldat 'peut répondre ainsi dans un corps-de-garde; 'mais non pas sur le théatre, devant les premières 'personnes d'une nation, qui s'expriment noble- 'ment, et devant qui il faut s'exprimer de même. '—Que ce soldat ait vu ou n'ait pas vu passer de 'souris, cet évênement est très-inutile à la tra- 'gédie d'*Hamlet;* ce n'est qu'un discours de 'Gilles, un proverbe bas, qui ne peut faire aucun

'effêt. Il y a toujours une raison pour laquelle 'toute beauté est beauté, et toute sottise et sot-'tise.'—*Lettre de M. de* VOLTAIRE *à l'Académie 'Française.*

'Ce Monsieur *Home*, Grand Juge d'Ecosse, en-'seigne la manière de faire parler les héros d'une 'tragédie avec esprit: et voici un example re-'marquable qu'il rapporte de la tragédie de *Hen-'ri IV.* du divin *Shakespeare.* Le divin *Shake-'speare* introduit *milord Falstaff, chef de Justice,* 'qui vient de prendre prisonnier le chevalier *'Jean Colevile*, et qui le présente au roi:—" Sire, " le voilà; je vous le livre; je supplie votre " grace de faire enrégistrer ce fait d'armes parmi " les autres de cette journée, ou pardieu je le fe-" rai mettre dans une balade avec mon portrait à " la tête; on verra *Colevile* me baisant les pieds. " Voilà ce que je ferai, si vous ne rendez pas ma " gloire aussi brillante qu'une pièce de deux sous " dorée," &c.—C'est cet absurde et abominable 'galimatias, très-frequent dans le divin *Shake-'speare*, que M. *Jean Home* propose pour le mo-'dèle du bon goût et de l'esprit dans la tragédie. 'Mais en récompense, M. *Home* trouve l'*Iphigé-'nie* et la *Phèdre* de Racine extrêmement ridi-'cules.'—*L'Homme au* XL *Ecus, Note (f.)*

'Permettez moi de vous soumettre quelques 'singularités curieuses de l'*Essai sur Critique*, en

'trois volumes, de M. *Home*, Lord *Makaims*,
'(c'est le titre d'un des Juges de Paix en Ecosse.)
'On ne peut avoir une plus profonde connoissance
'de la nature et des arts que ce philosophe, et il
'fait tous ses efforts pour que le monde soit aussi
'savant que lui. Il nous prouve d'abord que
'nous avons cinq sens, et que nous sentons moins
'l'impression douce faite sur nos yeux et sur nos
'oreilles par les couleurs et par les sons, que nous
'ne sentons un grand coup sur la jambe ou sur la
'tête. Il nous instruit de la différence que tout
'homme éprouve entre une simple émotion et une
'passion de l'ame; il nous apprend que les fem-
'mes passent quelquefois de la pitié à l'amour.
'——De-là, passant à la mésure du tems et de
'l'éspace, M. *Home* conclut mathématiquement
'que le tems est long pour une fille qu'on va ma-
'rier, et court pour un homme qu'on va pendre:
'puis il donne des définitions de la beauté et du
'sublime. Il connait si bien la nature de l'une
'et de l'autre, qu'il réprouve totalement ces beaux
'vers d'*Athálie*,

'*La douceur de sa voix, son enfance, sa grace, &c.*

'Il trouve que le monologue de *Dom Diègue*,
'dans le *Cid*,

'*O rage! O désespoir! O vieillesse ennemie! &c.*

' est un morceau déplacé et hors d'œuvre, dans ' lequel *Dom Dièguc* ne dit rien de ce qu'il doit ' dire. Mais en récompense, le critique nous ' avertit que les monologues de *Shakespeare* sont ' les seuls modèles à suivre, et qu'il ne connoit ' rien de se parfait. Il en donne un bel exemple, ' tiré de la tragédie d'*Hamlet :*

' *Oh si ma chair trop ferme, ici pouvait se fondre.*
' *Se dégéler, couler, se résoudre en rosée, &c.*

' Quelques lecteurs seront surpris, peut-être des ' jugemens de M. *Home* Lord *Makaims ;* et quel- ' ques Français pourront dire que *Gilles* dans une ' foire de province s'exprimerait avec plus de ' décence et de noblesse que le Prince *Hamlet.*— ' C'est avec le même goût et la même justesse ' qu'il trouve ce vers de Racine ridiculement am- ' poullé :

Mais tout dort, et l'armée, et les vents, et Neptune.

' M. *Home* porte ainsi sur tous les arts des juge- ' mens qui pourraient nous paraitre extraordi- ' naires. C'est un effet admirable des progrès de ' l'esprit humain, qu'aujourdhui il nous vienne ' d'Ecosse des règles de goût dans tous les arts, ' depuis le poëme épique jusqu'au jardinage. ' L'esprit humain s'étend tous les jours, et nous ' ne devons pas désespérer de recevoir bientôt des

' poétiques et dés rhétoriques des îles Orcades.
' Il est vrai qu'on aimerait mieux encore voir de
' grands artistes dans ces pays-là, que de grands
' raisonneurs sur les arts. Il est aisé de dire son
' avis sur le Tasse et l'Arioste, sur Michel-Ange
' et Raphaël ; il n'est pas si aisé de les imiter : et
' il faut avouer, qu'aujourdhui nous avons plus
' besoin d'exemples, que de préceptes, aussi bien
' en France qu'en Ecosse. Au reste, si M. *Home*
' est si sévère envers tous nos meilleurs auteurs,
' et si indulgent envers *Shakespeare*, il faut avouer
' qu'il ne traite pas mieux Virgile et Horace.
' M. *Home* donne toujours son opinion pour une
' loi, et il étend son despostisme sur tous les ob-
' jets. C'est un juge à qui toutes les causes res-
' sortissent. Ses arrêts sur l'architecture et sur les
' jardins ne nous permettent pas de douter qu'il ne
' soit de tous les magistrats d'Ecosse le mieux logé,
' et qu'il n'ait le plus beau parc. Il trouve les bos-
' quets de Versailles ridicules ; mais s'il fait jamais
' un voyage en France, on lui fera les honneurs
' de Versailles, on fera jouer les eaux pour lui,
' on le promenera dans les bosquets, et peut-être
' alors ne sera-t-il pas si dégoûté. Après cela, s'il
' se mocque des bosquets de Versailles, et des
' tragédies de *Racine*, nous le souffrirons volon-
' tiers : nous savons que chacun a son goût,' &c.
—*Lettre à un Journaliste.*

To these critical remarks of M. de Voltaire, there is nothing to reply. We can do no more

than agree cordially in the last sentiment he expresses, *que chacun a son goût.*

APPENDIX.—No. V.

Character of Lord Kames *by Dr* Reid, *in an Extract from the Dedication of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.*

" It would be ingratitude to a man whose memory I most highly respect, not to mention my obligations to the late Lord Kames, for the concern he was pleased to take in this work. Having seen a small part of it, he urged me to carry it on; took account of my progress from time to time; revised it more than once as far as it was carried before his death; and gave me his observations on it, both with respect to the matter and expression. On some points we differed in opinion, and debated them keenly, both in conversation and by many letters, without any abatement of his affection, or of the zeal for the works being

carried on and published. For he had too much liberality of mind not to allow to others the same liberty in judging which he claimed to himself. It is difficult to say, whether that worthy man was more eminent in active life or in speculation. Very rare surely have been the instances where the talents for both were united in so eminent a degree.

" His genius and industry, in many different branches of literature, will, by his works, be known to posterity. His private virtues and public spirit, his assiduity through a long and laborious life in many honourable public offices with which he was entrusted, and his zeal to encourage and promote every thing that tended to the improvement of his country, in laws, literature, commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, are best known to his friends and cotemporaries."

Extract of a Letter from Dr REID *to Mrs* DRUMMOND, *after the death of Lord* KAMES.

" I accept, dear Madam, the present you sent me *, as a testimony of your regard, and as a pre-

* A gold snuff-box.

cious relic of a man whose talents I admired, and whose virtues I honoured; a man who honoured me with a share of his conversation, and of his correspondence, which is my pride, and which gave me the best opportunity of knowing his real worth.

"I have lost in him one of the greatest comforts of my life; but his remembrance will always be dear to me, and demand my best wishes and prayers for those whom he has left behind him.

"When time has abated your just grief for the loss of such a husband, the recollection of his eminent talents, and of his public and domestic virtues, will pour balm into the wound. Friends are not lost who leave such a character behind them, and such an example to those who come after them."

APPENDIX.—NO. VI.

Three Letters from Mrs MONTAGU *to Lord* KAMES.

I. *Anticipates a visit to Blair-Drummond.*

Sandleford, August 28. 1772.

MY LORD,

As next summer and Blair-Drummond are at a great distance, it is happy for me that I have a rapid imagination, which whirls through space and time faster than the fiery-footed steads of Phœbus, whose progress may be marked by shadows and counted by clocks. I am come; I am arrived; I am actually at Blair-Drummond; I am sitting by your Lordship on the seat you marked with my name. The river is fretting over the pebbles, or foaming among the rocks; just as we human creatures are fretfully and peevishly murmuring at the little impediments, or raging and storming at the great obstacles that thwart us in the progress of life. I see Ben-Lomond lift his scornful brow, frowning with proud disdain on the vainly emu-

lating hills, and humble unaspiring vales beneath him; just emblem of human greatness, human power! Thou sendest forth the eagle and the vultur, and many a beast and bird of prey upon thy humble subjects: And shall the barren top of the hill of storms, which hurls the shivered rock, or rolls the cataract upon the fertile valley, boast of its pernicious eminence, and scorn what lies in the better mean? Let us then turn to the village Lord Kames has built. I hear the hammer of the artificers, the wheel of the spinsters, the voice of mirth, the play of children, the social greetings of friendly neighbours.—Proud castle! did sounds so cheerful echo through your walls when the Regent kept his state there? No. Envy and jealousy ran in whispers through the rooms of state; drunken riot roared in the hall; party and faction clamoured at the gate. What then is suggested from the prospect around us, but that the present state of Scotland is far happier than the former? that it is well the Highlander is come down from his forts and fastnesses, the mountains and rocks, to beat his broad-sword into plough-shares, and to cultivate instead of plunder the valleys. But best of all, that the barbarian Chieftain has left the castle where tyranny and oppression were protected, to give place to a milder Lord, who wields the sceptre of justice, instead of the iron-road of power.

Now that we are returned from our walk, I wish my imagination could farther represent to me the chapter of your book, which I know your Lordship would read to me on such an occasion. I have not, alas, the elements of which this book will be made; learning and wit, the foundation on which the structure will be raised. I can only build castles in the air. I cannot therefore at all substitute my empty visions in lieu of it. Finish your work; publish and put the world in possession of it. Till then I am uneasy and impatient.——I inclose this to our friend Dr Gregory, &c.

ELIZ. MONTAGU.

II. FROM THE SAME.

On the Death of Lord LYTTELTON.

Sandleford, October 27. 1773.

MY LORD,

With the History of Man, I dare say your Lordship has *(con amore)* written the History of Woman. I beg, that in specifying their characters, you would take notice, that time and separation do not operate on the female heart as on the male. We need not go back so far as the

time of Ulysses and Penelope to prove this. We may pass over the instances of his dalliance with the sole suitor that addressed to him, the lovely Calypso; and the constant Penelope's continued disdain of the whole herd of her pertinacious wooers. The more near and recent an example is the better; so, my Lord, we will take our own. You feel, you say, when you take up your pen to write to me, the same formality as on our first acquaintance; I, on the contrary, find my confidence in you has had time to take root. A long winter, dreary seasons, cannot blast or wither it; under its shadow I am protected from any apprehensions from your genius and learning. You appear to me in no character but that of my friend,—the sacred character of my old friend. The years of absence, the months of vacation in our correspondence, come into the account; for I remembered you, when I did not hear from you; I thought of you when I did not see you; esteem, nursed by faithful remembrance, grew up *sans* intermission: I am most sincerely rejoiced that your Lordship has completed your great work: May you long enjoy your fame; and may you see mankind derive advantage as well as pleasure from your work! The more Man understands himself, the less averse he will be to those Divine and human laws that restrain his licentious appetites. It is from ignorance of his nature he misapprehends his interest; not comprehend-

ing how he is made, he disputes the will of his Maker. I am impatient for the publication of your book, and hope your printer will make all possible haste to indulge us with it. I rejoice that it has pleased God to give you life and health to finish this great work; and I flatter myself, that though you may not again embark in so great an undertaking, so able a pen will not be consigned to indolent repose. As to my poor goose quill, it is not much to be regretted, that probably it will scribble no more. I have neither the force of good health, nor the presumption of good spirits left to animate me: without the energy of great talents, these are necessary to the task of undertaking something for the public. I have been for many months teased with a slow fever; and the loss of my excellent Friend has cast a cloud over my mind. I remember Sir William Temple says, in one of his Essays, that when he recollects how many excellent men and amiable women of his acquaintance have died before him, he is ashamed to be alive. With much more reason than Sir William Temple, whose merit I dare say was equal at least to that of any of the friends he survived, I feel this very strongly. I have lived in the most intimate connexion with some persons of the highest characters in this age; they are gone, and I remain: all that adorned me is taken away, and only a cypress wreath remains. I used to borrow some lustre

from them, but now I seem respectable (even in my own eyes) only as the mourner of departed merit. I agree with your Lordship, that I ought not to lament the death of Lord LYTTELTON on his account: His virtue could not have been more perfect in this mortal state, nor his character greater, than it was with all those whose praise could be an object to a wise and worthy man. He now reaps the full reward of those virtues, which here, though they gave him a tranquil cheerfulness amidst many vexations, and the sufferings of sickness, yet could not bring a perfect calm to the wounds his paternal affection suffered. When I consider how unhappy his former, how blessed his present condition, I am ashamed to lament him: The world has lost the best example, modest merit the most zealous protector, mankind its gentlest friend: my loss is unspeakable; but, as the friendship of so excellent a man is the best gift of God, and I am sensible I was never deserving of so great a blessing, I ought rather to offer thanks it was bestowed, than repine it was taken away; and only to beg, that by the remembrance of his precepts and example, I may derive the same helps to doing my duty in all relations of life, and social engagements, as I did from his advice. But virtue never speaks with such persuasion as when she borrows the accents of a friend. Moreover, my time in this world will probably be very short; and if

it were long, I could not forget to admire so admirable a pattern of goodness.——I ever am, my Lord, &c. &c.

ELIZ. MONTAGU.

III. FROM THE SAME.

On a Domestic Event;—and on Religious Education.

[Written within a few weeks of the death of Lord KAMES.]

Portman Square, Nov. 12. 1782.

MY LORD,

I cannot wait till I have conferred with the grave Bench of Bishops on the doctrine of your letter*, to return my warmest thanks for the kind and friendly sentiments it expresses for me, and the good domestic news which it communicates.

Mr Drummond Home's excellent choice is an event of the highest importance to your happiness, as well as his own. I have long been soli-

* See Lord KAMES's letter, to which this is an answer, at p. 320. of Vol. II.

citous, that a name to which you have given celebrity, a noble estate you have improved, and a charming place you have embellished, should be transmitted to your posterity. This wish was made of the common stuff, the hardware of this world: ambition, and the love of fame, &c. you may see, furnished, and fashioned it. By the account your Lordship and others have given me of your new connexion, many softer and sweeter blessings will flow from that alliance. She will embellish your society, and enliven your hours of retirement. When you are all well and in good spirits, she will add to your gaiety and pleasure: in the hours of sickness, she will alleviate pain by tender attentions. My amiable Miss G—— has made me know how much pleasure and comfort may be derived from a near connexion with a person, who adds to the various *agrémens* of youth, the discretion, and sober, and solid merit of a mature character. The seasons of life have been often compared to the seasons of the year, and each have their comforts. I think the calm autumn of life, as well as of the year, has many advantages. Both have a peculiar serenity, a gentle tranquillity. We are less busy and agitated, because the hopes of the spring, and the vivid delights of the summer, are over; but these tranquil seasons have their appropriate enjoyments; and a well-regulated mind sees every thing beautiful that is in the order of nature.

I hope your Lordship received my acknowledgments and thanks for your excellent sentiments on religious education. To errors, defects, and faults, in the first training up, we may often ascribe the irreligion of many persons; for, philosophically speaking, man is a religious animal. Sensible of his weakness, he is ever desirous of obtaining the assistance of a superior Being. The most ignorant are sensible, that great power and intelligence must have combined to form all they see in the creation: they wish for the protection and favour of this Great Being. Man must be much perverted before he can wish to disbelieve a God and Providence. His interest must be misrepresented to him, or he would never reject the means offered by Divine Revelation to make the Omnipotent his friend. The unsophisticated man is never an atheist. But when either erroneous impressions have been made upon the youthful mind, as where the Deity has been held forth as a wrathful being, clothed in terrors; or where he has observed, that those with whom he has lived, have not acted with any reference to a Superior Power, he is easily made the disciple of those who call themselves Freethinkers.

Our Bishops are now in their dioceses. When they return to town, I will not fail to communicate what you sent me. I cannot imagine it is calculated to give the slightest offence. Beyond

the regions of human knowledge, human authority cannot form establishments of doctrine.

I shall always be glad to find excuses to write to you. I passed the summer in Berkshire, but removed to London the first week in November. No augur ever paid more regard to the flight of birds than I do. I take a hint from the swallows to leave the country. To what region they repair, I do not know enough of their constitutions and taste to say; but I will pronounce, that for a human creature, of flimsy materials of mind and body, a capital city is the best situation. The weather has less power there; the blank and silence of the vegetable and animal world is less perceived, and there are great resources in society to prevent our feeling our own insignificance and weakness. My new house affords me many comforts; but it has lost at present its best ornament. My amiable Miss G——— is now making a visit to her family at Edinburgh; but I flatter myself she will return to me some time in the next month. In the mean while, I reflect with satisfaction on the happiness she is enjoying in her friends, and they in her. My best and most affectionate regards attend all at Blair-Drummond.——And I am, with the greatest esteem, &c.

ELIZ. MONTAGU.

APPENDIX—No. VII.

The Prayer in the Conclusion of Lord Kames's *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion.*

For do not all these wonders, O Eternal Mind, Sovereign Architect of all, form a hymn to thy praise! If in the dead inanimate works of Nature thou art seen, if in the verdure of the fields and the azure of the skies, the ignorant rustic admire thy creative power; how blind must that man be, who, contemplating his living structure, his moral frame, discerns not thy forming hand? What various and complicated machinery is here! and regulated with what exquisite art! While Man pursues happiness as his chief aim, thou bendest self-love into the social direction. Thou infusest the generous principle which makes him feel for sorrows not his own: nor feels he only, but, strange indeed! takes delight in rushing into foreign misery; and with pleasure goes to

drop the painful tear over real or imaginary woe. Thy divine hand thus formed the connecting tie, and by sympathy linked man to man; that nothing might be solitary in thy world, but all tend toward mutual association. For that great end, Man is not left to a loose or arbitrary range of will. Thy wise decree hath erected within him a throne for Virtue. There thou hast not decked her with beauty only to his admiring eye, but hast thrown around her the awful effulgence of authority divine. Her persuasions have the force of a precept; and her precepts are a law indispensable. Man feels himself bound by this law, strict and immutable. And yet the privilege of supererogating is left! a field opened for free and generous action; in which, performing a glorious course, he may attain the high reward by Thee allotted, of inward honour and self-estimation. Nothing is made superfluously severe, nothing left dangerously loose, in thy moral institution; but every active principle made to know its proper sphere. In just proportion, man's affections spread from himself to objects around him. Where the rays of affection, too widely scattered, begin to lose their warmth: collecting them again by the means of a public, a country, or the universe, Thou rekindlest the dying flame. Converging eagerly to this point, behold how intense they glow! and man, though indifferent to each remote particular, burns with zeal for the whole. All things are by Thee

pre-ordained, great Mover of all! Throughout the wide expanse, every living creature runs a destined course. While all under a law irresistible fulfil thy decrees, Man alone seems to himself exempt; free to turn and bend his course at will. Yet is he not exempt: but ministers to thy decree omnipotent, as much as the rolling sun, or ebbing flood. What strange contradictions are in thy great scheme reconciled! What glaring opposites made to agree! Necessity and liberty meet in the same agent, yet interfere not. Man, though free from constraint, is under bonds. He is a necessary agent, and yet acts with perfect liberty. Within the heart of man Thou hast placed thy lamp, to direct his otherwise uncertain steps. By this light, he is not only assured of the existence, and entertained with all the glories of the material world, but is enabled to penetrate into the recesses of nature. He perceives objects joined together by the mysterious link of cause and effect. The connecting principle, though he can never explain, he is made to perceive; and is thus instructed to refer even things unknown, to their proper origin. Endowed with a prophetic spirit, he fortells things to come. Where reason is unavailing, sense comes in aid; and bestows a power of divination, which discovers the future by the past. Thus Thou gradually liftest him up to the knowledge of Thyself. The plain and simple

sense, which in the most obvious effect reads and perceives a cause, bring him straight to Thee the First Great Cause, the Ancient of Days, the Eternal Source of all. Thou presentest thyself to us, and we cannot avoid Thee. We must doubt of our own existence, if we can doubt of thine. We see Thee by thine own light. We see Thee not existing only, but in wisdom and benevolence supreme, as in existence first. As spots in the sun's bright orb, so in the universal plan, scattered evils are lost in the blaze of superabundant goodness. Even by the research of human reason, weak as it is, those seeming evils diminish and fly away apace. Objects, supposed superfluous or noxious, have assumed a beneficial aspect. How much more, to thine all-penetrating eye, must all appear excellent and fair! It must be so.—We cannot doubt. Neither imperfection nor malice dwell with Thee. Thou appointest as salutary, what we lament as painful. Even the follies and vices of men minister to thy wise designs: and as at the beginning of days Thou sawest, so Thou seest and pronouncest still, that *every thing Thou hast made is good.*

APPENDIX.—No. VIII.

LETTER *from the Honourable* FRANCIS GARDEN *of Gardenstone to Lord* KAMES, *on the merits of the old English Drama.*

With some Additional Observations on the same Subject.

THE following Letter to Lord KAMES from his brother Judge Lord GARDENSTONE *, which con-

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* The Honourable FRANCIS GARDEN of Gardenstone, a Judge of the Courts of Session and Justiciary. He was an acute and able lawyer; of great natural eloquence; and, with much wit and humour, had a considerable acquaintance with classical and elegant literature. He was appointed King's Solicitor in 1761, and raised to the Bench in 1764. On the death of his elder brother, Alexander Garden of Troup, M. P. he succeeded, in 1785, to a very ample fortune. His tenants and dependants found him an indulgent and liberal master; and the village of Lawrencekirk, in Kincardineshire, raised by

tains much ingenious and just criticism on dramatic writing, though not referred to in the preceding Memoirs, will not be deemed foreign to the purpose of the work. It illustrates the character of both correspondents, and affords a pleasing picture of the elegant amusements with which a cultivated mind can solace itself in old age.—Lord Gardenstone was at this period in his 70th year; Lord Kames in his 85th.

To Lord KAMES.

Fountain-Bridge, March 1. 1781.

MY DEAR LORD,

A man who has no whims, is, in my opinion, a stupid man. I am sure mine are, (now at least), altogether innocent, and in some particulars, useful. With this letter, I take the liberty of sending you one specimen of those which I consider to be of the innocent kind.

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him from a few mean cottages to a large, populous and thriving baronial borough, distinguished by its industry in various branches of manufacture, is an honourable monument of his public spirit and active benevolence. Let these his merits be remembered, while his failings are humanely consigned to oblivion.

I lately, and accidentally, became acquainted with the works of an old dramatic poet, *Massinger*. He was a cotemporary of Shakespeare, Johnson, and Fletcher; and though in our days we have lost sight of him, he has, in my opinion, no small share of the merit which we still allow to those old poets of the stage. There is in his works, I think, a rich store of materials, a precious mine of dramatic entertainment, though incumbered with a mass of superfluous rubbish. He studied nature, and wrote with spirit and propriety, with a strange mixture of extravagance, and often absurdity; blemishes from which none of our old poets, Shakespeare himself included, are exempted. True critics will bestow the commendation of classical writing only on simple composition, joined to propriety of thought, and clear nervous expression. Such were, though in various degrees of excellence, the prevailing characteristics of our ancient dramatic poetry. Shakespeare stands at the head of the scale; and I believe will ever maintain that pre-eminence; *Nec ortum tale, nec oriturum.* Dryden bestows a fine encomium on Shakespeare, and in part, on his cotemporary dramatic poets. I have the passage in my memory, though I cannot recollect where it is to be found. After some things said in his own vindication, he adds:

In spite of all his pride, a secret shame
Invades his breast at Shakespeare's sacred name;
And when he hears his godlike Roman rage,
He in a just despair would quit the stage;
And, to an age less polish'd, more unskill'd
Would with disdain the foremost honours yield.
As with the greater dead he dares no strive,
He would not match his verse with those who live.
Let him retire, between two ages cast,
The first of this, the hindmost of the last.

There is uncommon merit, if I mistake not, in these lines, though they are not commonly in the mouths of our spouters in poetry.—Ben Johnson understood the art of poetry. He was not only judicious and learned, but he had a great deal of humour, and knew how to form conversations, "such as men do use," as he expresses it. Beaumont and Fletcher were joint labourers; and though much inferior to Shakespeare in power and strength of genius, and to Johnson in judgment and accuracy; yet in their comedies they have produced many natural characters, and pleasant scenes.

My author, Massinger, though now forgotten, was ranked among the great poets of that age. He was in high esteem. I take it to be certain, that Shakespeare himself on some occasions lent him assistance; and I think I can discern in some pas-

sages of his comedies, the marks of Shakespeare's peculiar genius. With this view, I beg your Lordship will make your observations on *Luke's* soliloquy (in the piece I send to you) after he has surveyed with transport the treasures in his brother's warehouse *. This speech appeared to me

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* The play here alluded to is the *City Madam*. The authors of the *Biographia Dramatica*, (Mr Baker and Mr Reed), give the following character of the piece: "This is an excellent comedy; nor can there perhaps be shewn a more "perfect knowledge of the human mind, than is apparent in "the behaviour of the City Lady and her two daughters, to "the husband's brother, who is unfortunately fallen into distress, and is become a dependant on the family. The "plot, the business, the conduct, and the language of the "piece are all admirable. Mr Love, in the year 1771, made "some alterations in it, with which it was acted at Richmond."——*Luke's* soliloquy in the original play is as follows:

Enter Luke *with a key.*

Luke 'Twas no phantastick object, but a truth,
A real truth, no dream. I did not slumber,
And could wake ever with a brooding eye
To gaze upon't! It did endure the touch.—
I saw, and felt it.—Yet what I beheld
And handled oft, did so transcend belief
(My wonder and astonishment pass'd o'er)
I faintly could give credit to my senses.
Thou dumb magician, that without a charm
Did'st make my entrance easy, to possess

so admirable, that I have ventured to make very little alteration on it. I have always thought it

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What wise men wish and toil for! *Hermes, Moly,*
Sybilla's golden bough, the great elixir,
Imagin'd only by the alchymist,
Compared with thee are shadows; thou the substance
And guardian of felicity. No marvel,
My brother made thy place of rest his bosom,
Thou being the keeper of his heart; a mistress
To be hugg'd ever.——In bye corners of
This sacred room, silver in bags heap't up,
Like billets saw'd, and ready for the fire,
Unworthy to hold fellowship with bright gold
That flow'd about the room, conceal'd itself.
There needs no artificial light; the splendour
Makes a perpetual day there; night and darkness
By that still-burning lamp for ever banished.
But when guided by that, my eyes had made
Discovery of the caskets, and they opened,
Each sparkling diamond from itself shot forth
A pyramid of flames, and in the roof
Fixed a glorious star, and made the place
Heaven's abstract, or epitome. Rubies, sapphires,
And ropes of orient pearl; these seen, I could not
But look on gold with contempt. And yet I found
(What weak credulity could have no faith in)
A treasure far exceeding these. Here lay
A manor bound fast in a skin of parchment,
The wax continuing hard, the acres melting.
Here a sure deed of gift for a market town,
If not redeem'd this day, which is not in
The unthrift's power. There being scarce one shire

a profanation in Garrick, and other modern reformers (as they are called) of old plays, to add or alter in the genuine strokes of Shakespeare; though I think they might have retrenched with judgment and propriety, when his strong luxuriancy of imagination runs to wildness. I have often thought, and indeed it is my fixed opinion, that the restoration was equally the æra of bad *morals* and of bad *taste* in England. There, therefore, I draw the line between the ancients and the moderns in English literature; and I do affirm, that England has produced no true genius in any species of poetry since that inglorious period. Milton, Dryden, and the author of *Hudibras*, were born and brought up before the Restoration. Our ancient poets, thus distinguished, drew natural characters, and imitated the conversations of real life. For one strong instance of this, take the inimitable character of *Falstaff*. It is carried on through three complete plays. He utters not one sentence that is not in the same character, or that would accord with any other character; from his first words in *Henry IV.* to *Hal*, "What time o' the "day is it, Lad?" to some of his last words in *The*

In Wales or England, where my moneys are not
Lent out at usury, the certain hook
To draw it more.——I am sublim'd! Gross earth
Supports me not. I walk on air!——Who's there?
Thieves?—— Raise the street!——Thieves!

Merry Wives of Windsor, "I do begin to perceive "that I am made an ass."

Most of our modern dramatic writers use affected language, because they have no clear ideas; and run into the regions of Invention, because they have not wisdom to discover, or genius to describe natural characters and manners. Conversation in our modern drama is much the same in all the characters. The poet studied only to be witty, and a uniform strained sprightliness of composition pervades the whole. The wise man and the fool, the old lady and the young, the fine lady and the chambermaid, the fine gentleman and the valet, all speak in the same strain, not of character, but of the poet's studied wit and composition. *Jeremy* is as witty as *Valentine*, and *Tattle* as *Scandal*. This sameness of studied wit in the dialogue is not peculiar to Congreve's plays. It prevails generally in all our comedies (tragedies I do think we have none of real excellence) since the Restoration, the period, (I cannot forbear repeating it) of incorrigible manners and vitious taste. Sir Richard Steele, in his play of *The Conscious Lovers*, attempted with some success an imitation of Terence's natural and elegant composition in his *Andria:* but he was forced to introduce the affected characters and studied buffoonery of *Tom* and *Phillis*, and the fictitious, unnatural personage of *Cimberton*, to make it pass:

—otherwise, it is my opinion a London audience would fall asleep at the exhibition of the play *.

The piece which I have attempted to alter, has, as originally written, in my opinion, many beauties, and some absurdities. I have endeavoured to preserve the former, and suppress the latter; and on the whole, to make it a regular, uniform comedy, without any mixture, on my part, of studied modern wit. You may believe that, on more accounts than one, I cannot intend it for publication, but only for private amusement to myself, and some select friends, who may relish this sort of writing, as I do; or if they should differ from me, I shall not incur the public censure, but be corrected by a private and friendly admonition. I submit it to your Lordship's judg-

* The general justness of these observations must be acknowledged; but the particular criticism on these characters in the *Conscious Lovers* may admit of some dispute. The characters of *Tom* and *Phillis*, are perfectly consonant to nature, and are drawn with a very happy pencil: besides, they sustain useful parts in the drama. As to *Cimberton*, though a character exaggerated beyond nature, he is drawn with great consistency of appropriate features, and has much of that ludicrous absurdity or strong *vis comica*, characteristic of the older drama, which the writer justly prefers to the modern. The writer's own observation, that a modern audience would fall asleep at the exhibition of this play, were it not for those characters, is indeed the best criterion of their merit, and utility in the drama.

ment and taste, in which I have the greatest confidence; and I beg that you will correct and censure it with all possible freedom. I cannot be hurt, having neither fame nor profit at stake. Yet I must observe, in justification of my attempt, that some of our best modern plays have been formed in this manner from plays in foreign language, or from our own old plays. I will specify a few instances. I have already mentioned Steele's *Conscious Lovers*. The witty Buckingham formed one of the most entertaining comedies now acted on our stage, from the *The Chances* of Beaumont and Fletcher; and that, without the aid of affected wit. One of Colley Cibber's best comedies is *The Non-Juror*, formed upon Moliere's *Tartuffe;* and exceptionable only in as far as he departs from the simplicity and good sense of his original, to gratify the vitious taste of his times for studied and affected wit in comedy. The same observation is applicable to Fielding's *Miser*, closely imitated from Moliere's *Avare*. I conclude this point with a great and ancient authority, which I know will please *you* better than all the rest. Horace says,

Difficile est propriè communia dicere, tuque
Rectiùs Iliacum carmen deducis in actum
Quàm si proferres ignota indictaque priùs.

Lord Roscommon has singular merit in his Translation of *Horace's Art of Poetry*, which preserves more of the simplicity, elegance, and sense of the original, than almost any other version of the classical writings I know, in the English language.——I beg leave to give you his translation of this passage:

> New subjects are not easily explained,
> And you had better use a well-known theme,
> Than trust to an invention of your own:
> For what originally others writ
> May be so well disguis'd, and so improv'd,
> That with some justice it may pass for yours.

Before I conclude this private address to your Lordship, I cannot forbear to quote a fine passage from my favourite poet, Virgil. Of one of his celebrated characters he says,

> ——————— *Nec tarda senectus*
> *Debilitat vires animi, mutatve vigorem.*

If, in addressing you, I did not with singular pleasure consider this as an apt quotation, I would not have written to you this letter, nor have given you the trouble of examining the piece, which, in so far as I have preserved the original, is, I do think, a neglected work of genius; and I will not, with affected modesty, conceal my opinion, that my own part of it has some little share of

judgment and taste.——But I must repeat my request, that you will criticise it with a freedom unrestrained by any tenderness or good-nature to the author. For though I must own, that your unbiassed commendation would highly please me, yet your free censure will not mortify me; because I have the agreeable vanity to believe, (and in this I do not wish, if mistaken, to be undeceived,) that in more material particulars I possess some share of your good opinion.——I am, my dear Lord, with most sincere esteem, your faithful, humble servant,

FRA. GARDEN.

THE preceding remarks are the result of that genuine good taste, which arises more from an innate sensibility to what is just and natural, beautiful or sublime, in the productions of the imagination, that from an acquaintance with critical rules, or the habit of measuring such productions by the laws of regular composition. Where the former quality prevails, the latter will ever maintain a subordinate rank: But as the one is a very rare gift of Nature, while the other may be acquired with moderate study by any person endowed with a competent share of understanding, it is no

wonder that such productions of the drama as are framed according to those artificial rules, which serve as an useful canon of judgment where the natural perception is wanting, should meet with more partizans, than those higher efforts of untutored genius, which are capable of a just estimation only by a kindred spirit to that which produced them.

This consideration enables us easily to account for the circumstance so often noticed as extraordinary,—the neglect shewn to some of the noblest productions of genius, at their first appearance; and the small portion of fame which such authors as Shakespeare and Milton enjoyed in their own lifetime, compared to that high and universal celebrity to which they have since attained. The great mass of the public, incapable of appreciating, by any native perception of the sublime and beautiful, those high efforts of genius, required to be instructed and disciplined by the few critics of genuine taste, whose literary celebrity entitled them to guide the popular opinion. A fame thus acquired is of slow growth, and often retarded, not less by the dogmatism of false taste, than by the envious malignity of rivals in the same path of literature; but these obstacles once overcome, it is permanent and universal.

If such, however, are the difficulties to be surmounted, and such the ordeal to be undergone by

a genius of the first rank before he attains to his just estimation, and reaps the full harvest of his fame, it is a natural consequence, that many a most deserving candidate for the prize of reputation, yields to the severity of the trial; and because not quite entitled to the highest honours, is unjustly deprived of that inferior share of praise which was truly due to his merits. Such has assuredly been the lot of many of our old English dramatic poets. The same excellencies of thought and expression which we idolize in the dramas of *Shakespeare*, are to be found, if not so frequent, yet in no scanty measure, in the plays of *Beaumont and Fletcher*, *Massinger* and *Shirley*: but they want the stamp of that great name, which has not only given additional lustre to beauties, but too frequently canonized deformities.

There is something generous in the attempt of the writer of the preceding letter to do justice to neglected merit. The *City Madam* of Massinger, is one of the best of that author's comedies; and with a very few alterations and corrections, might be happily revived on the modern stage. Massinger excelled in the construction of his plots; and, what is rarely to be found in the older dramatic writers, there is scarcely a single scene in any of his pieces that has not a direct tendency to produce the catastrophe. He is likewise a very skilful delineator of character,

Every personage in his plays has his appropriate manners, and is in himself a well-finished portrait, possessing those features of individuality, which we never fail to perceive in real life, but which it requires the greatest skill to transfer to the creations of fancy. It is in this rare quality that the older English dramatists eminently excel the moderns. If the latter shall be allowed to surpass the former in the structure of their fables, which are more consonant to truth, and more artful and ingenious, without the aid of improbable fictions; it must on the other hand be admitted, that in the skilful painting of the characters, they are as signally inferior to their predecessors. In the modern plays, the persons, singly considered, have seldom any appropriate or distinct features: A modern dramatic writer gives to his persons only the general characteristics of the class to which they belong. They are heroes or poltroons, sages or fools, honest men or knaves; and their actions and discourse are sufficiently consonant to those general characteristics. You hear them expressing either noble or base designs, wise or foolish sentiments, honest purposes, or schemes of villany: they justly excite your approbation or your contempt, your esteem or your aversion. But make this hero or this sage, this poltroon or this villain the object of a close examination: compare him with

others of his class, and you find he has no individual features: he is incapable of a particular description. He is not therefore a natural character: he resembles one of those masks or vizors worn by the Greek and Roman actors, each of which was painted to exhibit the characteristics of a particular passion: and the same mask was put on, as often as the same passion was to be represented.

But there is no criticism, (as Mr Hume well observes,) which can be useful, without descending to particulars; and I willingly indulge myself on a favourite subject, in giving a few examples in justification of these remarks.

The passion of avarice has its general characteristics; and it requires no extraordinary talent to exhibit them in the drama, by the medium of such sentiments and actions as suit the general character of a miser. But it will be confessed, that the poet who could pen the following scene between a miser and his son, possessed the power of giving distinct and appropriate features to his persons, and of copying nature with a master's hand.

Philargyrus. My son to tutor me!—Know your obedience
And question not my will.

Parthenius. Sir, Were I one
Whom want compell'd to wish a full possession

Of what is yours; or had I ever numbered
Your years, or thought you liv'd too long, with reason
You then might nourish ill opinions of me:
Or did the suit that I prefer to you
Concern myself, and aim'd not at your good,
You might deny, and I sit down with patience,
And after, never press you.

Philarg. I' the name of Pluto,
What would'st thou have me do?

Parthen. Right to yourself;
Or suffer me to do it.——Can you imagine
This nasty-hat, this tatter'd cloak, rent shoe,
This sordid linen, can become the master
Of your fair fortunes, whose superfluous means
(Though I were burthensome) could clothe you in
The costliest Persian silks, studded with jewels,
The spoils of provinces; and every day
Fresh change of Tyrian purple?

Philarg. Out upon thee!
My moneys in my coffers melt to hear thee.
Purple! hence Prodigal! shall I make my mercer
Or tailor my heir, or see my jeweller purchase?
No, I hate pride.

Parthen. Yet decency would do well:
Though for your outside you will not be alter'd,
Let me prevail so far yet, as to win you

Not to deny your belly nourishment;
Neither to think you've feasted when t'is cramm'd
With mouldy barley bread, onions and leeks,
And the drink of bondmen, water.

Philarg. Would'st thou have me
Be an *Apicius* or a *Lucullus*,
And riot out my 'state in curious sauces?
Wise Nature with a little is contented;
And following her my guide, I cannot err.

Parthen. But you destroy Her, in your want of care
(I blush to see and speak it,) to maintain her
In perfect health and vigour, when you suffer
(Frighted with the charge of physic) rheums, catarrhs,
The scurf, ache in your bones, to grow upon you,
And hasten on your fate with too much sparing;
When a cheap purge, a vomit, and good diet
May lengthen it. Give me but leave to send
The Emperor's doctor to you.

Philarg. I'll be borne first
Half-rotten to the fire that must consume me,
E'er his pills, cordials, his electuaries,
His syrups, juleps, bezoar stone, or his
Imagin'd unicorn's horn comes in my belly:
My mouth shall be a draught first. 'Tis resolv'd.
No! I'll not lessen my dear golden heap,
Which every hour increasing, does renew
My youth, my vigour;——but if lessen'd, then——

Then my poor heartstrings crack.——Let me enjoy it,
And brood o'ert while I live;—it being my life,
My soul, my all.——But when I turn to dust,
And part from what is more esteem'd by me
Than all the gods Rome's thousand altars smoke to,
Inherit thou my adoration of it,
And, like me, serve my idol.

[*Exit Philargyras.*

Parthen. What a strange torture
Is avarice to itself! What man looks on
Such a penurious spectacle, but must
Know what the fable meant of Tantalus,
Or the ass whose back is crack'd with curious viands,
Yet feeds on thistles. Some course I must take,
To make my father know what cruelty
He uses on himself.——

MASSINGER'S *Roman Actor*, Act. II. Sc. 1.*

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* As Massinger was a good scholar, it is not improbable, that, in composing the foregoing scene, he might have had in his eye a fine passage from one of the low comedies of *Menander*.

Εν Δυσκόλω.

Περὶ χρημάτων λαλεῖς, ἀβυβαίᾳ πραγμάτῃ·
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶσθα τοῦτο παραμυθοῦμαί σοι
Εἰς πάντα τὸν χρόνον, φίλαυτε, μηδενί
Ἀλλῳ μιᾶ δὲ δεῖ· αὐτὸς ὢν δὲ πένητος·
Εἰ δ' ἀδὲν αὐτῷ, τῆς τύχης δὲ παῖ' ἔχεις,
Τί ἂν φθονοίης, ὦ πατερ, τούτων τινί;

This, it will be allowed, is a high-finished portrait; and to vary the picture in any other dramatic character representative of the same passion, must, at first view, appear an arduous task. It would have proved so to a poet of inferior powers to Massinger's; but he has atchieved it with success. His character of *Sir Giles Over-*

Ἀντὶ γαρ ἄλλῳ τυχὸν ἀναζιω τινί
Παραλωμένη σε πάλιν προσθήσει πάλιν.
Διόπερ ἐγὼ σε φημι δεῖν ὅσου χρέους
Εἴ κυριος, χρῆσθαι σε γυναίοις, πιστῆς,
Αὐλον ἐπιωμρεῖν πασιν, ἐυπόρους ποιεῖν,
Ὡς ἂν δύνῃ πλείστους διὰ σαύλου· τοῦτο γὰρ
Ἀθανάτου ἐστι, κ'ἂν πόλι πλείστας τύχῃς,
Ἐκεῖθεν ἔσται τ'αὐτὸ τοῦτό σοι πάλιν.

Thus loosely translated into English:

Rich in ignoble pelf, but poor in soul,
Could but that gold thou covet'st make thee blest,
In God's name hoard it; cherish't as thy life.
Fortune thou own'st may change, and give thy wealth
To others;—ne'er to those who worse could use it.
But worthless as it is while unenjoyed,
Why grudge a pittance to the starving wretch;
Why grudge it on thyself, the verier wretch,
With all thy countless treasures? Oh, for shame!
Live as thou should'st, right nobly: make thee blest,
In blessing others, wealth's first, best employ,
And high prerogative. Thus fortune's shafts
Secure thou may'st defy, while man's thy friend.

reach, exhibits avarice, combined with inhumanity and brutal insolence.

To have a usurer that starves himself
And wears a cloak of one and twenty years,
Or a suit of fourteen groats, bought of the hangman;
To grow rich, and then purchase, is too common:
But this *Sir Giles* feeds high, keeps many servants,
Who must at his command do any outrage;
Rich in his habit, vast in his expences,
Yet he, to admiration, still increases
In wealth and lordships.

Over-reach, and Marrall his Attorney.

Over-reach. He's gone, I warrant thee;—this commission crush'd him.

Marrall. Your worship has the way on't, and ne'er miss
To squeeze these unthrifts into air: and yet,
The chop-fall'n Justice did his part, returning
For your advantage the certificate,
Against his conscience and his knowledge too;
(With your good favour) to the utter ruin
Of the poor farmer.

Over. 'Twas for these good ends
I made him a Justice. He that bribes his belly,
Is certain to command his soul.

Mar. I wonder
(Still with your licence) why your worship, having
The power to put this thin-gut in commission,
You are not in't yourself.

Over. Thou art a fool:
In being out of office, I am out of danger;
Where, if I were a Justice, besides the trouble,
I might, or out of wilfulness, or error,
Run myself finely into a *præmunire*;
And so become a prey to the informer.
No.——I'll have none on't; 'tis enough I keep
Greedy at my devotion; so he serve
My purposes, let him hang, or damn, I care not.
Friendship,—'tis but a word.

Mar. You are all wisdom.

Over. I would be worldly wise—for the other wisdom,
That does prescribe us a well-govern'd life,
And to do right to others, as ourselves,
I value not an atom.

Mar. What course take you,
(With your good patience) to hedge in the manor
Of your neighbour, Master *Frugal*? as 'tis said,
He will not sell, nor borrow, nor exchange;
And his land lying in the midst of your many lordships
Is a foul blemish.

Over. I have thought on't, *Marrall*;
And it shall take. I must have all men sellers,
And I the only purchaser.

Mar. 'Tis most fit, Sir.

Over. I'll therefore buy some cottage near his manor;
Which done, I'll make my men break down his fences;
Ride o'er his standing corn, and in the night,
Set fire on his barns—break his cattle's legs.
These trespasses draw on suits; and suits expences;
Which I can spare, but will soon beggar him.
When I have harried him thus, two or three years,
Though he sue *in forma pauperis*, in spite
Of all his thrift and care, he'll grow behind-hand.

Mar. The best I ever heard! I could adore you.

Over. Then, with the favour of my man of law,
I will pretend some title: Want will force him
To put it to arbitrement: Then, if he sell
For half the value, he shall have ready money,
And I possess his land.

Mar. 'Tis above wonder!
Well-born was apt to sell, and needed not
These fine arts, Sir, to hook him in.

Over. Well thought on.——
This varlet, *Well-born*, lives too long to upraid me

With my close cheat put on him; Will not cold
Nor hunger kill him?

Mar. I know not what to think on't:
I have us'd all means; and the last night I caus'd
His host the tapster turn him out of doors;
And have been since with all your friends and tenants,
And, on the forfeit of your favour, charg'd them,
Though a crust of mouldy bread would keep him from
starving;
Yet they should not relieve him. This is done, Sir.

Over. That was something, *Marrall*; but thou must
go farther;
And suddenly, *Marrall*.

Mar. Where, and when you please, Sir.

Over. I would have thee seek him out: and if thou
canst,
Persuade him that 'tis better steal than beg;
Then, if I prove he has but robb'd a hen-roost,——
Not all the world shall save him from the gallows.
Do any thing to work him to despair,
And 'tis thy masterpiece.

Mar. I'll do my best, Sir.

Over. I am now on my main work, with the Lord
Lovell,
The gallant-minded popular Lord *Lovell*;

The minion of the people's love. I hear
He's come into the country; and my aims are
To insinuate myself into his knowledge,
And then invite him to my house.

Mar. I have you;
This points at my young Mistress.

Over. She must part with
That humble title, and write *Honourable,*
Right Honourable, Marrall! my Right Honourable
Daughter!
If all I have, or e'er shall get, will do it.
I will have her well attended; There are Ladies
Of Errant Knights decay'd, and brought so low,
That fair cast clothes and meat will gladly serve her.
And 'tis my glory, though I come from the city,
To have their issue whom I have undone,
To kneel to mine, as bond-slaves.

Mar. 'Tis fit state, Sir,

Over. And therefore, I'll not have a chambermaid
That ties her shoes, or any meaner office,
But such whose fathers were *Right Worshipful.*
'Tis a rich man's pride! there having ever been
More than a feud, a strange antipathy
Between us and true gentry.

A New Way to Pay Old Debts,
Act II. Sc. 1.

But it is not alone in the exquisite delineation of character, that the Plays of Massinger, of Shirley, and of Beaumont and Fletcher, approach to the merits of Shakespeare. They rival him often in that forcible eloquence and glowing diction, which is the natural expression of the greater passions; and that high spirit of poetry, which consists in the use and adaptation of just, noble and striking figures, which kindle the reader's enthusiasm, while they delight his imagination. I shall give a few specimens from each of these authors, without regard to method.

——————————— A lethargy!
Rouse up thy spirit, man, and shake it off. ——
A noble soul is like a ship at sea,
That sleeps at anchor when the ocean's calm;
But when it rages, and the wind blows high,
He cuts his way with skill and majesty.

BEAUMONT & FLETCHER'S *Honest Man's Fortune*, Act IV. Sc. 1.

In the following speech of *Archas*, an old General, unthankfully treated for his past services, and deprived of all employment by his ungrateful Sovereign, we trace a similarity of thought to one of the noblest passages in Shakespeare's *Othello*.

——————————Glorious war, farewell!
Thou child of honour, and ambitious thoughts,
Begot in blood, and nurs'd with kingdom's groans:
Thou golden danger, courted by thy followers,
A long farewell I give thee! Noble arms,
You ribs for mighty minds, you iron houses,
Made to defy the thunder-claps of fortune,
Rust and consuming time must now dwell with ye.
And, thou, good sword, that knews't the way to conquest;
Upon whose fatal edge despair and death dwelt;
That when I shook thee thus, foreshew'd destruction;
Sleep now from blood, and grace my monument!
Farewell my eagle! When thou flew'st, whole armies
Have stoop'd below thee:—at passage I have seen thee
Ruffle the Tartars as they fled thy fury;
And bang them up together; as a tassell
Upon the stretch a flock of fearful pigeons.
I yet remember when the Volga curl'd,
The aged Volga, when he heav'd his head up
And rais'd his waters high, to see the ruins,
The ruins our swords made, the bloody ruins;
Then flew this bird of honour, bravely, Gentlemen;
——But these must be forgotten; so must these too,
And all that tend to arms, by me, for ever!
Take them, you holy men! My vow take with them,
Never to wear them more: Trophies I give them,
And sacred rites of war, to adorn the temple.
There let them hang, to tell the world their master
Is now devotion's soldier, fit for prayer.——

Why do you hang your heads? Why look you sad, friends?
I am not dying yet.——

BEAUMONT & FLETCHER'S *Loyal Subject*,
Act I. Sc. 3.

The following scene from *Shirley*, where the Princess *Fioretta* goes to the prison to wreak her vengeance on *Juliana*, whom she supposed her rival, affords a noble specimen of sublime and pathetic eloquence.

Juliana. Ha! 'Tis the Princess *Fioretta.*

Fioretta. Can you direct me, Madam, how I may
Speak with the noble lady *Juliana*?

Jul. I can instruct you, Madam, where to find
A miserable woman of that name.

Fior. Where?

Jul. Here.

Fior. Do not deceive me.
I came to visit her whom the Duke's love
And confluence of glories must create
A Dutchess; to whose greatness I must pay
My adoration.

Jul. Do not mock her, Madam,
To whose undoing nothing wants but death:

Let not my sin, which cannot hope your pardon,
Make you forget your virtue. Princely natures,
As they are next to forms angelical,
Shew the wretch acts of pity, not derision,
When she is fall'n from innocence.

Fior. Do you know me?

Jul. For the most injured Princess, *Fioretta.*

Fior. You must know more.——I come to take revenge,
And kill thee!

Jul. Thus, I kneel to meet your wounds,
And shall account the drops my proud veins weep
Spent for my cure. Oh Madam! you are not cruel,——
You have too soft, too merciful a look:——
When you see me, your countenance should wear
Upon it all the terrors that pale men
Can apprehend from the wild face of war,
A civil war, that wo'not spare the womb
That groan'd and gave it life.——This would become you:
Or fancy meagre famine, when she hunts
With hollow eyes, and teeth able to grind
A rock of adamant to dust; or what
Complexion the devouring pest should have,
Were it to take a shape; and when you put
Their horrors in your visage, look on me.

Fior. What hath prepar'd this bold resolve?

Jul. A hope
To be your sacrifice: I was not before
Without a wish to see myself thus laid,
And at your feet to beg you would destroy me.

Fior. Canst thou so easily consent to die,
And know not whether afterwards this guilt
Would fling thy wand'ring soul?

Jul. Yes.——I would pray,
And ask yourself, and the wrong'd world forgiveness. [*Weeps.*]

Fior. Why didst thou use me thus?

Jul. I could, if you
Durst hear me, say something perhaps would take
Your charity.——Do you weep, gentle Madam?
And not one crimson drop from me, to wait
Upon those precious showers! Not to invite
Your patience upon the lost *Juliana*,
But to call back your tears into their spring,
And stay the weeping stream, I can inform you,
The Duke looks on me now with eyes of anger;
I have no interest in a thought from him,
That is not armed with hate and scorn against me.

Fior. This will undo my pity, and assure me
Thou hast all this while dissembled with my justice.

Jul. I would I might as soon invest my soul
With my first purity, as clear this truth;
Or would the loss of him were all that sits
Heavy upon my heart: I cannot hope
For comfort in delays of death, and dare
Attend you to him, though it more undo me.

SHIRLEY'S *Imposture*, Act. V.

The same luxuriancy of poetic fancy, frequently tinctured with conceit and quaintness, which we observe in Shakespeare, is equally remarkable in the poets of the same school.

Though I have lost my fortune, and lost you,
For a worthy father; yet I will not lose
My former virtue; my integrity
Shall not yet forsake me: But as the wild ivy
Spreads and thrives better in some piteous ruin
Of tower or defaced temple, than it does
Planted by a new building, so shall I
Make my adversity my instrument
To wind me up into a full content.

BEAUMONT & FLETCHER'S *Fair Maid of the Inn.*

Viola. Woman, they say, was only made of Man:
Methinks 'tis strange they should be so unlike!
It may be, all the best was ta'en away
To make the woman, and the naught was left
Behind with him. I'll sit me down and weep.

All things have cast me from them, but the earth.——
The evening comes, and every little flower
Drops now, as well as I.

BEAUMONT & FLETCHER'S *Coxcomb*, Act. III.

I close these illustrations * with a specimen of comic dialogue, from a cotemporary writer, *Mar-*

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* In an ingenious Essay on the writings of Massinger, by Dr FERRIAR, prefixed to a new and valuable edition of the poet's works by W. GIFFORD, Esq., the following passage, while it touches the chief characteristic excellence of the old English comedy, assigns a very probable cause for the deficiency in that respect in the modern drama, and the consequent inferiority of its productions.

" The neglect of our old comedies seems to arise from " other causes than from the employment of blank verse in " their dialogue; for in general, its construction is so natural, " that in the mouth of a good actor, it runs into elegant " prose. The frequent delineations of perishable manners " in our old comedy have occasioned this neglect; and we " may foresee the fate of our present fashionable pieces, in " that which has attended Johnson's, Fletcher's, and Massin- " ger's. ——The changes of manners have necessarily pro- " duced very remarkable effects on theatrical performances. " In proportion as our best writers are further removed from " the present times, they exhibit bolder and more diversi- " fied characters, because the prevailing manners admitted a " fuller display of sentiments in the common intercourse of " life. Our own times, in which the intention of polite edu- " cation is to produce a general, uniform manner, afford " little diversity of character for the stage. Our dramatists, " therefore, mark the distinctions of their characters, by in-

ston, whose singular merit it was, (like the Greek *Menander's*,) that, with a rich luxuriancy of fancy, and an easy vein of wit and humour, his page is never polluted with indecency, or stained with ribaldry and scurrility. The fruitless studies of scholastic sophistry were never more justly or ingeniously satirized than in the following passage:

> I was a scholar: seven useful springs
> Did I deflower in quotations
> Of cross'd opinions 'bout the soul of man.
> The more I learn'd, the more I learn to doubt:
> Knowledge and wit, faith's foes, turn faith about.
> Nay mark:—*Delight*, my spaniel, slept; whilst I paus'd
> leaves,
> Toss'd o'er by dunces; por'd on the old print
> Of titled words; and still my spaniel slept:
> Whilst I wasted lamp-oil, bated my flesh,
> Shrunk up my veins;—and still my spaniel slept.——
> And still I held converse with *Zabarell*,

"cidents more than by sentiments, and abound more in "striking situations than interesting dialogue. In the old "comedy, the catastrophe is occasioned, in general, by a "change in the mind of some principal character, artfully "prepared, and cautiously conducted: in the modern, the "unfolding of the plot is effected by the overturning of a "screen, the opening of a door, or some other equally dig-"nified machine."

Aquinas, Scotus, and the musty saws
Of ancient *Donate;*—still my spaniel slept.——
Still on went I.—First, *An sit anima?*
Then, an it were mortal. O hold, hold,——
At that, they're at brain-buffets;—fallen by the ears
Again pell-mell together;—still my spaniel slept.——
Then, whether 'twere corporeal, local, fix'd,
Ex traduce? But whether't had free-will
Or no, the philosophers
Stood banding factions, all so strongly propp'd
I stagger'd; knew not which was firmer part,
But thought, quoted, read, observ'd, and pryed,
Stuff'd noting-books;—and still my spaniel slept.——
At length he wak'd, and yawn'd; and, by yon sky!
For aught I know, he knew as much as I.

MARSTON'S *What you will.*

These are a very few, out of the numberless specimens that might be given, of the merits of those too much neglected writers.——Our own times have seen a noble attempt to revive the taste for those peculiar and striking excellencies of the old English drama, without any of its impurities, and chastened by the correction of its extravagancies, both of plot and manners, in the admirable *Plays* of *Miss Joanna Baillie.* It requires no great sagacity to foresee, that a much higher measure of reputation awaits these productions of true genius, than they have yet attained to.

APPENDIX.—NO. IX.

I HAVE mentioned that Lord Kames was in the habit of frequent and familiar correspondence with his bookseller Mr Creech. As these letters regarded chiefly matters of business relative to the publication of his different works, and corrections on the several editions, they are not of a nature generally interesting. The following short letters are, however, selected as characteristic of the writer. The first, and the two last, display some very amiable features of his disposition.

To Mr CREECH.

Blair-Drummond, April 12. 1778.

GOOD MR CREECH,

I have received the copy of *Elements of Criticism* for correcting upon. It has been long of coming: there is however no time lost; for, ever since I left town, I have been extremely busy

about my *Opus magnum* *, which is now very near a close, leaving me nothing to do but polishing, which never has an end. I guess I shall be ready with the fourth part of the *Elements* before I go to the circuit; so that you may prepare for printing next week, if you please; for I can hold the press going from week to week.

In the Preface to *Camden's Britannia*, I am informed, that mention is made of *Ossian*, as an Irish poet. Be so good as look for the passage, and let me have a copy of it; for it will be one link in the chain of evidence.

In the fifth volume of Dodsley's *Collection of Poems*, there is one by T***** D***** at page 226. which will make a good illustration of a new rule of criticism that is to go into the new edition of the *Elements*. But as it is unfavourable to the author of that poem, I wish to know whether he be alive; for I would not willingly give pain.—Might you not come out here, any time in the end of a week, for two or three days?—— Yours,

HENRY HOME.

Send me out the second volume of Sir John Dalrymple.

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* His *Sketches of the History of Man.*

To Mr CREECH.

Blair-Drummond, October 20. 1773.

DEAR SIR,

You shall not have it in your power to accuse me of lingering. On the contrary, perhaps you may soon have reason to think me too active a correspondent. I give you notice, that I have been ready for you, several weeks ago; particularly, that I have put the last hand to the First Book. I wish to hear from you what is passing in the world, especially with regard to literature. Tell my good friend Mr Alexander Adam *, that I have ready for him a most exact definition of a verb, which even Mr Harris has missed.

Remember your promised visit here. I shall be disappointed if you do not come. I love a walk; and I love a sensible companion to walk with.——Yours,

HENRY HOME.

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* Dr ALEXANDER ADAM, Rector of the High School of Edinburgh, author of *Roman Antiquities, A Summary of Geography and History, A Classical Latin Dictionary, Classical Biography,* and other very useful works; a man equally respectable for his worth and learning, and for whom Lord Kames entertained a sincere friendship and esteem.

To Mr CREECH.

Blair-Drummond, November 3. 1773.

FRIEND CREECH,

When I am labouring for you, with more assiduity than ever I did for myself, (since my labour to enlarge the volume is an advantage to you alone,) I take it horridly amiss that you never once inquired for me; though I traced you in several places of my neighbourhood, and particularly sent you word to Glasgow that I wanted to see you. For that reason I take the first opportunity of venting my wrath against you. How in the name of goodness came it into your head, or rather I suppose into the heads of your coadjutors,—for you have something like humanity in you,—to place in the very front of your Edinburgh Magazine a most illiberal and cruel attack upon our worthy friend Adam, under the signature of *Busby?* Some country schoolmaster, I suppose, who is envious of his betters, and has contracted a habit of sourness and ill temper, which he gratifies in whipping his poor boys without mercy. And this ill-natured performance your editors think proper to praise to the skies:—a bad specimen of them, indeed. And

the best of it is, that these remarks are almost every one of them erroneous; one or two at the most doubtful. To be sure, our friend Adam's definitions may be nibbled at; for it is no easy matter to give a good definition. I warned him of this, but my warning came too late. But to the point: Send me no more of those Magazines, for they are not to my liking. So much for scolding: and having discharged my bile, I must now end by telling you, that, after all, I find I must be friends with you, when I go to town, for I cannot live conveniently without you.

HENRY HOME.

P. S. I return Duchal's Sermons. They are good rational discourses, perfectly free from cant; but they have no *onction*, as the French call it; nothing that either touches the passions, or interests the fancy. They are cold and inanimate, as all popular discourses must be, in which simple truths and plain duties are held forth, without any painting to please the imagination, or enthusiasm to warm the heart.

Lord Kames had unconsciously offended Dr T. BLACKLOCK, (an ingenious and worthy man, for whom he entertained a sincere esteem,) by the following passage of his *Sketches*, in that chapter which treats of the *Progress of Manners*: "Man,

" an imitative animal, is prone to copy others;
" and by imitation, external behaviour is nearly
" uniform among those who study to be agree-
" able; witness people of fashion in France. I
" am acquainted with a blind man, who, with-
" out moving his feet, is constantly balancing
" from side to side, excited probably by some
" internal impulse. Had he been endowed with
" eye-sight, he would have imitated the man-
" ners of others." The following letter expresses Lord Kames's regret upon this subject, in terms that do honour to the writer's humanity:

To Mr CREECH.

Blair-Drummond, March 23. 1774.

DEAR SIR,

A few weeks more will bring me back to town, when there are many subjects on which I shall be glad to converse with you. But there is one which cannot suffer that delay, as it makes me truly uneasy. You did well to send me the letter relative to Dr Blacklock; and I must beg of you, that you will immediately wait on that gentleman in my name, and assure him of my particular regard, and that I have ever esteemed him both as a man of genius and a good man. He knows indeed that I have endeavoured to

serve him, by recommending young men to his care in attending their education. You may tell him, at the same time, that I heartily regret that I should involuntarily have given him any offence:—I say involuntarily; for I would rather have put my manuscript in the fire, than I would have knowingly treated him ill, or any man of virtue. But it never entered into my mind, that it was treating him ill, to describe what I took to be a natural consequence of blindness; especially as I named no person. However, if you perceive that he is still any way disobliged, or uneasy, you may assure him from me, that the passage shall be struck out in any new edition of the book. Yours,

HENRY HOME.

APPENDIX.—No. X.

Lord KAMES *to* WILLIAM MOREHEAD, *Esq.*

Blair-Drummond, November 8. 1777.

SIR,

This family are extremely sensible of your obliging, and indeed kindly invitation, which would be not a little agreeable, to correct the depression of this bad weather. But we are fixed at home to-morrow, by an expected visit, which we would not avoid; and we have been long engaged to dine at Kinneil on Monday, and to be there all night. At the same time, your invitation shall not be neglected when an opportunity offers.

I have been busy at my Principles of Equity, for a new edition, ever since I returned from the circuit; and I never laboured harder upon any subject.

That book I always considered as my chief performance; and the advance of ten years of my life since the last publication, made me doubt-

ful whether I would be able to make any improvement. It delighted me to find my mental faculties still entire, even so much as to be able to detect several errors that had escaped in the former edition. You cannot conceive my satisfaction in detecting these errors myself, instead of having my reputation wounded by their being detected after my death. I write this to you, because I know you will sympathize with me. And now I hope to leave behind me a correct edition of the Principles of Equity, that will leave little room for *(Illegible.)*

As you write nothing about Mrs Morehead, we take it for granted that she is in a firm state of health.——Yours affectionately,

HENRY HOME.

Epitaphs on Lord KAMES *and Mrs* HOME DRUMMOND.

Sacred to the Memory of
HENRY HOME OF KAMES,
Judge in the Courts of Session and Justiciary,
Who will long be esteemed
An Honour to his Country:
As a Writer, celebrated for literary Excellence,
In a variety of Subjects,
Law, Criticism, Morality and Agriculture:
As a Man, endowed with the Powers
Of an active, vigorous, penetrating Mind;
Ardent in the Pursuit of Knowledge;
In Industry and Application, indefatigable;
Eminently distinguished by public Spirit,
Love of his Country,
And zeal for promoting
Every useful and laudable Undertaking;
The Friend and Protector of Genius,
Even in the humble Spheres of Life:
As a Judge, of inflexible Integrity;
In private life, faithful to the duties
Of a Husband, a Father, and a Citizen;
Warm in his Temper, but candid and just;
In Friendship steady, affectionate, and sincere.
After a long Life
Spent in the highest Estimation,
And ever devoted to honourable Pursuits,
He died December 27. 1782,
Aged 86 years.

Sacred also to the Memory of his Spouse,

AGATHA DRUMMOND, HEIRESS of BLAIR-DRUMMOND,

Who, possessed of strong Understanding,
Joined with those graces of a cultivated Mind,
Liveliness of Fancy, and Power of Wit,
Which would have enabled her to shine
In every Sphere of exalted Society,
Dedicated all her Talents
To the Virtues of a domestic Life.

As a Wife, a Mother, and a Friend,
Esteemed and beloved by all who knew her;
She died June 18. 1795.
Aged 84 Years.

To the Memory of those Excellent Parents,
Whose Remains lie here
Entombed in the same Sepulchre,
GEORGE DRUMMOND HOME of Blair-Drummond,
Their only Son,
Hath erected this Monument
As a small Token of filial Veneration *.

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* These Epitaphs were written by Dr BLAIR.

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

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